Lithuanian Papers

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ANNUAL JOURNAL OF THE LITHUANIAN STUDIES
SOCIETY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TASMANIA



• **Making Crosses in Lithuania**
(Story, Page 37).
Illustration by Edward Radclyffe.

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PHOTO: PETER WEST / AUSPIC.

I am delighted to congratulate the Lithuanian Studies Society for publishing the 1994 edition of the* Lithuanian Papers *and welcome this opportunity to send my greetings to readers.

The Lithuanian Studies Society was established in 1987 and its success in promoting academic interest in matters Lithuanian is an example to us all. From modest beginnings as a students' organisation, the Society is now effectively a Centre for Lithuanian Studies in Australia. It has achieved this status on meagre resources and by cooperating in a focussed manner with selected faculties each year. This strategic approach has gained it international recognition from a range of institutions, including more recently the World Bank.

The* Lithuanian Papers *are now regarded as the leading English-language Lithuanian periodical in the Southern Hemisphere.

The Society's achievements are a good example of the Commonwealth's Productivity Diversity concept at work. Here we have local expertise bringing together the academic, cultural and linguistic resources of our Tasmanian population to satisfy both domestic and international demand.

Once again congratulations.

P.J. KEATING, Prime Minister of Australia.

Lithuania — Main Facts

Location — On eastern shores of the Baltic sea.

Area — 67,788 square kilometres (26,173 square miles). Greatest distances: east-west 336 kilometres (210 miles), north-south192 kilometres (120 miles).

Climate — Temperate, mean annual temperature 5°C (41°F).

Capital — Vilnius (500,000 inhabitants).

National holiday — February 16 — day of restoration of Lithuania's independence (1918).

Population — 3,539,000, urban — 64%, rural — 35%.

National Language — Lithuanian.

Religion — Catholic 85%.

Nationality — Lithuanian 80%.

Agriculture — 24% — barley, cattle, flax, oats, pigs, potatoes, rye, sheep, wheat.

Forest Products — birch, fir, pine.

Manufacturing and Processing — agricultural and forest products, electrical products, machinery.

National Flag — three horizontal stripes, coloured (from top to bottom) yellow, green, red.

Map reprinted from *Lithuania/Lietuva*, 1/91.
Text by Katherine Ross, repr. from *Lithuania in 1991*.

Lithuania and the New Order in Europe

Robert F. MILLER
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In the years since independence and the final disintegration of the USSR, Lithuania has undergone a number of changes in her domestic and international orientation. The transformations involved are similar to those in the other Baltic States and in other countries of the former Soviet empire in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as some of the states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The transition - to full independence, political democracy and a functioning market economy - has not been easy. The legacy of economic dependence on Russia and Moscow's continuing attempts to limit their freedom of action in foreign policy have affected most of these countries to some degree; in some cases Russian behaviour has impeded the patterns of change; in others, it has, paradoxically, perhaps accelerated them.

For a number of reasons the transformation process has been especially complicated in the Baltic States. Because of their heavy dependence on Russian energy and raw material supplies and technological inputs, as well as markets for their agricultural and industrial exports, these countries have been particularly vulnerable to economic pressures from Moscow. Moreover, the presence in each of them of substantial ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking populations has constituted an important source of leverage against them. Russia has not hesitated to use these people, in the name of concern for their human and civil rights, as hostages for the withdrawal of the large Russian military contingents stationed on their territory and for other forms of pressure on their domestic and foreign policies.

Each of the Baltic States has, like other countries of the former Soviet empire, its own specific strengths and weaknesses in handling these kinds of issues. Lithuania is certainly no exception. While it has a significantly smaller Russian-speaking

population than either Latvia or Estonia (about 10% as against 30-45%) and has accordingly been less constrained by this 'hostage' factor in dealing with Russia on troop withdrawals and other bilateral issues, Lithuania has an additional problem with its large ethnic Polish population (some 280,000). They have been a source of complications in relations with neighbouring Poland, whose support is valuable for responding to Russian pressures. Furthermore, the large Russian enclave of Kaliningrad Oblast (the old German province of East Prussia - 'Krolewicz' to the Poles), adjacent to Lithuanian territory along the Baltic Sea coast and accessible by land and air to Russia mainly through Lithuania, has become a serious security issue for all Baltic Sea states, but especially for Lithuania. The situation there and the opportunities the enclave presents for Russian military-strategic ambitions are somewhat analogous to Ukraine's problems over the Crimea.

The initial euphoria over Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin's speedy recognition of the three Baltic States' secession from the USSR in the aftermath of the August 1991 putsch and his apparent willingness to accord them full diplomatic relations unfortunately proved to be rather short-lived. Once Yeltsin had got rid of his rival Gorbachev and the USSR's old central communist power apparatus, the imperatives of Russia's geostrategic position (as interpreted by his military advisers and his increasingly 'patriotic' democratic political entourage) gradually began to reassert themselves. The Minister of Defence of the then still existing Soviet Army, General Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, in mid-December 1991, linked the removal of Soviet troops from the Baltic States - an obviously vital question to them - to the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, which was not scheduled to be completed until the end of 1994.[1] In the event, the last Russian troops did leave Lithuania by the end of August 1993, but the process of negotiating this outcome was tortuous and often painful. Russian troops are still in Estonia, and agreement on this and related issues between Moscow and Tallinn has yet to be concluded.

The actual number of Soviet troops in Lithuania was a closely

[1] LUFKENS, Matthias, "They came in two days, why can't they leave tomorrow?" *The Baltic Independent*, 6-12 December 1991, pp.1-2.

guarded secret - one evidently never shared with the Soviet Lithuanian authorities. Some sources have mentioned a figure of 40,000; others, 100,000.[2] The withdrawal from Lithuania and Latvia was scheduled to begin in February 1992, before the conclusion of a final agreement on the matter with the Russian Government.[3] However, the withdrawal process was never a smooth one, and its periodic interruptions and threatened reinforcements of remaining forces became part of the armoury of standard Russian tactics in negotiations with what came to be called by Moscow the 'near abroad' (*blizhnee zarubezh'e* - the successor states of the former USSR, even those like the three Baltic States which had not joined the CIS.

The eventually successful completion of the withdrawal process was undoubtedly linked to the replacement of Vytautas Landsbergis by former reform-communist boss Algirdas Brazauskas as a result of the parliamentary elections in the (Northern) autumn of 1992. The circumstances of this radical change in the domestic political situation have been described elsewhere. Suffice it to note that the failure of Landsbergis's efforts to solve Lithuania's worsening economic problems was a major factor in the popular vote for the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party of Brazauskas, who was evidently considered better able to handle negotiations with Russia on economic as well as political issues.[4]

Whether because of the Brazauskas factor, the smaller Russian population or the strategic position of the country *vis-a-vis* the

[2] LUFKENS,, loc. cit., gives the higher figure; the lower figure is mentioned in 'Republika Litewska', *Rzeczpospolita*, 11-12 April 1992, p.8.

[3] LASHKEVICH, Nikolai and LITVINOVA, Irina, 'V fevrale nachnetsia vyvod voisk iz stran Baltii', *Izvestiia*, 3 February 1992, p.1.

[4] It is undoubtedly significant that the results of a survey of attitudes in the Baltic states carried out by a group from the University of Strathlyde in Scotland in 1993 showed that Lithuanians were substantially more negative on the economic situation in their country than were Latvians and Estonians. They were also more positive than their neighbours on the merits of the old Soviet economic system. Richard ROSE and MALEY William, *Natonalities in the Baltic States: A survey Study*, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1994, tables on pp.27-28.

Kaliningrad enclave, Russia had apparently decided by the autumn of 1992 to treat Lithuania as a 'model' case to inspire Latvia and Estonia to be more flexible in addressing the troop withdrawal and related issues. In September of that year the Lithuanian and Russian defence ministers had worked out a framework for withdrawal, to be completed by the end of August 1993.[5] Barely a month later and again in March 1993, the Russians nevertheless seemingly reneged on the agreement and suspended troop withdrawals throughout the Baltic States. The reason was apparently to increase pressure on the three states to make further concessions to what was becoming an increasingly nationalistic and revisionist Russian foreign policy line.

Indeed, by the end of 1992 it was clear that the domestic political situation in Russia was forcing even the more liberal, Western-oriented economic and foreign policy reformers to harden their line. In a speech to an assembly of foreign ministers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) on 14 December 1992 in Stockholm, Kozyrev warned that Russia's foreign policy was about to change, partly in response to what he saw as intemperate actions on the part of NATO and the new concern of Russia for its role in Asia. Among the actions he specifically condemned were NATO's alleged plans to enhance its military presence in the Baltic States. He further asserted that the space of the former USSR must be considered a zone of Russia's special interest and not a region where 'CSCE norms are wholly applicable'. Kozyrev returned to the podium an hour later and informed the shocked audience that he had been joking; that this was the kind of policy that could be expected if Yeltsin's enemies came to power.[6] Events in the following year showed that Kozyrev had not been joking and that he himself would be carrying out a similar policy, albeit with less dramatic language, to what he attributed to the conservative Russian nationalists.

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5 BODIE, William C. *Moscow's "Near Abroad"": Security Policy in Post-Soviet Europe*, McNair Paper 16. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1994, pp.12-13. Bodie quotes Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin as calling the 8/8/92 agreement a "model" for the region.

6 'Kozyrev's Dramatization', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research*

• Lithuania's President Algirdas Brazauskas addressing the Council of Europe at Strasbourg on 14 April *(above)*; and relaxing at a country fair *(below)*. Photos EPA/AFP Christophe Simon, and *The Baltic Independent*.

Perhaps the most important and threatening aspect of the change in Russian foreign policy from Lithuania's point of view was the adoption of a special line, with special institutional arrangements, for dealing with the 'near abroad' - the countries of the former USSR. Even though Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia had explicitly refused to join the CIS, it was clear that they were considered part of the near abroad, as the zone where Russia was demanding special rights in matters of national security and the treatment of Russian-speaking settlers.

Nevertheless, the signals were often mixed. The special status of the Baltic States among the countries of the near abroad was suggested by the fact that Russian diplomats assigned to them were paid entirely in hard currencies, whereas those sent to the CIS countries were paid partly in roubles.[7] For another thing, the Baltic States were excluded from the list of countries of the near abroad where Russian military bases were to be established by bilateral agreements.[8] Despite the lack of a formal treaty and a number of difficulties in bilateral negotiations, Russian troops completed their withdrawal from Lithuania ahead of the 31 August 1993 deadline. Brazauskas's moderate line on dealing with Russia drew praise from Russian parliamentary foreign policy leader, the hard-line nationalist Yevgeny Ambartsumov, who called Lithuania an example for other former Soviet republics in dealing with Russia.[9] In return, in recognition of Yeltsin's generally moderate line on relations with Lithuania, President Brazauskas warmly supported him in his showdown with the Russian parliament in September and October. Finally, the era of relative 'good feelings' between Russia and Lithuania reached a

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Report, Vol.1, No.50, 18 December 1992, p.49.

[7] CHECKEL, Jeff, 'Russian Foreign Policy: Back to the Future?', *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol.1, No.41, 16 October 1994, p.24.

[8] The international outcry over Yeltsin's initial inclusion on 6 April 1994 of Latvia as the location of one of the thirty bases to be established in the near abroad forced the Russian foreign and defence ministries to issue a denial that any of the Baltic states were intended. FOYE, Stephen, 'Confusion in Moscow on Military Base Directive', *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No.67, 8 April 1994.

[9] GIRNIUS, Saulius, 'Russian Parliament Delegation Visits Lithuania', *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No.169, 3 September 1993.

climax on 18 November 1993 with the signing of a series of bilateral agreements by Prime Ministers Chernomyrdin and Šleževičius in Vilnius. The agreements included most-favoured-nation treatment of Lithuanian exports, social guarantees for former service personnel, pensions, and transport and communications, as well as the transit of Russian troops from Germany through Lithuanian territory and transportation to and from Kaliningrad Oblast.[10]

That was the good news. The bad news was that, apart from the withdrawal of her troops from Lithuania, Russia continuously violated both the spirit and the letter of many of these agreements. Lithuania is still waiting for the application of MFN treatment to her exports to Russia. Russian military officials continually violate Lithuanian air and ground space in resupplying their forces in Kaliningrad, which gradually became a cause of concern not only to Lithuania, but also to Poland, the Scandinavian countries and NATO, as many of the troops withdrawn from the Baltic States were simply shifted there. The new edition of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation further complicates the issue by making a point of claiming a peace-keeping role for the Russian army in the countries of the near abroad.[11] The deployment of some 250,000 Russian ground, sea and air forces in Kaliningrad is obviously consistent with such a role and constitutes something of an anomaly in Europe today. It may also reflect an attempt by Moscow to circumvent the provisions of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement of 1990. Lithuania has received support from officials of the European Union in her efforts to work toward the demilitarisation of Kaliningrad, but Moscow seems to be ignoring Western concerns on the issue.[12]

The abrupt turn of Russian foreign and domestic policy toward the

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[10] GIRNIUS, Saulius, 'Lithuanian-Russian Agreements Signed', *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No.222, 19 November 1993.

[11] '"Detailed Account" of Russia's Military Doctrine', Translated from *Rossiiskie Vesti*, 18 November 1993, in *Reuters Textline* 1 December 1993.

[12] See, for example, the report of the visit of the President of the European Parliament, Egon Klepsch, to Vilnius in May-June 1994. GIRNIUS, Saulius, 'President of European Parliament in Lithuania', *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No.104, 3 June 1994.

right as a result of the 12 December elections, which saw Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal-Democratic Party receive the largest party vote, caused great consternation in Lithuania and the other Baltic States. The apparent willingness of Yeltsin and Kozyrev to abide by the apparent decision of the electorate to push a harder line in defence of Russian national interests in both the near and far abroad and to pay even greater heed to the fate of Russian settlers in the near abroad caused Lithuania to reassess her entire policy towards Russia. The toughening of the Russian line could be seen also in strengthened efforts to have countries of the near abroad accept the concept of dual Russian and local citizenship for Russian settlers on their territory.[13] The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry officially rejected the concept of the 'near abroad'[14], and warned of the new dangers of Russian expansionism. Lithuania was indeed the first of the successor states of the former USSR to sign up for NATO's 'partnership for peace' (PFP) program. Russian efforts to cajole or threaten her former satellites not to join the PFP proved counter-productive.

Brazauskas had evidently at last concluded that the concessions he had been making to Russia to gain better treatment for Lithuania provided little protection against Russian expansionism and arbitrariness. Indeed, his domestic opponents, and not only those on the right, were becoming increasingly restive over his policies on such matters as transit rights and the whole question of Kaliningrad Oblast.[15] Bilateral relations between two such

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13 See Kozyrev's remarks on dual citizenship in an interview on 17 December, shortly after the elections. Ostankino TV, carried by BBC Monitoring Service, 'Russian Foreign Minister on Threat of Fascism and Russian Foreign Policy', *Reuters Textline*, 19 December 1993.

14 LASHKEVICH, Nikolai, 'Litva napugana i meniaet vneshnepoliticheskie orientiry ...', *Izvestiia*, 22 January 1994, p.4.

15 LASHKEVICH, Nikolai, 'Prezident tolkaet stranu v lapy "russkogo medvedia", utverzhdaet litovskaia oppozitsiia', *Izvestiia*, 16 April 1994, p.3. On 24 March, Prime Minister Šleževičius complained that the Russian authorities in Kaliningrad were demanding unilateral concessions from Lithuania, and that Russia was trying to link the implementation of the MFN treaty with the Kaliningrad question - a linkage which Šleževičius rejected. BBC Monitoring Service, 'Premier Claims that Russia Wants Unilateral Concessions on Kaliningrad', *Reuters Textline*, 28 March 1994.

unequal partners as Lithuania and Russia, Brazauskas evidently concluded, could never provide much military security for the weaker partner; hence his turning toward the West.

Lithuania has also intensified its efforts to reduce dependence on Russian goodwill in other spheres, most notably the economy. Energy dependence on the RF is particularly dangerous, as recent experience has shown. The Šleževičius Government has been trying to procure crude oil supplies for the Mažeikiai refinery complex from non-Russian sources, as the opposition has been demanding, but without paying too high a financial price.[16] However, continuing Russian evasiveness on trade and other issues has undoubtedly raised the size of the price premium that Vilnius is willing to pay to secure greater independence. Russian recalcitrance has also increased the sense of urgency in seeking entry to Western economic organisations. In June 1994 Lithuania was preparing to initial a free-trade treaty with the European Community, of which it hoped to become an associate member by the end of the year.[17]

The worsening of relations with Russia has also had the effect of impelling Lithuania to improve relations with Poland. The Poles evidently had similar sentiments and for the same reasons. In the recent past, in the course of negotiations between the two countries, the Poles had accused the Lithuanians of an obsession with historical issues to the detriment of current matters in their relationship.[18] There was a certain amount of truth in such charges. One of the main sticking points in negotiations on a state treaty with Poland had been Polish refusal specifically to repudiate the 1920 seizure of Vilnius by Polish General Lucjan Żeligowski and its incorporation into pre-war Poland.

Another contentious issue was the treatment of the large Polish

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16 LASHKEVICH, Nikolai, 'Litva pytaetsia uiti ot energeticheskoi zavisimosti', *Izvestiia*, 17 February 1994, pp.1-2.

17 GIRNIUS, Saulius, 'Lithuania, Estonia Near EU Trade Accords', *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No.106, 7 June 1994.

18 See, for example, NOWAKOWSKI, Jerzy Marek, 'Wezel do rozwiazania', *Rzecpospolita*, 11-12 April 1992, p.8.

• **President Walęsa *(left)* was greeted in Vilnius by Lithuanian V.I.P.s, including President Brazauskas *(third from left)* and the Chairman of the Lithuanian Episcopal Conference, Archbishop A. Bačkis *(right, with his back to the camera).***
Photo: Marius Baranauskas / *Mūsų Pastogė*.

• **Lithuanians are actively restoring their churches and opther national treasures. *Pictured:* The interior of St Jacob's church in Švėkšnai.** Photo: R. Tarvydas.

communities in Vilnius and two other regions, which had proven, in the March 1991 referendum on the territorial integrity of the USSR, to be decidedly unenthusiastic about the prospect of Lithuanian independence. These communities had elected ethnic Polish majorities to their local councils, which had subsequently been dissolved on grounds of electoral fraud by the Lithuanian authorities. Despite strong pressures from Warsaw, new elections were long delayed, and Lithuania had justifiably complained of Polish interference in her internal affairs.

Thanks largely to the new assertiveness of Russian foreign policy and its apparent threat to both Polish and Lithuanian security, the long-awaited Polish-Lithuanian friendship treaty was finally signed during a visit by President Lech Walęsa to Vilnius on 26 April 1994. Although both sides expressed regret for past disagreements and the use of force in settling them, nothing specific was mentioned on the crisis over Vilnius in 1919-20. Both sides agreed to be bound by international standards on the treatment of ethnic minorities and confirmed current borders. Poland had in effect renounced any special claims to the allegiance of ethnic Poles in Lithuania and the territories in which they resided.[19]

As in the case of Poland and other countries of the former Soviet empire and Russia's other close neighbours, the perceived dangers from Moscow magnified by the results of the December 1993 elections had thus had a clarifying effect on Lithuanian foreign-policy making.[20] In a live radio broadcast of the debate on foreign policy in the Lithuanian parliament on 22 December, President Brazauskas outlined the three main priorities of Lithuanian foreign policy in the following order: 1)'increasing cooperation' between the Baltic States and the members of the

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[19] VINTON, Louisa, 'Polish-Lithuanian Treaty Signed', *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No.80, 27 April 1994.

[20] The title of an article by well known Polish former dissident and now editor of the most popular Polish daily *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Adam Michnik, 'Zhirinovsky - mon amour', is a good illustration of the 'clarifying role' that Zhirinovsky's elector success had had on the thinking of Poland and her neighbours concerning the dangers of what he calls Russia's 'nihilism'. Translated in *The Guardian* and reprinted in *Reuters Textline*, 17 January 1994.

Nordic Council; 2) 'closer integration' of Lithuania into European economic, political, cultural and military structures; 3) the maintenance of normal relations with neighbouring states. He denied that relations with Russia were tense and sought mutually acceptable agreements on military transit through Lithuania to Kaliningrad, but hoped that the Oblast would be demilitarised.[21]

In summation, Lithuania has since achieving independence had to walk a tightrope in its relations with the Russian Federation. Largely thanks to the moderation and flexibility of President Brazauskas, who, as part of the old Soviet ruling establishment, had plenty of experience in dealing with Moscow, she was able to accomplish the vital objective of the withdrawal of Russian troops earlier and seemingly with less difficulty than her two Baltic neighbours. In the longer run, however, Lithuania remains as vulnerable as they are to the increasing assertiveness and resortionist ambitions of the Russian Federation. Brazauskas has ultimately come to realise that Lithuanian political and economic security are better served by closer involvement in the multilateral organisations of the West and the Nordic countries than by any special bilateral relationship with Russia. Nevertheless, the demonstrated ambivalence of the West, especially the US, toward commitments that might antagonise Moscow and disrupt the cherished 'partnership' with a supposedly transformed Russia suggests that Lithuania will have to continue to pay serious attention to the sensibilities of her powerful and unpredictable neighbour to the East in making whatever arrangements she can in the West. Like many of the smaller states of the former Soviet empire, Lithuania must pay the price of her unfortunate geographic situation.

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[21] GIRNIUS, Saulius, 'Lithuania's Foreign Policy', *RFE/RL Daily Report*, No.245, 23 December 1993.

Lithuania's Economic Restructuring

Raphael SHEN, S.J. and Angela EATON
University of Detroit

Lithuania was a predominantly agriculture-based economy prior to annexation, with fledgling industries based on this maturing primary sector. It enjoyed years of tranquil existence until 1940 when Moscow forcibly transformed it into a Socialist Republic of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Lithuania lost its political and economic independence. Its pre-annexation development path, uniquely suited to its indigenous conditions, was altered by the FSU's economic needs and political objectives. Vytautas Landsbergis guided Lithuania's *Sąjūdis* movement in the late 1980s and reclaimed the nation's independence from the FSU on March 11, 1990. By then Lithuania's economy had for decades been suffering from severe structural deformities and functional deficiencies.

Economy Under the FSU

Forced integration of Lithuania into the FSU operated on two major fronts:

(1) on the political front, Moscow arrested, deported and executed opponents to annexation. For ethnic integration, plan-designed emigration of Lithuanians to other republics flowed concurrently with immigration of non-natives. All key positions in political and economic spheres were held by non natives and a small number of Lithuanians with apparent loyalty to Moscow.

(2) on the economic end of the spectrum, Moscow nationalized Lithuania's private farms, appropriated industrial complexes and confiscated commercial and residential properties. National currency was abolished and Lithuania's central bank became a branch bank of Moscow's "All Union Banks".

Moscow's economic and political objectives dictated all major

investment and production decisions in Lithuania. Collectives and state farms replaced family farming, while plan-designed industrialization of Lithuania led to heavy investments in non-traditional industries, artificially transforming Lithuania's economy into a predominantly industrial producer.

Sovietization of Lithuania's economy severed all earlier commercial ties with the West. Lithuania's economy became wholly dependent on the central planners in Moscow for input supplies and output distribution, reducing the previously market-based Lithuanian economy into a rigidly controlled subservient entity in service of Moscow's political and economic objectives.

Economic Reform

Needing political assurances and financial assistance from the West upon regaining independence, Lithuania turned to market economies of the West for advice and support. Western economies promised assistance with the condition that Lithuania's reform program secured prior approval from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF prevailed on the Lithuanian government to adopt a reform program that was comparable to the *shock therapy* approach implemented in Poland. In essence, the IMF demanded a thorough and speedy restructuring of Lithuania's economy - from that of a rigidly controlled command system to that of a purely market driven one.

Major components of the approved reform program included: price liberalization, property restitution, enterprise privatization, subsidy removal, reestablishment of the central bank, re-issuance of an independent currency, strict fiscal and monetary policies, and liberalized foreign trade and investment policies.

A Critique of the Reform Program

The IMF-endorsed reform package was theoretically correct. Theoretical correctness, however, does not guarantee structural soundness nor functional feasibility in the Lithuanian setting of the early 1990s. For successes of market economies are the cumulative effects of a long, evolutionary process. Essential ingredients for a successful systematic transformation require time

and effort for their cultivation, development, and maturation. Leaders of Lithuania's new government, coaxed and counselled by IMF experts, narrowly focused on where the economy should reach, overlooking where it had come from. The cogent question of whether - within the prescribed time frame - the reform approach was, or was not, capable of accomplishing their grandiosely conceived goals was not adequately addressed.

Reform architects overlooked the relevance of economic subjects' ability to constructively respond to radical changes. They disregarded the fact that, after half a century's *modus vivendi* under the socialist system, the mould for *modus operandi* was cast. Lithuania's management and work force could not readily discard or unlearn practices inherited from the Soviet system for the past fifty years. Further, Lithuania lacked, and still lacks, adequate infrastructural support system, essential market institutions, and a corps of entrepreneurial management, all of which are *enabling* elements for economic subjects to make rational choices and to respond productively to reform measures.

In brief, proponents of a speedy systemic transformation for Lithuania ignored the absence of ingredients which are indispensable for the proper functioning of the envisioned market forces.

A Question

Advocates of the IMF-espoused approach to economic restructuring in Lithuania used examples of successes in Poland as validation of the approach's merits. They point to Poland as having the fastest growth rate among former CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) countries. They assert that foreign investors view Poland as a prime site for investment opportunities.

The question is: If Poland's *shock therapy* was so appropriate, then why did the Polish voters return the previously disgraced Communists to a majority position in the nation's recent parliamentary election? Similarly, if the IMF-sanctioned reform approach in Lithuania was correct, then why did the LDDP party win "surprise", yet easy, victories at the polls in the nation's 1992 and 1993 elections?

• Open air markets have sprung up all over Lithuania. *Pictured:* Part of the central market in the town of Ukmergé.

Photo: R. Tarvydas.

The fact is that systemic deficiencies exist even in the most developed of economies. Yet advisers from outside of Lithuania would never have either dreamed of, or dared to suggest, reform measures of a radical nature to their respective home governments. The question is then: Why do unto Lithuania what they would not do to themselves?

Short Term Reform Outcomes

There are areas of qualified success. There have also been avoidable macro dislocations and undue social/economic costs. Only a select few are given a cursory review below.

Banking and Currency Reform. The Lithuanian government reestablished the Bank of Lithuania on February 13, 1990, and assumed ownership of the FSU's 29 Gosbank branches in Lithuania. Reform defined the central bank's functions, authorized private banking operations, discontinued the central bank's earlier commercial activities, and initiated the process of privatizing some of the state banks. A new banking structure is now in place. However, owing to the lack of private savings, among others, the traditional functions of a central bank cannot as yet be effectively exercised.

Lithuania introduced the nation's provisional currency, the *talonas* on May 1, 1992 and its permanent currency the *litas,* in June 1993. Replacing rubles with a Lithuanian currency was a precondition to economic independence. Lithuania had to quickly isolate itself from the adverse effects of chaotic economic developments in other republics of the FSU. Although large quantities of counterfeit *talonas* and *litas* appeared as quickly as the legitimate currency was introduced, the Bank of Lithuania has at least been able to maintain the latter's stability against convertible currencies, giving confidence to prospective investors from abroad and economic subjects at home over the new currency's trustworthiness.

Price Liberalization. The moderate 16.1 percent price increases in 1990 owed primarily to the government's continued price controls. The accelerated price liberalization program, which removed prices from governmental controls, propelled the inflation rate to 224.7 percent in 1991 and 1,130 percent in 1992. Meanwhile increases in nominal wages lagged steadily behind price increases, inflicting severe losses on wage earners' real incomes. Savers lost their life savings. Pensioners saw security evaporate. Despite the consumers' rapidly dwindling purchasing powers, inflation still hovered around 120 percent between March 1993 and March 1994. Bankruptcies rose and unemployment rates climbed. Unbearable economic hardships led many to reminisce the "good old days" of bygone years when there was still some semblance of economic stability and job security.

Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade. Lithuania adopted foreign investment and foreign trade policies more liberal than those in the West. As of December 1993, foreign investment in Lithuania totalled 120.7 million *litas,* with more than three-fourth originating from the non-CIS republics. Prospective foreign investors do view Lithuania as a promising market for investment ventures. However, better synchronized and more concerted efforts by the government are in order for actualizing the potentials of foreign capital inflows.

The Lithuanian government simultaneously sought expanded trading relations with Western markets, erecting no trade barriers and minimizing import/export restrictions. The most prominent aspect of trade reform achievement so far resides in the nation's steadily growing export sector to markets of the West. Trade surplus against hard currency markets has been on a steady rise. Yet, despite the sector's promising growth, Lithuania still depends heavily on republics of the FSU for factor and product markets.

In brief, systemic transformation in Lithuania has accomplished qualified successes in select areas. The process has also resulted in extensive macro dislocations, inflicting intense hardships on the general public.

The chief architect of *shock therapy* for Poland once proudly quoted a Russian proverb to justify his tenet, "One does not take two jumps over a deep chasm". A similar "jump" approach was urged upon Lithuania, but a more successful solution would have been a bridge between the old command system and the new market system.

A Concluding Remark

Lithuania's efforts at a systemic transformation would have been more orderly and constructive if the ensuing fundamentals had been taken into due account prior to reform implementation:

- reform policies are rational only to the extent that they can effectively summon forth positive responses from micro economic entities;

- reform programs must aim at minimizing avoidable macro dislocations which may alienate the citizens of Lithuania;

- reform designers must effectively promote the belief that an average participant at least has a chance of surviving the transformation process, plus, with personal efforts, *can* win handsomely in this new game of the market;

- economic entities can and will respond constructively when policy measures are internally consistent, logically sequential, functionally operative and when *enabling* conditions are adequately present;

- such conditions and environs reach beyond quantifiable financial, technical, and infrastructural resources. They include the concepts of feasibility, opportunities, and self worth in a newly introduced, social, economic setting;

- economic performance is a function of interconnected social, economic, cultural, historical, and political forces of a given people. One force influences as well as is overshadowed or enlightened by the others. Reform architects must recognize the other forces' influences on the development of market institutions; and,

- decision makers must recognize and accept the reality of existing limitations, while proceeding with flexible resolve.

In conclusion, the *shock* approach to a systemic transformation in Lithuania has achieved qualified successes in select domains. It has also incurred high social and economic costs, a significant portion of which could have been either mitigated or even neutralized. The people of Lithuania deserve better than being treated as objects of experiment in the name of theoretical correctness. A text-book approach to economic restructuring is inappropriate in any of the newly liberalized economies. Unfortunately, Lithuania's general public has been paying a steep price for it.

Raphael SHEN is a Jesuit priest and a Professor of Economics at the University of Detroit.
Angela EATON is an Insignis scholarship student at the University and is his graduate assistant.

Out of the Catacombs

The renaissance of the Lithuanian Roman Catholic Church

Rūta B. VIRKUTIS
New York

The Roman Catholic Church of Lithuania, while liberated from the Soviet governmental repression it endured for decades, nevertheless faces numerous challenges in contemporary Lithuania, many of which stem from the damage done by over 50 years of communist attempts at atheistic indoctrination of the population.

Once the initial euphoria over the fall of communism faded, the Church in Lithuania found itself facing a long and difficult road ahead - a severe shortage of clergy, a largely indifferent population, and only the most meagre material resources with which to begin rebuilding. Nevertheless, they are forging ahead and overcoming obstacle after obstacle.

One of the most crucial problems, the shortage of priests, is being addressed in a number of ways. The existing situation is a direct consequence of Soviet policies of persecution directed at the Church. Over one-fourth of Lithuania's pre-war clergy, numbering over 1500, was executed or exiled and strict government limits were imposed on acceptance to the single seminary which continued to educate men for the priesthood. As of October, 1992 (the latest date for which formal statistics are available), there were a total of 686 priests in Lithuania, averaging 60 years in age. Of the country's 675 Catholic parishes, only 453 have their own resident clergy, with the remainder being served by priests travelling from neighbouring parishes.

The only seminary which remained open throughout the Soviet occupation, located in Kaunas, currently has 175 candidates studying for the priesthood. Two additional seminaries are also in operation now - one in Telšiai, with 74 students, and one in Vilnius, which just opened its doors last autumn with the

admittance of 22 young men. Therefore, the shortage of clergy is a problem on its way to improvement; but only time will rectify the situation, re-inforced by a continued emphasis on vocations. This is needed to ensure that there are sufficient numbers of new priests being ordained to replace the many current clergymen entering retirement.

A greater challenge lies in the problem of education and evangelization of a people who lack a basic foundation in the principles of the faith, have largely grown indifferent or feel that the Church is not in touch with their concerns. The greatest efforts in this area are being focused on Lithuania's young people, those in many cases most difficult to reach due to the prevalence of an extreme materialism which has accompanied the beginnings of the free market system and the presence of numerous sects well financed and trained in the art of attracting youth.

Despite these numerous challenges, much has already been done and new programs continue to be planned and implemented. In addition to the education offered by the seminaries, other institutions of higher education have established departments to educate and train the laity for an active role in the Church.

• **The Pope's visit in September, 1993 was an inspirational experience for the Lithuanian people.** Photo: *The Observer.*

Among them are: the Vytautas Magnus University Faculty of Philosophy and Theology, which is graduating its first class this year; the Vilnius University Religious Research and Studies Centre; and the Vilnius Pedagogical University's Department of Religious Education.

The Catholic Youth Association "*Ateitis*" (trans.-"future") is active throughout the country at the high school and college levels and is focused on Catholic leadership training. There are catechetical centres in each of the six dioceses working to develop curricula and implement educational programs as well as to provide training to religious teachers working in the public schools, where religion is now taught. In addition, more than 15 Catholic schools have been opened in various regions and another 15 Catholic pre-schools are working with the youngest children.

Efforts are being made to reach the adult public - particularly those whose entire education was completed during the period of Soviet occupation, known as the "lost generations" - through the mass media. A number of Catholic periodicals (weeklies and monthlies) are being published and, while their circulation remains rather small, interest is growing. Additionally, a television studio has been established with the assistance of the U.S. National Conference of Catholic Bishops to produce high quality Catholic programming. At present, a half-hour broadcast is aired weekly and expansion is planned to include the production of video educational materials for use in parishes, schools, and other fora. Daily one-hour radio programs are compiled and broadcast by a Catholic studio in Vilnius, reaching over a quarter of a million Lithuanians.

Also of great significance as a driving force in the rebirth of the Church in Lithuania are the nations' woman religious, forced to go completely underground during the Soviet occupation. There are over 1000 religious sisters in Lithuania, primarily working in religious education and evangelization programs and in various branches of social service such as homes for the elderly, orphanages, soup kitchens, hospitals, etc. The 17 existing orders which were active in pre-war Lithuania and the underground Church are receiving much assistance in formally re-establishing themselves from Lithuanian women religious in the diaspora. Several additional orders are in the early stages of organization.

The Catholic social service organization "Caritas" is very active and widespread in Lithuania, maintaining chapters in virtually every parish and larger coordinating bodies in each diocese and centrally, in the city of Kaunas. In many cities and towns, Caritas is the primary force at work on social and family issues including various forms of assistance to the needy, psychological counselling and family therapy, instruction in natural family planning, pro-life activism, etc.

A source of great encouragement to all of these efforts was the visit of the Holy Father to Lithuania in September of 1993. The visit itself as well as the planning and coordination of the program drew in both governmental and private organizations as well as a large contingent of volunteers. It was both spiritually and organizationally an important inspirational and learning experience for the Lithuanian people and a source of encouragement for continued work in the Church.

The election of the Archbishop of Vilnius, Audrys Bačkis, as the President of the national Bishops' Conference in October of 1993 is also a significant step for the positive future development of the Lithuanian Catholic Church. Archbishop Backis, formerly a member of the Vatican diplomatic corps, is forward-looking, rich in experience, and fully committed to implementing the teachings of Vatican II, previously virtually unheard of and only recently begun to be studied in Lithuania.

Having traversed the first, and perhaps some of the most difficult, miles on the road to renewal, the primary concern of the Church in Lithuania for the near future is to insure that the positive trends continue and the necessary resources are available to continue the work already underway in all of the areas mentioned.

Rūta B. VIRKUTIS is Executive Director of Lithuanian Catholic Religious Aid, in New York.



The churches of Vilnius. by Vida Kabaila.

Letters to the Editor

Book

Your book, *Lithuania in 1991*, certainly recaptures the drama and poignancy of the country's ongoing struggle, and fills me in on some details of Lithuania's early history of which I had been quite unaware. Many thanks!

Professor P.J. BOYCE,
Vice-Chancellor,
Murdoch University, Perth, W. A.

I would like to thank you sincerely for the book *Lithuania in 1991*. I have read it with great interest. I am pleased that your country is interested in us, and that you receive such objective information.

Prof. akad. B. JUODKA,
Vilnius University, Lithuania.

Similarities

I have found much interest in the contents of your *Lithuanian Papers* (Vol.. 7, 1993) - not least, some striking similarities between Lithuania and Tasmania. Size, division of population, main industries and economic base - all found something in common with Tasmania.

Trevor G. COWELL,
Perth, Tasmania.

Congratulations

Congratulations on the standard and professionalism of your work. You can be assured of the support of Societies Council in the future.

Jenny NEWMAN,
Societies President (1993),
Tasmania University Union Inc.



• **Aldona Zakarauskas, *Childhood Dreams*.** Oil, collage and various media, 92 x 83 cm, 1966.

Aldona Zakarauskas (O'Brien)

Aldona Zakarauskas (O'Brien) was born in Lithuania in 1943. She studied at the National Art Schools of Newcastle and East Sydney (Diploma in Art, 1964); and at the School of Painting, Royal College of Art, London where she graduated M.A. (R.C.A.). Aldona travelled extensively in Asia, Europe and the U.K., 1971 - 74; and again in Europe and U.S.A. in 1980 - 81.

Aldona Zakarauskas taught painting at N.A.S. Newcastle in 1978-80; was Senior Lecturer in Art at Newcastle C.A.E., 1975 - 76; and is now Senior Lecturer at the University of Newcastle.

She has had ten solo exhibitions in Newcastle, South Australia and London, 1968 - 1991. She also took part in 17 major group exhibitions in Sydney, Newcastle, Maitland, Melbourne, Canberra, Brisbane and S.A., 1967 - 1993.

Aldona won the Mirror Waratah Special Award (1965) and the Lake Macquarie Art Award (1971).

Her work is represented in the National Collection Canberra, Newcastle Region Art Gallery, The University of Newcastle Collection, Margaret Carnegie Collection U.S.A. and private collections in Australia and abroad.

Statement

It is no accident that the artist permanently resides in his or her own reserve, where physical and mental layers of experience accumulate.

I maintain a delicate balance between the use of 'cut-outs' of recognisable images from glossy women's magazines like *Vogue,* tracings and appropriated images and actual textures of papers or objects, veiling them with oil paint to create a mystery between what is collage and what is paint.

I select images that reflect my personal response to fragments of childhood memories from other artists' work, film, videos, magazines and advertising, interweaving them with present personal associations in a deliberate randomness with an undercurrent of sexuality.

The work of several writers has begun to re-shape my visual language; in particular, Kathy Acker. She uses 'appropriation' in her writings. I've applied a similar use of collage images in a visual way.

Aldona Zakarauskas.

• **Aldona Zakarauskas,** ***Thought Chairs.*** Oil and collage. 100 x 100 cm, 1989.

• **Aldona Zakarauskas,** ***Jewish Gentlemen to the Synagogue, Regardless.*** Oil, collage and various media, 92 x 83 cm, 1969.

Lithuania's Eastern Neighbour

Edward LUCAS
Tallinn

Lithuanians like to joke that the best antidote to depression about their own country's halting progress back to Europe is to visit Belarus.

At first sight it is easy to see why - indeed many Belarussians themselves see little to be pleased or proud about. and certainly anyone who missed, or has forgotten, what it was like during the Soviet era can fill in the gaps in their knowledge without difficulty.

There are plenty of Lenins, busts of murderers such as Feliks Dzerzhinsky (his is situated opposite the building housing the KGB, which is paying for its restoration), streets named after Karl Marx and other Soviet idols, and a unique concentration of the peculiarly nasty and depressing 'megalomaniac-imperial' style of architecture.

Inside, the traditional Soviet greetings of "Whaddywant" and "Gimmeyerpassport" still prevail. Officials parrot Sovspeak, effortlessly, for hours. On the street, there are potholes worse than anywhere in the Baltic States; shops and kiosks are stocked more poorly than has been seen here since 1990.

Yet smug superiority is out of place. If this century had dealt to any of the Baltic States the horrific hand of cards it gave to Belarus, things might be little different here. Imagine, for example, if instead of the two decades of interwar independence, there were barely two years, followed by division between two hostile neighbours (as Belarus was divided between Poland and Soviet Russia).

Imagine that almost every historic city had been levelled during the war, and rebuilt in hideous, pompous concrete. Imagine that, during the sixties, the Kremlin had decided to create here the first "truly Soviet" (ie Russian-speaking) SSR, doing its best to erase

an already fragile national culture. Imagine that instead of the vigorous, vocal Baltic diasporas, there were only a handful of small, fractious, emigre groups.

As in the Baltics, 1991 brought independence. But in Belarius, it was greeted with only the most minimal enthusiasm by the country's rulers. Since then they have been busy, at an accelerating rate, reforging the ties which bound them to Moscow. Defence is now in the Kremlin's hands, and when the monetary union is implemented, so will be economic policy. The media is docile, the parliamentary opposition (with barely a tenth of the seats in the 'Supreme Soviet') has little influence, the KGB is still feared.

In the first free presidential elections this year, the only real question was: which of the two leading hardline, pro-Moscow candidates would be elected: the cynical populist Aleksandr Lukashenka, or the incumbent strongman Vyacheslau Kebich.

Both candidates supported closer ties with Russia. Mr. Lukashenka explicitly favoured a formal merger. Mr. Kebich had advocated currency and defence union, and the establishment of Russian as a second official language. Both were sceptical of market reforms. Mr. Lukashenka's particular selling point was corruption - a subject on which he had a high profile as head of the parliamentary committee dealing with the struggle against organised crime.

Aleksandr Lukashenka won, after two voting rounds in June and July.

Baltic diplomats have been watching events in Belarus with concern. Lithuania has a lengthy border with its neighbour, which has still not been fully defined. In particular, there is an outstanding disagreement about a small rural railway station at Adutiškės, where the line crosses Lithuanian territory in between two longer stretches on the Belarussian side. Belarus wants the station handed back, and says that if necessary it will rebuild the line further east. Belarus, which is landlocked, has also complained that the Baltic States gained more than their share of the former Soviet fishing fleet, when it was divided up following the break-up of the Soviet Union.

• **In Belarus, the media are controlled by the State. This forces the opposition press in Minsk to seek alternative distribution channels.** Photo by ETA/*The Baltic Independent.*

This dismal picture is bad news for the Baltic States. Already, Belarus has been adding its voice to the Kremlin's complaints about "discrimination" against Russian-speakers (there are about 200,000 Belarussians in the Baltic States). Belarus' foreign minister, Piotr Krauchenka, caused a minor diplomatic incident earlier this year when he appeared to support Russian claims of 'discrimination' against the Slavic non-citizen population.

There is every reason to fear that the Russian solos hitherto directed towards the Baltics will become the Moscow-Minsk duet.

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Edward LUCAS is managing editor of The Baltic Independent, the weekly English-language newspaper of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

The Last Cross-Makers?

Rimas KABAILA
Canberra

Lithuanian wooden monuments, crosses, have generally been examined for their beauty or style, regarded as an expression of unchanging folk-art tradition. This paper argues the significance of the Lithuanian cross as residing in its role as physical marker of past events: of religious, social, political and economic changes. The meaning and significance of crosses at four locations (Palanga, Hill-of-Crosses, Čiurlionis Way, and the small village of Asasnikai) is interpreted in light of their specific historical context.

"Eight men of Asasnikai had finished their day in the fields and were making crosses in the village clearing. Four of the straightest trees in the area, the tallest about thirty metres high, had been felled and were laid down on logs in the centre of the village green. The men were working only with axes, slowly shaping the trees that were to become simple crosses. When asked the reason, one replied 'because [the nearby village of] Musteikos has three crosses put up. We will have four!' At nightfall the cross-makers had to stop work. While some returned to their houses, others continued onto their potato fields to ring the bell which scared away the feral pigs that came to feed on their potatoes at night."

This may sound like an old account, of traditional cross-making dating from the last century or even earlier. But this is no early description of farmers in the 'Land of Crosses' before the industrial era. It is what an Australian tourist saw in 1989 when he arrived to visit a small and isolated village in the swamplands of Dzūkija.1

[1] Asasnikai village near Kabeliai is inhabited by semi-subsistence farmers in an area bordered by lake and swampland near the border of Belarus. The visitor was Prof. Algis Kabaila. The nearest rural centre which can be found

Ever since the popularisation of ethnography in the 1930s, Lithuanian writers have made much of the pre-Christian origins of their wooden monuments. It was said that the pre-Christian Baltic peoples venerated certain trees and groves, that the souls of the dead reside in trees and that funeral poles may have warded off evil spirits.[2]

Indeed it is quite likely that the Lithuanian cross was used during the prehistoric pre-Christian period. Christianity was brought by the sword to Lithuania during the middle ages by the crusaders. Mediaeval bishops issued regulations to eliminate the wooden monuments. Mykolas Junge, Bishop of Sambia, ordered in 1426 that burial poles in Lithuania Minor be destroyed. Similar events occurred in Estonia and Latvia in the seventeenth century. Burial poles may have been saved from destruction by being adapted, adding a layer of Christian symbols over the pre-Christian star, sun, moon, serpent and plant motifs.[3]

By the nineteenth century, the Catholic Lithuanian cross-makers were typically farmers who erected the wooden pole, cross, or shrine to mark a turning point in their lives: a birth or death, a harvest or epidemic. Some were craftsmen whose woodcarving ability overtook their value to the community as builders orfurniture makers: they became known and honoured as 'Dievdirbis' literally 'God-maker'.[4]

The widespread use of crosses continued in rural areas into the 1930s, up to Lithuania's occupation by the Soviet Union, and at least one photographer was busy recording the cross-builders and 'God-makers' who were occupied in their craft, still held in high

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on maps is Marcinkonys. The Soviet government's ban on firearms for farmers necessitated a rostered night patrol of the fields to scare away feral pigs.

[2]Gimbutas,Marija, 1968, *The Balts*, Praeger Inc. New York, contains detailed descriptions of the possible correlation between pre-Christian beliefs and existing art motifs and beliefs in Lithuania.

[3]Kabaila, Rimas 1980, *Lietuvių Liaudies Statyba, Traditional Lithuanian Architecture,* Thesis {unpub}. Department of Architecture, University of NSW, p.181-194.

[4]Baltrušaitis, Jonas 1948, *Lithuanian Folk Art,* Munich.



• Farmers erecting a cross in a field. Village of Acokavų, 1933. (After a photograph by B. Buračas, published in 1971).
Illustration by Edward Radclyffe.

esteem by the common people.[5]

The Lithuanians' view of their own history and national culture as a single linear tradition, an unchanging body of knowledge, has formed an anchor for Lithuanians in their home country, securing them through times of repression, and giving emigre communities a map and compass with which to orientate abroad.

Yet despite these great benefits, the firm and inward-looking definition of national history and culture also has some drawbacks. The attempts by nineteenth century ethnographic accounts to depict Lithuanian cultural continuity from pre-Christian times, has some parallels with the 'faction' of medieval chronicles. Both used a mixture of fact and fiction which was designed to create a simple two-dimensional stereotype for Lithuanian culture, rather than seeing it as a complex of beliefs and practices constantly adjusting to changing circumstances. The general tendency of conservative emigre communities to view their home cultures as a body of inherited procedures, static and fixed over time, has also left some mark on Lithuanians abroad.[6] Popular literature of Lithuanian culture emphasises this view of history and culture, as a fixed entity cemented and immovable, by harking back to romanticised 'golden ages' of nineteenth century rustic peasantry, mediaeval heroism, and ancient pre-Christian origins.

An alternative to this conservative view is to understand Lithuanian wooden monuments not so much a continuing single tradition, but as physical markers whose meaning is specific to their time and place, to their historical context. It is the various changes in the social and political landscape of Lithuania that have provided an impetus for cross-makers to erect monuments.

One dramatic change to the social landscape of Lithuania was the forced removal of one in every ten Lithuanians by Stalin's regime.

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[5]Juodakis V., *Balys Buračas*, 1971, Vaga Vilnius, published collection of ethnographic photographs.

[6]Bindokienė D.B., 1989, *Lietuvių Papročiai ir Tradicijos Išeivijoje, Lithuanian Customs and Traditions.* Contains rituals and observances which are recommended to emigre communities as suitable traditions to preserve.

Following the death of Stalin, and the demise of Khrushchev, survivors began to return secretly to Lithuania from their places of deportation. In Palanga this trickle of people became a steady stream so numerous that even the towns' Soviet authorities could not prevent the making of a commemorative cross. It is placed on the site of a barn into which KGB death squads herded the townspeople for mass deportation to the 'gulags' of Siberia. Stumps encircle this cross and each is carved with the name of one of the places of deportation.

Outside of towns, the most well-known place in Lithuania is the Hill-of-Crosses, near Šiauliai. Photographs of this place of pilgrimage, a small hill crammed with thousands of newly-placed crosses, layer upon layer, were used in the Western media in the late 1980s to convey to the Western public some of the fervour of political dissent in Lithuania.

The siting of the Hill-of-Crosses onto a prehistoric hill-fort suggests that wooden monuments were first erected there as burial poles or in memory of some skirmish with the crusaders (Order of the Sword) who were 'Christianising' Lithuania by conquest in the 14th century.

Centuries later, the 1831-83 uprisings against the Tsar were suppressed with deportations and executions of the revolutionaries. They were commemorated by over a hundred large crosses placed by people onto the small hilltop. Russian government's response was swift and decisive: Governor-General of Lithuania Muravyov ordered prohibitions on both the Lithuanian (Latin) alphabet and on the building of crosses outside of church-consecrated land. Crosses were removed from the hill-top.

Early in this century Lithuania remained a Catholic peasant society under the Tsars. On Sundays people gathered from surrounding villages. In the summer of 1914 several thousand villagers went on a pilgrimage to the hill. There they held a service of atonement, parishes erected their own crosses, people performed the stations of the cross, and drank holy-water from the spring.

Crosses were placed in testimony of prayers answered, so that their numbers accumulated over the course of this century. Then

• A cross at Palanga. Each stump at the base of the cross is carved with the name of one place of deportation.

Illustration by Edward Radclyffe.

in 1961, authorities bulldozed about five thousand crosses from the hill in an over-zealous demonstration of the "Soviet state religion".[7] The holy-water spring was buried. Wooden crosses were burned in bonfires and metal ones were driven out in trucks to a foundry as scrap. Overnight, new crosses always reappeared, carried up by people from farm collectives. This process was repeated three more times in 1973, 1974 and 1975.

7Atheism operated as the state religion in the Soviet Union. Passing an examination in Atheist theory was a mandatory university entrance requirement.

Finally, in 1977, a state project was put forward to solve 'the Hill-of-Crosses problem' for ever by flooding the area under a dam. As with many unpopular Soviet state projects, work proceeded at snail's pace, until its final abandonment in 1980.[8]

The case of the Hill-of-Crosses illustrates that Lithuanian crosses document specific historical events. They can only be properly understood in terms of their historical context. It is the very act of making the cross and putting it up, its timing rather than its permanency or style, that conveys its meaning and ensures its potency.

By the 1970s, the Soviet state was paying lip service to ethnic diversity, organising such events as national folk dance and song festivals. The state sought to defuse and contain the symbolism of the cross by commissioning a series of wooden monuments in secular and politically neutral contexts. The Čiurlionis passage is a series of wooden posts and crosses strung out on the road between Vilnius and Druskininkai. It gave artists the politically correct context in which to display works which would otherwise have been used to express religious conviction and political dissent.

Typical of many small crossroads villages in Lithuania, Asasnikai was able to retain its old wooden cross over the fifty years of Soviet state rule. In such an exposed location, no local authority would oppose the village over one decaying cross. The official state view was that Catholic Christian belief, and national/ethnic solidarity would wither away with the older generation, while young people would carry the Soviet way into the future. Yet the foundations for the new secular post-Christian society were shifting. 1989 became a special year: while preparations for an independence declaration were being made at a government level, the three Baltic peoples staggered the world's media by organizing a mass protest for independence, linking an unbroken human chain across the six hundred kilometre route through the three Baltic states. Gorbachev's reforms tried to save the Soviet empire

8Hill-of-Crosses details were sourced from an unpublished manuscript distributed at the site in the 1980s. Privately-owned photocopiers were illegal in the Soviet Union,so the manuscript was distributed as hand-printed black and white photographs.

by lifting some of the restrictions on political and religious expression. For the first time in fifty years, the men of the village felt that it was safe; that the time was right to become cross-makers again. Their four new crosses now stand alongside their old one, rivalling the display of tall crosses in the neighbouring village of Musteikos.

This account of cross-making began with a scene from the village of Asasnikai. For these people who have become used to living a regulated life under the Soviet state, the symbolic gains made by achieving independence may not outweigh its associated economic uncertainties. For the people of this village, the right time for cross-making may not return within the lifetime of this generation. Were the farmers, who were swept along by the euphoric waves of the independence movement in the 1980s, the last of the Lithuanian cross-makers?

Rimas Kabaila, B.Arch. (NSW) works as an architect. He has also recently taught nineteenth century Australian history in high schools and has just completed a thesis about Aboriginal missions for the Department of Archaeology at the Australian National University.

The author wishes to thank Wilfred Shawcross for reviewing the text, and Edward Radclyffe for preparing the illustrations.



• A 30-meter felled tree, supported on pine-log horses for shaping into a cross. Village of Musteikos,1989.

Illustration by Edward Radclyffe.

Non-Offensive Defence as a Strategy for Lithuania?

Bjørn MØLLER
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Small States in the International System

Lithuania is a small state, but so are most of the world's countries. As a matter of fact, we seem presently to be witnessing a new wave of proliferation of small states, following the first one resulting from decolonization. The present one is the product of the dissolution of the Soviet Union as well as of Yugoslavia, which gave rise to the birth of a large number of small and medium-sized states. This centrifugal process may not yet have lost steam, as the disintegration of the Russian Federation remains a distinct possibility.

There are, of course, countervailing, centripetal tendencies towards integration, above all in the framework of the European Union. However, this will most likely not result in the formation of larger states, but rather in a new form of 'authoritative allocation of values' *sui generis*. One possibility might be a 'diffusion of powers', featuring overlapping authorities and a reduced salience of territoriality. Hence, the international system will for the coming decades be characterized by a blend of a large number of small states, a fairly constant (perhaps slightly declining) number of medium-sized states, and a smaller number of great powers (including one superpower), plus a growing number of international governmental and non-governmental organizations - many of which may surpass small states in terms of authority and command of resources.[1]

It remains disputed whether the resultant 'neomedievalist' system will be stable and peaceful or volatile and war-prone. Pessimists such as John Mearsheimer have equated the disappearance of bipolarity and the reduced salience of nuclear deterrence with a new multipolar system in which war will, once again, become a means for political ends. More optimistic analysts such as

Stephen Van Evera, however, have pointed (in the present author's opinion, correctly) to the numerous inhibitions against war in the European context, where interdependence is high, possible gains from wars of aggression low, and war-weariness[2] Above all, the fact that the vast majority of the new small states are (more or less) democratic - and certainly more so that the larger states they are replacing - should serve as a further inhibition against war[3].

Changing Security Political Context

In their quest for national security, all states, but particularly small ones, have to define the appropriate context. This will determine, *inter alia,* the standards which their defence policies will have to meet. Several options recommend themselves to states starting 'with a clean slate' as the three Baltic states:

I. **Neutrality**, which may be subdivided into the 'Swiss', the 'Swedish' and the 'Finnish' variety: the first signifies a traditional form, almost tantamount to isolationism, the second a more activist and less restrictive interpretation of neutrality, and the third a neutrality circumscribed by special obligations *vis-à-vis* one side[4]. As far as the Baltic states are concerned, the Finnish model may be the most realistic, albeit not necessarily the most attractive, option. In all three cases, however, the national defence should be able to stand alone, not counting on any assistance from abroad: a self-sufficient defence.

II. **Subregional cooperation** among neighbouring states. Most obvious would be a cooperation among the three Baltic states, as is already well underway, e.g. in terms of joint peacekeeping forces. It might, however, be expanded to include the Visegrad countries and/or Belarus [5] and/or, to a certain extent, all the countries of the Baltic region[6] (including the Nordic states and Germany): a fairly large group of states who do not fear an attack from each other and who may provide each other some security political and military assistance, above all in peacetime.

III. Traditional **alliance membership**, *in casu* admittance into NATO, may eventually become an option for the Baltic States (as well as some or all the Visegrad states), yet probably not before

• **Neither Lithuania's policemen *(above)*, nor the country's ancient fortresses are likely to stop foreign aggressors today. *Pictured below:* The castle of Kaunas.** Photos: R. Tarvydas.

the turn of the century. The NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council) and its offspring, the PFP (Partnership for Peace), may thus become introductory steps towards, rather than alternatives to full membership. In that case the defence of the Baltic states should be seen as contributions to the common defence of the Alliance, rather than as national defence in its own right[7]. The same would be the case for an (unlikely) membership of the WEU or the EU[8]. However, because of the proximity to central parts of Russia, this might well have undesirable repercussions, unless such a step is accompanied by an extension of membership to the Russian Federation itself, or by appeasement efforts such as a defensive restructuring of the armed forces (more on which below).

IV. **Collective security** would be an arrangement encompassing all states, either within the region (say, under the auspices of the CSCE) or with a global scope (in a United Nations framework). States parties to such arrangements would commit themselves not to attack each other, as well as to come to each other's assistance, should one of them nevertheless be attacked[9].

In such an arrangement, each state would not so much rely on its own defence efforts as on those of all the others. However, because of the perennial 'free rider' temptations, states would be well-advised to make their national defence as robust as possible, as well as to make a 'fair' contribution to the system as a whole.

Under conditions of uncertainty such as the present, whatever defence plans states make should preferably be adaptable to all contexts, i.e., states should not unwittingly foreclose attractive options of tomorrow through the choices they make today.

Criteria for Defence Planning

Other relevant criteria for defence planning include the following, as far as the Baltic states are concerned:

I. The defence should be 'adequate', for both deterrence (i.e. war prevention) and defensive purposes. This, of course, immediately raises the perennial question 'how much is enough?', to which there is no 'correct' answer. The costs of a hypothetical war with an unknown probability are simply incommensurable

with those of peacetime defence expenditures. It is all a matter of (preferably informed) political judgement. On the other hand, the *prima facie* persuasive answer, 'as much as you can get', is surely wrong, because an unconstrained arms build-up would only induce a state's adversaries to reciprocate, leaving both sides worse off at the end of the day. Also, as far as small states with much more powerful neighbours are concerned, such as Lithuania, 'balance' is anyhow well beyond reach.

II. The defence should contribute to (at the very least not damage) international stability in the dual sense of arms race and crisis stability. This means that it should neither lead to balancing arms build-up on the part of the state's adversaries, nor pose a threat to neighbouring states which might invite pre-emptive attack. This is not particularly relevant for any of the Baltic states *vis-a-vis* the much stronger Russian Federation, but it certainly might be for the hypothetical NATO expanded to include these countries.

III. The defence should be affordable, i.e. it should not call for major investments in new hardware - preferably allow for a build-down, freeing resources for civilian purposes. This is probably the main constraint facing the Baltic states at the present juncture, when a renovation of society as a whole after more than fifty years of Soviet occupation is long overdue.

IV. The defence should be compatible with, ideally supportive of, democracy: it should be under firm political control, and the members of the armed forces should enjoy the same democratic rights as other citizens. Whether this is best accomplished through a professional army, universal (male) conscription, or a militia system, depends on the concrete circumstances. In the present author's opinion, conscription represents the best choice for small countries such as Lithuania, for two reasons: it tends to integrate the armed forces with society, and the military training of the entire male population provides a high 'inflation' potential for the armed forces in times of war. The latter may be further expanded through the addition of a home guard structure.

The criteria listed above are not automatically compatible, and hard political choices may have to be made between them. Fortunately, there is (in the present author's opinion at least) one solution which would satisfy all criteria, namely that of a non-

offensive military defence (NOD), combined with fall-back option of civilian-based or social defence (SD).
NOD might be defined as a defence that maximizes defensive while minimizing offensive capabilities. This would present an escape from the security dilemma, strengthening both arms race and crisis stability[10]. Also, it would tend to be less costly than a 'dual-capable' defence, i.e. one designed to operate on the offence as well as on the defence.

There are numerous proposals for how to configure such a defence[11], the best of which is probably the 'spider and web' model, designed by the Study Group Alternative Security Policy (SAS), also known as 'confidence-building defence'. The central idea is that of an integration of mobile forces ('spiders') with a stationary network ('the web'), featuring infantry, artillery and support and engineer troops specializing in the emplacement of barriers. The spiders would be able to reinforce exposed parts of the web, and would benefit from its support in terms of logistics and C³I (command, control, communications and intelligence). The benign synergies between the two would strengthen the defence on home territory ('defensive strength') at the same time as weakening it beyond the confines of the web ('offensive strength'). By thus amplifying the difference between defensive and offensive strength, it would serve as a confidence-building measure. The design principle is illustrated below with a chart drawn from the most recent publication of the SAS, published jointly with the PDA (Project Defence Alternatives)[12].

CBD System: Spider & Web with Defensive Support

a. Infantry/engineer/artillery units: selected area coverage

b. Armor integrated with area units: spiders in the web

c. Limited pool of light, rapid operational reserves for defensive support



For the near future, however, even the modest forces requirements of this model may exceed the means of countries such as Lithuania. However, the envisaged corps size of the ACC (Area Control Corps) is not sacrosanct, and smaller units than brigades might suffice (or at least be better than nothing), especially when combined with more effective barriers[13]. Furthermore, the Baltic states might opt for a joint pool of operational reserves, as well as of rapid reinforcement units, which would go even further towards meeting the requirements [14].

Whether national or multinational, these spiders would, furthermore, allow the states fielding them to make a significant contribution to international peace-keeping and peace-making (perhaps even small-scale enforcement) operations. The envisaged defence posture would thus be compatible with the various possible security political contexts outlined above, from neutrality via subregional collaboration and alliance membership to collective security.

Still, as illustrated in the force comparison table and charts below, the defence would need some further underpinning. Pending the (according to the present author's assessment not very likely) NATO security guarantees, a fall-back strategy of social defence would seem a good solution.

As a strategy, SD would constitute a defence of society (rather than territory) by society as a whole, rather than only by the armed forces. The strategic goal would be to make society 'indigestible', thereby dissuading attack in the first place. The tactical means to this end would be various forms of civil disobedience, strikes, demonstrations, and the like[15].

SD has been employed on a number of occasions with significant results, albeit mostly in conjunction with military defence[16]. Indeed, the defence of Lithuania in 1989-90 against a new imposition of Soviet rule constituted one of the most successful employments of SD so far[17]. A further attraction of the combination of NOD and SD would be that it could make the right of conscientious objection fully compatible with the principle of universal conscription.

	Lithuania	Latvia	Estonia	Belarus	Poland	Russia
Population	3.833.000	2.733.000	1.613.000	10.438.000	38.655.000	150.385.000
Area	65.200	64.589	45.100	207.600	312.680	17.075.400
Armed forces	20.800	21.000	8.500	392.100	753.000	4.430.000
Active	9.800	5.000	2.500	102.600	287.500	2.030.000
Reserves	11.000	16.000	6.000	289.500	465.500	2.400.000
Paramilitary	5.000	?	2.000	8.000	16.000	220.000
GDP (USD 1992)	7.800	7.350	6.700	36.220	83.590	400.200
Defence bdg. (USD 1992)	55	40	37	660	1.880	3.968

RUSSIAN SUPERIORITY	Scenario A	Scenario B	Scenario C
Population	93	23	3
Armed forces	521	106	4
GDP (USD 1992)	60	26	3
Defence bdg. (USD 1992)	106	42	2

Legend:

Scenario A: Russia/Lithuania

Scenario B: Russia/the Baltic States

Scenario C: Russia/the Baltic States plus Belarus and Poland

Source: *The Military Balance 1993-1994*



Outlook

The draft of a Lithuanian defence doctrine, published for public consideration in January, does not appear incompatible with the aforementioned principles. According to the draft, Lithuania does not consider any states to be her enemies and does not intend to start military operations first; she has no territorial claims against her neighbours; and her army is directed only against the violators of her sovereignty: political principles quite in line with the 'NOD philosophy'. Furthermore, Lithuania should neither build nor deploy or proliferate chemical, nuclear, biological or other weapons of mass destruction; her territory and air space should not be available for aggression against other states; and the defence should be tantamount to 'a general armed resistance of its citizens'. The draft further mentioned the intention to create a defensive union between Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia[18].

In the present author's opinion, the envisaged NOD-SD combination will go some way towards meeting the legitimate defence needs of Lithuania and her Baltic neighbours. However, it is, of course, unable to solve the problem of the large force disparity between the country and her most likely opponent in any armed conflict, namely the Russian Federation. The table and charts above clearly show that Russian superiority over Lithuania will be immense. The outlook is, however, somewhat better for a joint Baltic defence against Russia, and even better if Poland and Belarus are taken into account. Also, a realistic force comparison would have to take into account that Russia would have to protect other fronts, hence at most having part of its forces available for an attack on one or several of the Baltic states.

This was the bad news. The good news is that the Russian army is in complete disarray, making an attack extremely unlikely for the next several years.

A truly robust defence of the Baltic states is thus not achievable, but this should not be taken to mean that defence is futile. At the very least, a concerted national defence effort along the lines sketched above could prevent a quick *fait accompli*, thereby ensuring international involvement in the conflict before everything is over. In the words of two Estonian scholars,

'a combination of the regular army, civilian involvement and well-trained partisan forces could make the Baltic states an unattractive target for a potential aggressor from the East. They could not stop the Russian Army, but they could give it two black eyes, a broken nose, and a headache.'[19]

The prevention of a quick *fait accompli* would activate the powerful influence of world opinion, which would surely favour the small Baltic victim of attack over the mighty aggressor, especially if the victim were to have no significant offensive capabilities that might 'legitimate' an attack.

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Notes

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2. Mearsheimer, John J.: 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War'. *International Security, vol.* 15, no. I (Spring 1990), pp. 5-52; Evera, Stephen W. Van: 'Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War', *ibid.. vol.* 15, no. 3 (Winter 1990). pp. 7-57. See also Mueller, John: *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
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NATO Review, vol. 42, no. 2 (April 1994), pp. 7-10.

8. The wish for closer ties with all these institutions was, for instance, expressed on 25 March by the presidents of ail three Batic states *(Atlantic News,* no. 2610 (30.03.94), p. 3). See also Petersen. Phillip: 'Security Policy in the Post-Baltic States', *European Security, vol. 1,* no. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 13-49.

9. This was, of course, the original rationale of the UN. Even though it was subsequently almost forgotten, the end of the Cold War may render it realistic, as the UN actions against Iraq might indicate. See, e.g. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros: 'An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992', in Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury (eds.): *United Nations, Divided World. The UN's Role in International Relations,* New Expanded Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 468-498. See also Weiss, Thomas G. (ed.): *Collective Security in a Changing World* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1993); Kupchan, Charles A. & Clifford A. Kupchan: 'Concerts. Collective Security, and the Future of Europe', *International Security, vol.* 16, no. I (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161. For a more sceptical view, see Betts, Richard K.: 'Systems for Peace or Causes of War Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe', *ibid., vol.* 17, no. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 5-43.

10. Møller, Bjørn: Common *Security and Non-Offensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner and London: UCL Press, 1992), pp. 79-130.

11. The various German models are analysed in Møller, Bjørn: *Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence* (London: Brassey's, 1991); and idem: *The Dictionary of Alternative Defence* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming 1994).

12. SAS & PDA: *Confidence-building Defense. A Comprehensive Approach to Security and Stability in the New Era. Application to the Newly Sovereign States of Europe* (Cambridge, MA: PDA, Commonwealth Institute, 1994), p. 37. See also SAS (Studiengruppe Alternative Sicherheitspolitik): *Strukturwandel der Verteidigung: Entwürfe für eine konsequente Defensive* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984); idem: *Vertrauensbildende Verteidigung. Reform deutscher Sicherheitspolitik* (Gerlingen: Bleicher Verlag, 1989).

13. On barriers, see Epstein, Joshua M.: *Conventional Force Reductions: A Dynamic Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1990), pp. 67-72; Simpkin, Richard E.: *Race to the Swift. Thoughts on 21st Century Warfare* (London: Brassey's, 1986), pp. 57-77; Gupta, Raj: *Defense Positioning and Geometry. Rules for a World with Low Force Levels* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993).

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15. The classical works on SD include: Roberts, Adam, ed.: *The Strategy of Civilian Defence. Non-violent Resistance to Aggression* (London: Faber and Faber, 1967): Galtung, Johan: 'Two Concepts of Defense', in idem: *Peace, War and Defense. Essays In Peace Research,* vol. 2, (Copenhagen: Chr. Ejlers Forlag, 1976), pp. 280-340: idem: 'On the Strategy of Nonmilitary Defense. Some Proposals and Problems', ibid., pp. 378-426; Sharp, Gene: *The Politics of Non-Violent Action.* vols. 1-3, (Boston: Porter & Sargent, 1973); idem: *Making Europe Unconquerable. The Potential of Civilian-Based Deterrence and Defence* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1985); idem (with the assistance of Bruce Jenkins): *Civilian Based Defense. A Post-Military Weapons System* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990) Ebert, Theodor: *Gewaltfreier Aufstand: Alternative zum Bürgerkrieg* (Waldkirch: Waldkircher Verlag, 1968); idem: *Soziale Verteidigung,* vol. 1: *Historische Erfahrungen und Grundzüge der Strategie:* and vol. 2: *Formen und Bedingungen des zivilen Widerstandes* (Waldkirch: Waldkircher Verlag, 1981); Boserup, Anders & Andrew Mack: *War Without Weapons. Non-Violence in National Defence,* (London: Francis Pinter, 1974); Mellon, Christian, Jean-Marie Muller & Jaques Semelin: *La Dissuasion Civile* (Paris: Fondation pour les Etudes de Defense Nationale, 1985); Muller, Jean-Marie: *Vous avez dit 'pacifisme'?. De la menace nucleaire a la defense civile non-violente* (Paris: Lcs Editions du Cerf, 1984).

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18. *Tiesa.* quoted in SWB. *Summary of World Broadcasts, BBC Monitoring,* no. 1901 (21.01.94), p. 3; Palmisona: 'Litauen und seine Landesverteidgung', *Osterreichische Militärische Zeitschrift,* vol. 31, no. 5 (September-October 1993), pp. 456-458. The Latvian defcnce doctrine is described in 'R.': 'Letland -Die Landesverteidigung', *ibid..* vol. 31, no. 3 (May-June 1993). pp. 363-365. *International Defense Review.* no. 3, 1992, p. 212; and in *Jane's Defence Weekly,* vol. 18, no. 10 (05.09.92.), p. 21.

19. Vares, Peter & Mare Haab: 'The Baltic States: quo vadis?', in Regina Owen Karp (cd.): *Central and Eastern Europe. The Challenge of Transition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 283-306, quote from p. 304.

Cultural Oppression and Education in Lithuania

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For hundreds of years, Lithuanians have experienced various forms of cultural oppression including the oppression of their language, religion and expressive aspects of their cultural heritage. In this article, I shall discuss who the oppressors of Lithuanian culture were and how they influenced the methods of teaching and learning used by Lithuanians in both the formal and informal educational contexts.

Cultural oppression is not a new concept to Lithuanians. The people living in this 67,788 square kilometre Baltic country (Ross, 1992, p.10) have had a long history of their culture being either oppressed or dominated by people of other cultures. This dates back to the fourteenth century, when Jogaila, the King of Lithuania, married Jadwiga, the Queen of Poland in 1386. This personal union was formalised in 1569 by the Union of Lublin and continued until 1795 (Rose, 1992). During the years of Lithuania's union with Poland, the main aspect of Lithuanian culture which suffered oppression was the Lithuanian language. This was due to the use of Polish as the language of instruction at most schools and universities. The Lithuanian language was further oppressed during the period of Tsarist Russian (1795-1918) rule. By 1863, it was prohibited "to use Lithuanian as a language of instruction, to publish, import and disseminate Lithuanian books printed in Latin alphabet. This ban lasted till 1905". (Kiaušienė, et al., 1993, p.28).

When Lithuania regained independence on February 16, 1918, it was thought that the years of cultural oppression had passed forever. A peace treaty signed with Communist Russia on July 12, 1920 confirmed these beliefs for most Lithuanians, as the treaty stated,

"Russia recognises without any reserve the sovereignty and independence of

the State of Lithuania ... and voluntarily and forever renounces all sovereign rights possessed by Russia over the Lithuanian people and territory". (cited in Rose, 1992, p.16).

The use of the term "forever" suggested to Lithuanians that Russia would not attempt to oppress Lithuania and its people at any stage in the future.

Fifty Years of Foreign Rule

Unfortunately, ideas of Lithuanian independence were shattered in 1940, when the Republic was incorporated into the USSR after a bogus election (Rose, 1992, p.17). Lithuania remained under foreign rule for fifty years until independence was regained in 1990. This fifty year period is of particular interest, as Lithuanian styles of teaching and learning were greatly influenced by the Soviets, when "... the system of education was restructured along the lines of the Soviet education system ..." (Kiaušienė et al., 1993, p.29).

As a large emphasis was placed on the promotion of Soviet Russian culture in places of formal education, such as schools and universities, Lithuanian students had to learn their own culture through another source. During the Tsarist Russian oppression of Lithuanian culture in the 19th century, "priests, school teachers, peasant co-operatives and literary clubs carried out an underground educational programme so that there was a growing literate class of middle-class and even peasant Lithuanians" (Rose, 1992, p.15).

In the fifty years of Soviet occupation of Lithuania, it was again the responsibility of people in informal learning contexts to teach Lithuanian culture.

Informal learning contexts can be described as non-institutional places of teaching and learning. In such contexts, informal methods are used to further enculturation (Quillen, 1965, p.51). In Lithuania, the family home has been the usual informal learning context, during times of cultural oppression (Jonitis, 1951, pp.110-11). Older family members, such as parents and grandparents, were responsible for teaching children aspects of Lithuanian language, history, literature and music. Grandparents are particularly important sources of knowledge in the extended



• **Lithuanian heritage: A 19th century family home in Palanga.**
Photo: R. Tarvydas.

family situations in which many Lithuanians live, as retired grandparents often care for children while their parents are working.

Observation and imitation are the most common methods used by Lithuanian parents and grandparents when teaching their children aspects of their culture. Observation often involves children watching older family members complete various tasks, such as cooking or gardening. Children will actively imitate them under the guise of helping them while receiving instructions as to the best methods to employ. Observation can also involve listening to an older family member telling stories and tales of days gone by and learning these stories passively. My recollections of informal instruction in aspects of Lithuanian culture as a grandchild of Lithuanian immigrants in Australia resembles this method of learning, as I learned many Lithuanian poems, songs and stories by listening to my grandfather and gradually repeating what I heard after it was told to me on several occasions.

Of course, not all Soviet-era teachers neglected to teach Lithuanian culture. A Lithuanian trained teacher of English, who was educated during the years of Soviet occupation recalled, "I can be proud of my teachers who managed to give us some knowledge of our culture, alongside all the propaganda. We were even taught songs which were not really allowed to be sung in public" (Rekštienė, October 25, 1993). In such cases, individual teachers

were often responsible for deciding the extent to which Lithuanian culture was taught, dependent upon their own impressions of what was or was not considered to be of significance.

The goal of formal education in the former Soviet Union "was the preparation of highly educated and fully developed active builders of communism - the new Homo Sovieticus" (Zadja, 1988, p.393). Many traditional ways of learning and thinking were superseded (Scribner and Cole, 1973, p.553). For example, the Soviet Constitution proclaimed the "separation of the school from the Church". In practice, this meant a total ban on all forms of religious education for any below the age of eighteen" (Bourdeaux, 1979, p.9). Parents were allowed to educate their children in their religious beliefs but it was criminal to allow anyone else to provide a person under the age of eighteen with religious instruction, even if parental consent was granted. The Lithuanians who are 85% Catholic (Ross, 1992, p.10), suffered a great deal of religious oppression under the Soviets. Certainly teaching of religious beliefs did occur secretly, but at the risk of deprivation of parental rights, discrimination against children at school, and prevention from going on to higher education (Bourdeaux, 1979, p.215).

Conversations with numerous Lithuanians over the years have led me to believe that fear of possible reprisals meant that people neither divulged information about themselves, nor discussed the knowledge and beliefs they acquired informally. Discussing their private business was considered to be dangerous, as informants for Soviet agencies, such as the KGB, would repeat what they had learned. This could lead to serious repercussions, such as loss of employment, imprisonment or deportation.

Fortunately, people are no longer persecuted for their beliefs in Lithuania. Article 26 of the law on education in the present Republic of Lithuania states:

"It is prohibited in educational establishments to propagate racial, national, religious or social hostility and exclusiveness, to disseminate militaristic and other ideas, contradicting the universally acknowledged principles of international law and humanism" (Kuzmickas, 1991, p.13).

Thus, Lithuanians are now allowed to express their individual

beliefs and to teach aspects of Lithuanian culture openly.

Tasks ahead

To ensure that Lithuanians receive education in the various aspects of Lithuanian culture now, it has been decreed that the main tasks of the Ministry of Culture and Education in Lithuania are "... to create conditions for natural evolution of Lithuanian culture and to ensure its historical continuation" (Radziukynas, et al., 1993, p.19). Lithuanians recognise the importance of informal teaching and learning processes in the education and enculturation of their children. To promote the continuation of informal education to the preschool children, new laws have been adopted, ensuring better conditions for mothers to raise their children at home (Fedosejevas, 1992, p.9). Reported information (Rekštienė, 1993) suggests that these laws include provisions for mothers to be granted a year of paid maternity leave, followed by reduced salary and guaranteed employment until the child is old enough to commence preschool. Economic constraints often mean that mothers must return to work quite quickly, in which case the children are either cared for by retired grandparents or extended family members, or are placed in nurseries.

• Tasmanian teacher Regina Share *(left, 2nd row)*, photographed with her Lithuanian class and a few teachers in Vilnius. Regina taught in Lithuania for three years, 1991 - 93..

Care for school-age children is also of interest, given that the school day ends between 2 and 3 in the afternoon, but the average worker does not finish work until 7 or 8 in the evening. Recent investigations (Masiulytė-Stapleton, 1993) revealed that children will usually return home after school, where they are either greeted and cared for by a family member, or fend for themselves. In both instances children will usually eat lunch, complete their homework and play with other children. It is during that period of playing with other children, that Lithuanians learn by engaging in peer tutoring. Peer tutoring allows children to learn various pieces of information from other children around their own age. Although peer tutoring is a popular style of teaching and learning in the Lithuanian informal learning context, it is not encouraged in the formal learning context. This leads one to wonder what styles of teaching and learning are promoted in the formal learning context.

Styles of teaching and learning in Lithuania are greatly influenced by styles employed during the half a century of Communist rule (Šilkalns, 1993, p.15). The most popular method of teaching in Lithuania can be characterized as "authoritarian". This means that the teacher has absolute power in the classroom and plays the most important role in a lesson:

> "The lesson is a one-way process; the job of the teacher is to tell the pupils, theirs to accept and absorb. Lesson techniques are therefore closely akin to lecturing, with questioning of the class to make sure that the prescribed material is going home. There is not much place for learning by doing - the role of the children is mainly passive." (Grant, 1979, p.118).

Certainly other methods of teaching are known in Lithuania and are employed in some classes. For example, Rekštienė (1993) said that she attempted to adopt a communicative teaching approach in her foreign language classes as students were encouraged to develop proficiency in spoken language by discussing various topics and themes. However, the authoritarian type of chalk and talk lesson was still widely used, particularly due to the lack of resources available to teachers.

Teachers who have taught in Lithuanian schools (Rekštienė, 1993, Masiultytė-Stapleton, 1993) said that uses of innovative methods of teaching were restricted by the lack of resources. Visual aids,

such as television, videos, slide, film and overhead projectors are not readily available in Lithuanian schools. Those schools fortunate enough to have any of these aids usually have only one which is shared amongst all teachers in the school. When we discuss the contemporary Lithuanian school, it is important to note that it is a large joint primary and secondary school from year 1 to year 12. Tape recorders are also rarely used for this reason, although Rekštienė (1993) reported that many foreign language teachers were taking their own recorders to school. Handouts are rarely given to students as teachers do not have access to photocopiers. Using carbon paper is the only form of duplication.

Strict discipline

Strict discipline methods were employed before 1940 and during the Soviet era and are still found in Lithuanian schools. Students are seated at individual desks arranged in neat rows. They are taught that, "if they want to speak to the teacher, they raise their right arm from the elbow; no movement is permitted. When the teacher calls on them, they rise and must wait for the teacher's permission to sit down again. They also rise when the teacher or any other adult comes into the classroom" (Bereday et al., 1960, p.180). Some aspects of Soviet school life have been removed, as students are now permitted to play in between lesson breaks. It was reported (Masiulytė-Stapleton, 1993) that students would file outside the school building in their class groups during lesson breaks and would march in a clockwise direction around the schoolyard in pairs. Adults are still seen marching around in pairs in a clockwise direction during theatre intervals as a legacy of what they were taught in school.

As Lithuanian students appear to acquire knowledge in a passive way, I was curious as to their willingness to ask and answer questions. Teachers (Masiulytė-Stapleton, 1993; Rekštienė, 1993) said that few students ask questions, as questions were not encouraged in the past: "Problem-posing education does not and cannot serve the interests of the oppressor. No oppressive order could permit the oppressed to begin to question: Why?" (Freire, 1990, p.74).

To sum up, past oppressors of Lithuanian culture have greatly influenced Lithuanian methods of teaching and learning. The Soviet occupation of Lithuania between 1940-1990 is the most recent and significant, as many of the methods of teaching and learning promoted during that period are still found in Lithuanian schools today. For example, teaching is generally an autonomous activity, while learning is characteristically a passive process of memorization. It is impossible to speculate whether or not the Soviet influence on Lithuanian methods of teaching and learning will still be noticeable in the future. In the meantime, Western influence in Lithuania may well result in the demise of the chalk and talk method of teaching and the promotion of a more interactive and communicative approach to teaching and learning.

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Much More Than Colourful Costumes

Daina POCIUS
Adelaide Lithuanian Museum & Archives

Museums as public institutions are obliged to represent Australia's population but have not done so. Seventy-five per cent of Australia's population today is known as Anglo-Celtic (English, Irish, Scottish, Welsh, Manx and Cornish), one per cent is Aboriginal and the other twenty-four per cent consists of people from non-English speaking backgrounds. Given these figures it is understandable that the image of the Australian male has become essentially that of a white, masculine, outdoors person who originated from Britain (Ward 1958, p.18). From the times of European settlement Australia began as part of the British Empire and its current image has emanated from its "Britishness". Non-representation of all ethnic groups in museums could also be partially attributed to museums' origins. Contemporary museums have evolved from European foundations, and could be described as predominantly ethnocentric, male, elitist and exclusive. The owners defined, collected and determined what was considered the essentials of Western science and thought. Recently, however, ethnic groups have been eating away at this conception.

Cultural Retention

Australia's population can be truly called multicultural as it is made up of at least 115 diverse ethnic groups. Ethnic groups retain their identity in their country of adoption. They come together on the basis of a common socio-cultural complex which they are derived from (Matthews, Hart, Hirakis 1984, p3). Migrants organize themselves in groups based on the desire for protection against an alien environment, an unsympathetic culture and an insensitive majority. Ethnic groups form to provide assistance in settlement and establishing services. Migrants attempt to recreate their homeland to form links which represent security (Radia 1989, pp.4-5).

Arriving in a new country may cause the migrants to suffer from low self-esteem and, as a reaction, ethnic groups create closed social networks. Those migrants fleeing occupied countries tend to want to preserve their language and culture as an act of defiance against the oppressors. Ethnic groups' desire to retain their ethnicity can be seen in the establishment of ethnic clubs and social groups and museums in some cases.

Ethnic groups may find it difficult to preserve their material culture in the state-funded museums. In Adelaide, for example, the state-funded museums have tended to promote the interests of the dominant culture and have not addressed the collection of cultural material that represents the experiences of Australia's multicultural society (Szekeres 1988, p.173). It has not been the function of the South Australian Museum to concentrate on Australia's ethnic diversity, and until the newly created History Trust museums were established Australia's ethnicity was not reflected in the existing institutions. It wasn't until 1986 that Adelaide was fortunate to be the site of Australia's first multicultural museum, the Migration and Settlement Museum; its mission is to ensure the preservation of South Australia's 115 ethnic groups.

In South Australia alone, there are 106 museums, of which only three are ethnic-specific: the Lithuanian, the Latvian and the Ukrainian museums. According to Donald Garfield, it was ethnic pride that led to the establishment of many museums. They serve as a vital source of cultural expression (1989, pp.43-48).

The Adelaide Lithuanian Museum and Archives is located at the rear of the Lithuanian House. As early as 1961 the Adelaide Lithuanian Council appealed to the community for historical items relating to Lithuania. Jonas Vanagas had already begun to collect material on his own initiative and was appointed curator. The initial aim of the Museum was to gather and protect Australian Lithuanian printed material and other documents relating to life in Australia. It was envisaged that a museum could help the youth become more familiar with their history and culture.

Six years later, enough material had been collected to conduct the official opening which occurred on January 26, 1967. The Museum was officially opened by Juozas Bachunas, President of the World Lithuanian Community. The Museum houses several

thousand objects and over two thousand examples of printed material, photographs and documents.

More than Just Museums

It can be assumed that ethnic-specific museums present themselves as more than museums in the traditional sense of the word. A museum is defined as "a non-profit making permanent institution in the service of society and of its development and open to the public. It acquires, conserves, researches, communicates and exhibits for the purpose of study, education and enjoyment, material evidence of people and the environment" (C.A.M.A.). The Lithuanian Museum is a place where people are sure their personal history is safe. They are places where people can bring their family and friends and explain their heritage in an environment that is easily accessible.

The Lithuanian Museum, like the other ethnic specific museums in Adelaide, was created by migrants who were born in Lithuania and settled in Australia after the Second World War. Museums act as links with their homeland; which has expanded to include the community's achievements of what they had carved out for themselves in their country of adoption. Twenty-seven years after its opening, museum visitors have different demands. Younger people of Lithuanian descent may have a diluted understanding of the language and culture. As a result, the English language is now incorporated into the explanatory texts.

People of different ethnic backgrounds entering an ethnic specific museum may see little more than colourful costumes and folk art. These museums do not fulfil the contemporary image of museums - a place of interpretive information panels, dioramas and electronic technology. The migrants' past is one that many will not care to dwell on; instead, they focus on the lighter side of their culture to diminish their unpleasant past. The communities may not wish to be remembered for their own personal history but rather the history of their country.

Museums can play an important role in helping to defuse racial tension by developing programmes that help to bring people together, and encourage a greater understanding of different

cultures and different viewpoints (Lavine 1989, p.51).

Australia's history has been influenced by the influx of migrants, mainly refugees who arrive with little more than they are wearing. If a museum interprets experiences mainly through objects and photographs, there is a danger that they will not be fully represented (Szekeres 1988, p.76). Oral histories are an excellent way of obtaining primary sources, but sadly the Mortlock Library of South Australia holds only one oral history, that of a young Lithuanian girl, while the Migration Museum has three dealing with Lithuanian displaced persons. The importance of who collects material culture and communities' histories cannot be underestimated.

The future administration of the Lithuanian Museum is in question as community numbers decrease, although the security of the collection is assured. This is on the understanding that the community will not be rejuvenated by new arrivals. The Adelaide Lithuanian Museum as with other ethnic specific museums, collect at a grass root level. State institutions do not have the finance, room, time or manpower to collect for all ethnic groups at a detailed level.

Museums are able to broaden the public perception that multiculturalism does not just refer to colourful costumes, folkmusic and cooking. Multiculturalism is dynamic. I feel the value of ethnic museums has not been fully realized. They are collecting and preserving history that would otherwise be lost, not only of the communities' activities in Australia but also of material culture that may no longer exist in the country of origin.

The Lithuanian community should be proud that it is one of very few that had the initiative to preserve its history.

The Adelaide Lithuanian Museum and Archives is open to the public on Sundays 12.30-3.00 p.m. or by appointment at:

Adelaide Lithuanian Museum & Archives
6-8 Eastry Street
Norwood, South Australia 5067.

Please stop by and visit us on your next trip to Adelaide.

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Research in Progress:

The Lithuanian Singing Tradition in Australia

Jennifer RAKAUSKAS
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In 1992 I completed a Master of Arts Qualifying thesis entitled "*Liaudies Dainos* and Identity for Lithuanians Living in Adelaide" at The University of Queensland. In it, I discussed the relevance of the songs to the Lithuanians in maintaining a sense of identity.

I focused on four women who were recognised within the Adelaide Lithuanian community as singers. From them I learned of the great importance and meaning of the songs, how they had learned them and grown up with this tradition which had been perpetuated throughout their lives. Their one fear was that the songs would be lost to the succeeding generations of Lithuanians living in Australia.

When Lithuanians came to this country as displaced persons they brought with them a singing tradition which had been handed down to them in their homeland over a period of many hundreds

of years. Although there is a large body of Lithuanian music which has been written down in the Western classical tradition, it was the oral music, the *liaudies dainos* (folk songs) and the *sutartinės* which interested me most. This is the music which had formed such an integral part of everyday life for the Lithuanians in their homeland. Although those from the country sang more often and knew more songs, generally speaking, when groups of Lithuanians came together, they sang.

I first noted this phenomenon during my early contact with Lithuanians around 1950, but its importance became more apparent with closer involvement in subsequent years with the community living in Adelaide. It was here that I spent many hours with the four women selected, listening to them talk and sing their favourite songs. I also spoke with many other members of the community, and attended various public and private events where music making was practised.

After I had completed my qualifying thesis, many questions arose regarding the singing tradition, and in particular, how it may have changed. I am now further investigating its meaning for Lithuanians in Australia. By examining the social, political and economic conditions prevailing in this country from 1947 until the present, it may be possible to ascertain how these elements have been reflected in music-making during this time.

Government policies regarding the two year contract, assimilation, multiculturalism and education, for example, could have influenced change. Australian attitudes towards Lithuanians, and the formation of Lithuanian communities around Australia where music making has been nurtured and developed, are other areas of investigation. These and other elements have possibly reflected Australian society in the perpetuation of the singing tradition.

Music which is part of an oral culture relies on change for its survival. How change has occurred since 1947 is significant regarding Lithuanian identity in Australia.

Jennifer RAKAUSKAS, B.A. (Adel.) has completed an M.A. Qualifying program at the University of Queensland. She is now a Master of Arts candidate by research, at the same University.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AABS - Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies (Australasian Section)

TUULSS - Tasmanian University Union Lithuanian Studies Society, PO Box 777, Sandy Bay, Tasmania 7005, Australia.

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