

ISSN 1031-3958

# **LITHUANIA: A VIEW FROM AUSTRALIA**

*A Bicentennial Selection of Essays*

Edited by  
**Algimantas P. TAŠKŪNAS**  
and  
**John W. DOYLE**



Australia  
1788-1988



LITHUANIA is mentioned in the daily news bulletins quite often now. But what do we know about this ancient country on the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea?

This book offers a most interesting range of original articles on Lithuania as well as a broader survey of Russia's nationalities policies.

Written by leading experts in their fields, the articles are topical today and will retain their historical value in the years to come.

The book is published by the Lithuanian Studies Society at the University of Tasmania, as part of its annual series of publications, collectively known as *Lithuanian Papers*.



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ISSN 1031-3958

LITHUANIAN PAPERS • VOLUME 2

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Sandy Bay, Tasmania:  
T.U.U. Lithuanian Studies Society  
1991

This book is Volume 2 (1988) in the annual series, LITHUANIAN PAPERS, published by the Tasmania University Union Lithuanian Studies Society, PO Box 777, Sandy Bay, Tasmania 7005, Australia. The contents were written in 1988, but were not published until September 1991.

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Printed in Australia by Advance Publicity Co, 550 East Derwent Hwy, Lindisfarne, Tas 7015, Telephone (002) 43 6083.

ISSN 1031-3958

Recommended Retail Price: \$7.50, plus forwarding costs (\$2.50 in Australia).

If not available from local booksellers, this book may be ordered directly from the publishers, TUULSS, PO Box 777, Sandy Bay, Tasmania 7005 — Phone (002) 25 2505.



It gives me great pleasure to send a message for inclusion in the Lithuanian Studies Society's publication of its Bicentennial Papers.

One of our smaller communities, the Lithuanian community is widely respected for its active participation in Australian society. In particular, Lithuanian Australians have made major contributions to our art, sculpture and dance. Many have also achieved distinction in sport and in Australian business and commerce. Your community can be proud of its contribution to Australian life.

This strong participation in our society is complemented by the Lithuanian community's consistent striving to maintain and develop the Lithuanian heritage in a new country, contributing to the richness of our multicultural society. The work of the Lithuanian Studies Society at the University of Tasmania in researching and publishing this collection of papers is a fine example of the way that our varied traditions can be shared with other Australians.

Such sharing goes to the heart of our unique multicultural society, enriching us all. Your decision to carry out your work as an Australian Bicentennial project further underlines its value.

I congratulate all those involved in this important project.

A handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to read "Bob Hawke". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

**R. J. L. HAWKE**  
Prime Minister of Australia



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• An old picture of the courtyard of the University of Vilnius (Lithuania). Founded in 1579, the University of Vilnius is Eastern Europe's oldest institution of higher education. By contrast, Russia's first centre of higher learning, the State University of Moscow, was not founded until 1755.

The University's beginnings go back to April 1, 1579, when King Stephen Bathory issued a charter allowing the transformation of the Vilnius Jesuit College (established in 1570) to the stature of a full University. The new alma mater was to enjoy the same rights and freedoms as the University of Cracow.

The papal bull followed on October 29, 1579. Pope Gregory XIII endowed the University of Vilnius with full academic rights and privileges, and named it *Alma academia et universitas Vilmensis societatis Iesu*.

The University of Vilnius has always enjoyed high academic standards. Early in the 17th century, for example, a half of all students were from foreign countries.

## Introduction

The Lithuanian Studies Society was established in 1987 by a small group of students at the University of Tasmania. Within a few months of the Society's formation, its foundation President, Ms Liz Watchorn, introduced something new on campus: lunchtime lectures and seminars on topics connected with Lithuania.

They were well received, and it soon became apparent that the University of Tasmania had a lot to offer in this field. Academic staff, graduate students and visiting speakers willingly shared their expertise and created a great deal of interest in various aspects of Lithuanian history and culture. By now, the "Lithuanian lunchtime lectures" have become a regular annual series at the University of Tasmania.

The papers in this volume were mostly presented in 1988, Australia's bicentennial year. Unfortunately, they could not be published immediately because our small Society had insufficient funds.

I am pleased to report that, since then, we have received substantial financial support from several sources: the Societies Council of Tasmania University Union; Australian Lithuanian Foundation; Talka Credit Society; and Mr Č. Čekanauskas of Narrogin, Western Australia. We thank you all, most sincerely: you have made it possible to publish this volume.

The material presented here is mainly original work which will not date easily. It must be preserved for future generations, and the delay in publication should not detract from its importance.

Simon TAŠKŪNAS,  
President,

Tasmania University Union Lithuanian Studies Society





At the Spinning-Wheel

● A Lithuanian woman at her spinning wheel — Spinning requires considerable skill, especially in producing *metmenys* — the warp, or lengthwise, threads for weaving. Spinning wheels came to Lithuania in the 19th century. Before that, several types of hand spindles were in use.

## The Cherry Tree

### Most Rev Sir Guilford YOUNG

Late Archbishop of Hobart

She was a young woman and had been born in Lithuania. I met her in Jerusalem in 1978. As the sun rose over the grey waves of the Mountains of Moab I used to ascend to the flat roof of the hospice where I lodged to pray the Morning Prayer of the Church. She and a young Englishman, who had wandered many paths and stayed a while in varied places questing for God, prayed with me. He at last had found his home in the Church. Love for each other had caught them in its first fresh rapture and they were going to marry. Few have I met so aware that the flame of their love leapt and lived within them from God who is love.

As we prayed together each morning the inspired songs of praise and thanks “while the Earth, a joyous David” danced before the rising sun, we often lifted up Lithuania to the mercy of God. For her story was the story of modern Lithuania suffering and for the present defeated but unconquered.

When the Red Army rolled over Lithuania in 1940 and rigged elections made her a Soviet Socialist Republic, Christ was expelled from school and university, the Churches were closed, her priests and bishops silenced and transported, her printing plants confiscated and her religious books were burned.

As the God-less force of Communism pressed harder and wider on this small Catholic country, thousands upon thousands of her people were packed in cattle trucks and carried across the tundras to the concentration camps of Russia’s Gulag Archipelago.

This young woman and I, worshipping God as the sun’s light suffused Moab’s Mountain, remembered the Incarnated Light and the dark time into which she had been born. Her father before he was rounded up and stacked like an animal into the truck rolling him into slavery and harsh and hungry exile, had kissed her an infant in his wife’s arms and instructed her mother to try to find her way to freedom.

Mother and child through a journey of danger and tears finally found refuge in the United States. There she had grown through childhood and youth, her mother taking any job to ensure her





• Most Rev Sir Guildford Young (centre), photographed in 1980 with an interpreter (left) and Simas Kudirka (right), a former Lithuanian prisoner of conscience in the USSR. During his visit to Hobart, Kudirka helped to establish a new ecumenical Christian group, *Friends of the Prisoners* (PO Box 12, Sandy Bay, Tasmania 7005, Australia). *Friends* now have 2,000 active members.  
— Photo: Margaret Rosenhain

education. The love of her husband never died in her mother's heart which remained faithful and true. The desire of the daughter to see and touch the father whom she had never known grew within her and became stronger as the years passed.

Suddenly the opportunity came for her to join a group of young Americans going to Moscow on a cultural exchange visit. She, entrusting herself more to God's providence than calculated strategy, slipped at risk away from the group in Moscow. The Giver of love and desire, drove her and guided her through many hazardous twists and turns towards Lithuania. She went forward on her seemingly hopeless search, her young, courageous heart filled with longing to find her father.

She reached Lithuania and with the image of the home and little farm which had been stamped in stark clarity on her mind by her mother's often repeated remembrance, she arrived at the place of her birth.

And there daughter and father met. He, after years of endurance in Siberia, had at last been released and had wandered his way home. The father led the daughter to the small piece of land that once he had nurtured, and where he had rejoiced in the wonder of the birth of his baby daughter. He showed her the cherry tree which he had planted to express his joy of that day long ago. It had grown sturdy and still stood bearing its fruit in a land which through long years has been and still is shadowed by chill tyranny and deathfulness.

As they looked upon that cherry tree, the father, worn and broken in body, embraced his child now a woman and spoke to her not words of bitterness and hate against those who had torn them apart, for ensheathed in his broken body there flowed a light serene that the dark years of suffering could never quench. His was the faith and hope of Catholic Lithuania unconquerable. He spoke of her, of his undying love for her mother and they parted, that daughter's spirit enriched forever by her father's Christlike vision and fidelity. She returned to her mother and he perforce stayed to die within a brief few brief years to await in eternity their reunion in Christ where the three will never again know the pain of parting.

Her story is the Story of Lithuania today but the echo of it is but a whisper in the corridors of power reverberating with declarations of national freedom and the dignity and rights of the human person. Have they forgotten Lithuania's enslavement and agony?

However, during those mornings of 1978, near the holy site of Christ's agony, crucifixion and apparent plunge into death and oblivion, I experienced the power of the Holy Spirit resonating in that young woman of Lithuania communicated to her by the quenchless Christian faith and hope of her father. And I believe that Lithuania will again rise and break the iron bonds of her political entombment, for she still lives in Christ.

— Reprinted, with permission, from *BALTIC NEWS*, September 1981.





**Bruce DAWE**

## **The Baltic Horse**

*You can make the street-signs Russian (and the parks),  
Re-name the stadiums and re-structure schools,  
You can raid the people's houses after dark  
— Instead of Bibles, preach the Party rules.*

*You can drive detainees eastward as you please,  
You can try to harness culture to your cart,  
But there's something will not go down on its knees  
— And you cannot put a blind-fold on the heart.*

*For the heart is like a horse that knows the way,  
And shakes its mane and sniffs the mountain air,  
And no matter how it's blinkered day by day  
— It knows **WHAT** freedom is, and it knows **WHERE**.*

*— Reprinted from BALTIC NEWS, December 1987.*

## **Industrial Relations in Lithuania: An Introduction**

**Algimantas P. Taškūnas**

University of Tasmania

Lithuania is a country in Northern Europe, situated on the east coast of the Baltic Sea. It has been there for a long time — 4,000 years at least. Lithuania covers an area of 65,200 sq km<sup>1</sup> — about the same as Tasmania. It has a population of over 3½ million.

Lithuania was once a great empire. Today, it is a modest land of farms, forests and lakes. Through the ages, the Lithuanians have preserved strong national traditions and a rich culture. Their language is one of the oldest living tongues in Europe.

Traditionally, agriculture and forestry have been Lithuania's main natural resources. The country has no minerals; but the Baltic Sea provides valuable amber and fish.<sup>2</sup> Industrialisation has become more intensive since World War II.

The Lithuanians learnt early how to preserve their forests. Conservation principles were built into their original pagan religion. And so, in spite of intensive exploitation, Lithuania's perennial forests of pine, fir and birch trees still cover one-fifth of the country. Tasmania could certainly learn a lesson or two here.

### **Early History**

The earliest work traditions in Lithuania can be deduced from their folk-songs. Ancient Lithuanians loved singing: they sang at work, and they sang at leisure. I estimate that they had at least half-a-million folk-songs<sup>3</sup> — possibly more.

Lithuanian folklore deals with work in several ways. Some folk songs are for singing while engaged in any work; other songs are earmarked for special activities only, such as barley harvest, cutting the hay, threshing, etc.

Then there are songs that combine work with mythological elements. In one such song, the sun, having completed its job of lighting up the world, is waking the moon; and, in parallel, a young woman is running across the fields to call her father-in-law for work.<sup>4</sup>

In the absence of any written records before the first century A.D., these folk-songs hold the key to Lithuanian society in the pre-Christian



millenia. Lithuanian songs have been analysed for their form, lyrical style, boy-girl relationships and suchlike. But the social and work characteristics of those early Lithuanians still remain to be investigated.

“Ingeniis patuit campus”<sup>5</sup> — the field lies open to talent — in these areas.

## Feudalism, Manorialism


Archeologists say<sup>6</sup> that Lithuanian feudal castles, as defence posts for the growing towns, appeared in the period from approximately A.D. 500 to 800. They later became the centres of larger administrative units.

The feudal system was accomplished before the ninth century. It is attested by written records dated 876<sup>7</sup> and during the 890s.<sup>8</sup>

There are indications that land ownership existed in Lithuania as early as the 12th century<sup>9</sup>. At first, prisoners of war were used as farm labourers on larger estates. They lived on the properties or in adjoining settlements. The prisoners were gradually joined by debtors, land lessees and desperate people who sold themselves for life during famines.

The manorial system became established by the 15th century; but the Lithuanian serfs refused to accept it and kept revolting. Some of the better-known uprisings were:

- 1413 Žemaičiai
- 1483 Merkinė
- 1535-36 Tenziogala
- 1535 Telšiai
- 1538, Upytė Kurkliai
- 1794, 1831, 1863 general uprisings.



• Various implements were invented, to subdue and even torture disobedient serfs. This device was used to apply pressure to the serfs' wrists and arms.

— LE, Vol II, P 282

Lithuanian serfs were finally granted human rights by a manifesto of February 19, 1861. Serfdom was eliminated on May 1, 1863.<sup>11</sup>

One of the earliest studies of Lithuanian serfdom is by E. Römer, *Beiträge zu Litauens Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, published in 1897.

## Independent Lithuania

After 123 years' occupation by Russia, modern-day Lithuania regained its independence on February 16, 1918. From the start, the national government chose to play an active part in labour matters.<sup>12</sup> In Dunlop's terms<sup>13</sup>, the third group of actors — the government agencies — were making a major contribution to rule-making and to the industrial relations system as a whole.

The 1922 Constitution stipulated that the human work force was to be protected and cared for. The 1938 Constitution tried to ensure that the worker and his family would be able to find work, and to enjoy adequate rest along with a rich cultural life.

## The State

The regulation of industrial relations in Lithuania was in the hands of the national legislature. Some of the more important bills included:

- Establishment of the Labour Inspectorate (1919).
- 8-hour work day (1919).
- Labour exchange to combat unemployment and to place workers (1921).
- Hiring and dismissal of farm labourers on large estates (1921).
- Addendum to industrial regulations, prescribing compensation for workers retrenched or dismissed through no fault of theirs (1921).
- Salaries for Government employees (1922).
- Public holidays and rest periods (1925).
- Hire of blue-collar workers in industry (1933).
- Insurance against accidents (1936).
- Workers' compensation for farm labourers (1938).

Most of these laws superseded laws previously in force, sometimes laws inherited from Tsarist Russia.

Lithuania ratified a number of international labour conventions. For example (1931-1934):

- Children's night work in industry.
- 8-hour work day.
- 48-hour week.
- Weekly rest breaks in industrial concerns.



● Agriculture is Lithuania's main economic activity. The traditional farming methods (pictured) have since given way to modern mechanisation. Manufacturing industry expanded rapidly during the Soviet rule.

- Medical insurance for workers engaged in production, trade and domestic duties.
- Equal treatment of foreigners and citizens when assessing compensation for accidents at work.

In Lithuania, social welfare and industrial relations were administered by the Ministry of the Interior. The office of Labour Inspectorate was established on July 1, 1919. An Act passed on November 19, 1924, spelt out the Inspectorate's composition, authority and responsibilities.

Labour inspectors had the power to visit places of employment; register accidents; check the accountability of the medical funds in regard to industrial accidents; authorise the employment of apprentices and fix their wages and working conditions; and, from 1934 onwards, arbitrate in the determination of industrial workers' wages at the local level.

There were no special *industrial courts*. Industrial disputes were handled by the ordinary courts. Wage disputes were dealt with by a commission, consisting of the chief labour inspector and employers' and workers' representatives.

### Workers and their Organisations

The 1923 census recorded 2,168,419 people in Lithuania. 67.9% of them were workers and 45.7% of all workers were working family members. The labour force was distributed among:

- agriculture 76.7%
- industry 6.4%
- commerce and transportation 3.6%
- public service 3.2%
- others (incl domestic service) 10.1%

By 1929, 1,572,017 persons were in employment in Lithuania. Their distribution was:

	Blue-collar %	White-collar %
Agriculture	66.9	1.9
Industry, trades, building	13.0	3.3
Transportation, communications	2.6	9.0
Commerce, finance	1.4	10.5
Public service, self-employed professions	1.4	74.9
Other employment areas	14.7	0.4
	100	100

45.7% of the total work-force were still working family members. The proportion of family members in agriculture was then 42.4% (666,556 persons).

The first records of *trade unions* in Lithuania appear towards the end of the 19th century.<sup>14</sup> These were illegal workers' combinations, known as *kasa* (fund, treasury).

The Christian bootmakers' union was formed in Vilnius in 1891 with the help of certain socialist intellectuals. About the same time, Jewish workers and tradesmen were forming their own unions.

By 1902, the city of Vilnius had the leather workers', tailors', furniture makers' and bootmakers' unions. Other unions sprang up soon after: bakers, flour millers, brickmakers, sawmillers, potters, etc.

The leather workers' union established branches in country centres: Smurgainiai, Mašmena, Gardinas, Krinkai, Sokolka, Kėdainiai, Šiauliai.

In this way, Lithuanian organisations for the protection of workers' economic interests were formed earlier than their political groups.

Lithuanian workers' activism also started ahead of their Russian counterparts. There were several reasons for this: the Lithuanian working class was better educated; it was steeped in the Western tradition; and the Lithuanians were persecuted not only as workers, but also because of their religion and ethnic origin.

For the same reasons, political workers' movements emerged in



Lithuania before they did in Russia. For example, the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania and the Jewish Bund.

It proved more difficult to unionise farm workers. They were scattered and far less union-conscious. But the widespread agricultural workers' strikes of 1905 and 1906 changed the picture. The Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP), having organised and backed the strikes, went ahead and in 1906 drew up the rules for the Estate and Farm Workers' Society. The Field Workers' Union of Žagarė used the same model for its rules.

The period of 1907 to 1912 was unfavourable to trade union development and a lot of union functions were carried out by the local branches of LSDP.

Normal economic life was disrupted during the First World War. Retreating Russians closed down many larger industrial plants and took machinery and other equipment with them to Russia.

This put many Lithuanians out of work. During the ensuing German occupation, the Germans took advantage of the situation and employed Lithuanians on military tasks: digging trenches, repairing and building roads, felling trees . . . some were deported for forced labour in Germany.

The restoration of Lithuania's independence in 1918 signalled the revival of trade union activities.

The central trade union office was opened in Kaunas, Lithuania's second largest city, in 1919 (in Ugniagesiu street). The office published a popular weekly, *Darbininkų Gyvenimas*. The second ministry under M. Sleževičius, had a separate ministry of Labour. J. Paknys, the (Social Democrat) minister for labour and social welfare, encouraged the growth of workers' organisations.

The agricultural workers' union was registered on May 16, 1919, after a well attended meeting in Vilkaviškis. Similar unions were formed in other centres.

At a general trade union conference held on June 20-22, 1920, the central union leadership was taken over by Communists. This led to internal struggles between pro-Communist and anti-Communist unionists.

Finally, by 1926, two central headquarters were established: a Communist-controlled central office in Mapų street; and the Lithuanian blue and white collar workers' central office at 40 Kęstučio



street. The latter was registered on 3rd July 1926, immediately after the election of the Third Parliament.

Affiliated with the second office were 18,486 unionists, comprising: agricultural workers; miscellaneous workers; public service; railway; leather workers (700); metal workers; postal; musicians and actors; teachers.

The Christian Workers Union, formed before World War I, became the Lithuanian Labour Federation during the years of independence.

With the change of government on 17th December 1926, free trade unions were gradually phased out.

The central union office was closed down on 15th October, 1927, and its newspaper ceased publication.

Some trade unions continued (e.g., public service, railwaymen's), but they were eventually replaced by *Darbo Rūmai* (Labour Hall) in 1936.

## Lockouts

A significant lockout in Lithuania dates back to the first decade of this century.<sup>15</sup>

During the 1905 revolution, political mass strikes sometimes turned into economic strikes. As a result of these strikes, the workers of Vilnius secured the eight-hour day, higher wages and the recognition of collective bargaining contracts.

Three years later, in December 1908, the employers refused to honour some of the workers' gains and declared a lockout. In the case of the leather industry, the lockout continued for four months, until April 1909.

At the end of this struggle, the workers' wages were slashed by 20% and the working day was lengthened. However, all other work conditions were preserved — thanks to strong trade union organisation.

### Soviet-occupied Lithuania

During the Soviet rule (1940-41 and 1944-90), the nature and functions of the trade unions in Lithuania changed drastically. The total number of unions shrank and the unions became industry-based.

According to Soviet ideologists, the unions had no more battles to fight in the USSR. The fundamental cause for the employee-employer confrontations had been eliminated, they would say; for the Soviet State is the sole legitimate employer, and the workers are the State. So, they cannot fight themselves.

Guided by this philosophy, Soviet Lithuanian trade unions were expected to "help" the State in boosting production, increasing its efficiency and managing the national economy.

In occupied Lithuania, trade unions also administered most aspects of social insurance. They controlled maternity grants, pensions, temporary unemployment benefits, recreational facilities, holiday travel, allocation of holiday homes, and special diets.

One of their duties was to supervise sanitary standards, workers' protection and safety engineering. Trade unions employed technical inspectors who were aided by voluntary labour-protection activists.

Soviet Lithuanian unions endorsed the Kremlin's policy of occasional Saturday's or Sunday's work without pay. On Lenin's birthday and on other special occasions decreed by the party, all employees were expected to complete a day's "voluntary work without pay, for the good of society".

### Lithuanians Abroad

In more recent times, i.e., during the past two centuries, hundreds of thousands of Lithuanians have migrated to all corners of the Earth. Their reasons varied, depending on such things as avoiding the Tsarist draft (25 years' service in the Army), economic pressures, and flight from persecution.

The Lithuanian migrants faced great hardships in countries such as Scotland, Brazil and the United States. This led to industrial activism, confrontations and in some cases, repatriation.

Only a few of these colourful experiences have been researched to date, and some accounts that have been published are riddled with inaccuracies.<sup>16</sup>

### Post Scriptum

Eighteen months after the initial presentation of this paper (in late 1988), Lithuania's independence was restored once again, on March 11, 1990. This threw Lithuania's industrial scene into a state of flux, opening up yet another field for fruitful research.

\* \* \*

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> USSR '76: Novosti Press Agency Year book. Moscow: Novosti, 1976, between pp 64 and 65.

<sup>2</sup> cf. "Lithuania" in: *The World Book Encyclopedia*, Vol 12. Chicago: Field Enterprises, 1974, p 346 ff.

<sup>3</sup> 195,000 Lithuanian folk-songs were recorded in 1918-1940 alone ("Daina" in *Lietuvių Enciklopedija\**, Vol IV. South Boston: LEL, 1954, pp 232-233).

\* Lithuanian Encyclopedia (in Lithuanian), henceforth referred to as *LE*.

<sup>4</sup> Song No 5 in BALYS, Dr J, *Lietuvių Tautosakos Skaitymai*, Vol 1. Tübingen: Patria, 1948, p 100.

<sup>5</sup> University of Tasmania's motto.

<sup>6</sup> GIMBUTAS, Marija, *The Balts*. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1963, second printing 1968, p 142.

<sup>7</sup> RIMBERT, 'Vita sancti Anscharii per S. Rembertum', *Scriptores Rerum Svericarum*, Vol II, Uppsala, 1828, p 323. Quoted in: GIMBUTAS, *op cit*, pp 142-143.

<sup>8</sup> OROSIUS, *King Alfred's Anglo-Saxon version of the compendious history of the world*. London: 1959, pp 53, 54. Quoted in: GIMBUTAS, *op cit*, p142.

<sup>9</sup> "Baudžiava", in *LE*, Vol II, p 281.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>11</sup> "Baudžiava", in *LE*, Vol II, p 282.

<sup>12</sup> The data in this section are based on PAPLĖNAS, Jonas, "Darbo apsauga ir socialinis aprūpinimas", in *LE*, Vol XV, pp 255-266.

<sup>13</sup> DUNLOP, John T., *Industrial Relations Systems*. New York: Holt, 1958.

<sup>14</sup> This section on trade unions is largely based on "Profesinės sąjungos", in *LE*, Vol XXIV, pp 78-80.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid*, p 79.

<sup>16</sup> For example: RODGERS, Murdoch, "The Lithuanians", *History Today*, Vol 34, July 1985, pp 15-20.





● *Lithuanian Lady*: A painting by Vytautas Kasiulis, a contemporary Lithuanian artist.

Born in 1918, Kasiulis studied at Kaunas School of Art and at the Institute for Applied Art in Kaunas. He later taught in Kaunas and Freiburg. Since 1948 Kasiulis has been living and creating in Paris.

Kasiulis' first one-man exhibition was held in Kaunas (1943), followed by many other exhibitions in Freiburg/Breisgau (1947), Paris (annually since 1950), New York (1956, 1963), Stockholm (1957, 1959, 1969), Geneva (1958), Copenhagen (1959), Chicago (1971, 1976).


Jūratė REILLY

## Lithuanian Lady

*Proud aristocratic race,  
Such is the Lithuanian Lady.  
Same mould as Vitas Gerulaitis  
Inborn fighting spirit!  
Torn between two cultures  
More European than Australian.  
Clash of peasant and aristocracy,  
Austrian princes running through her veins.  
Autocratically Polish in her demands  
A zest for living and loving,  
She leaves her soul in the hearts of men  
As few forget a Lithuanian Lady . . .*

## Peace of Mind

*Some of us are destined to want others  
(Even when they don't want us any longer).  
Then, of course, there is you.  
You spend enormous amounts of energy  
In making yourself loved  
Only to lose interest the moment  
You are close to achieving your goal.  
As I perceive this part of your personality  
I enter a new-found state of peace  
And become purged of you totally,  
Only the memory of your voice remains.*



## Kristijonas Donelaitis in Johannes Bobrowski's *Litauische Claviere* (Lithuanian Pianos)

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University of Melbourne

In his final problematic prose work *Litauische Claviere* ("Lithuanian Pianos")<sup>1</sup> Johannes Bobrowski uses the Lithuanian poet Kristijonas Donelaitis (1714-1780) to express a dialectic principle<sup>2</sup>. Although not one of the central "real" characters of the novel, he becomes a prime illustration of Bobrowski's main theme, "die Deutschen und der europäische Osten" as well as the predominant symbol of Bobrowski's ideas<sup>3</sup>. The importance of his role has been frequently observed but not sufficiently stressed. It is therefore the aim of this article to analyse the direct and indirect role of Donelaitis in *Litauische Claviere* with particular reference to four quotations as well as a wedding scene from his work *Metai* (The Seasons)<sup>4</sup>.

Although scholarly research has often acknowledged Bobrowski as belonging to the Baltic area and has recognised his dependence on Baltic or, more specifically, Lithuanian themes and motifs (G. Wolf, S. Hoefert, B. Leistner), it is the novel *Litauische Claviere* and the character of Donelaitis that best exemplify his preoccupation with the Baltic region. Both Donelaitis and Bobrowski see individual creative effort as the only solution in seeking atonement for a long history of German oppression and for resolving conflict which arise not only within one community but also in the relationships of various nationalities with one another. The creative contribution of the individual, which Bobrowski himself and, in his view, Donelaitis wishes to make, lies in arousing the feeling of guilt (Bobrowski speaks of "Unglück und Vershuldung")<sup>5</sup> which is to be traced to intersocial tensions. These manifest themselves in direct conflicts between Germans and Lithuanians, who are given the roles respectively of oppressors and oppressed by both writers. Johannes Bobrowski can possibly be described as the only modern German poet who has through Donelaitis pointed to the cultural heritage of the Baltic people and emphasises their tragic history of oppression from the days of the Teutonic order to the recent past of Hitler's Germany.

Bobrowski was obviously fascinated by Donelaitis' life and his versatility and makes frequent use of well known biographical details. Donelaitis, as we read in *Litauische Claviere*, built three pianofortes, one of them a clavichord, made thermometers and barometers, and in his monumental work *Metai* (The Seasons), written well before Klopstock, as Bobrowski emphasises<sup>6</sup>, he consciously fostered the Lithuanian language and actively encouraged the Lithuanians to preserve their traditions including their language, customs and dress. The fact that *Metai* was written in Lithuanian, a minority language, is interpreted by Bobrowski as a patriotic act, displaying true appreciation of one's own culture:

Mich bewegt — Voigt spricht langsam . . . das Leben eines, Dorfpfarrers, ein preussisches Dorf litauischer Zunge, ein deutsch gebildeter Mann, — der sich einer Sprache bedient, damals, in seinen Werken, die seine Wirkung doch nur einschränken kann. [LC 75]

Voigt argues that Donelaitis' decision to write his works in Lithuanian ought not to be necessarily interpreted as an expression of antipathy against all Germans, although his own vision of the German character is presented in negative terms:


Die Reinheit der Sitten schwinde mit dem Vordringen der Deutschen, deutsch — das sei aus Stehlen und Fluchen zusammengesetzt, woketis aus wogt und keikt . . . [LC 75]

Despite these doubts and deliberations the librettist Voigt concludes that Donelaitis was not an enemy of the Germans, but merely concerned about the "Herrschaftsverhältnisse" (LC 76), i.e. the power structure or the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. It is not the people themselves who cause conflict, but the chauvinistic demands of the predominant group:

Diese Oper. Wer wird sie aufführen wollen? Oder können, jetzt, in Deutschland? Und in Litauen, wie stünde es damit? Das sieht doch alles, hüben wie drüben, sehr ähnlich aus. [LC 77]

Thus Voigt seems to suggest that no class, no culture or society should dominate another.

This is the only place in the novel where, with the word "Herrschaftsverhältnisse", the terminology reflects the Marxist concept of "Klassenherrschaft", which presupposes the coexistence of two antagonistic classes, one dominant and the other subordinate, underlying Marx's dialectic conception of thesis, antithesis and synthesis<sup>7</sup>.



• Lithuanian poet Kristijonas Donelaitis.

— Woodcut by Vytautas K. Jonynas

One cannot, however, agree with Voigt's supposition that Donelaitis nurtured a clear understanding of class differences as causing the social turmoil of those times and that one should seek the reasons within the social structure. Donelaitis, perhaps naively, viewed all social problems from a Christian point of view, attributing all difficulties to the foibles and weaknesses of the human species<sup>8</sup>.

Although there are many sections in *Litauische Claviere*, where Bobrowski describes episodes taken from the life of Donelaitis, there are four different parts of the novel where Bobrowski quotes directly from *Metai*, using the translation by Louis Passarge<sup>9</sup>. In some cases these 'quotations' are deliberately abbreviated or re-structured, as the author himself points out, a freedom which B. Leistner considers to be "durchaus anfechtbar"<sup>10</sup>. The first quotation taken from *Winter Cares* (*Žiemos Rūpesčiai*), describes hungry animals in winter and is here quoted by Potschka:

Ach,  
konnten sie reden, die Tiere, auf litauisch, wie  
sie euch dankten  
für eure Gabe, euch allen, jetzt wo sie im Stall  
sind, im Winter! [LC 92-93]

The quotation appears in a context where social problems have come to the fore: the presentation of the Lithuanian festivities at Rambynas, in honour of Grand Duke Vytautas. This context provides Bobrowski with the opportunity for raising the issue of Lithuanian-German disagreements; for in *Metai* not only the Lithuanian peasants appear to object to German colonists, but, in this extract, even the animals express their gratitude for fodder "auf litauisch", i.e. in Lithuanian, as a form of protest. The quotation seems to go even further. It draws attention to Potschka, a great admirer of the poet Donelaitis, yet a quiet, seemingly ineffectual character, not in any way involved in the action. It is all the more significant that he is more interested in quoting what is to him a living Donelaitis than in actively celebrating a dead Vytautas: "Potschka ist noch am Feuer geblieben, mehr mitseinem lebendigen Donelaitis als mit einem toten Vytautas" [LC 92]. Only in the last chapter does he emerge from his role as Außenseiter and continue to play an undefined and ambiguous role so that it is hardly convincing when a leading Bobrowski critic sees him as the "zentrale Figur des Romans"<sup>12</sup>.

The second Donelaitis quotation, from the third idyll *Autumn Wealth* (*Rudenio Gėrybės*) is made by one of the protagonists, Dr.



Storost-Vydūnas, an authentic historical character, who lived from 1868 to 1953:

Schwein, wie lebst du! Schämst du dich nicht!  
 Vorgestern  
 kam ich vorbei an deinem verlotterten Hofe.  
 Wiehert mein Brauner doch da, gleich fliegen die Sparren vom  
 Dache, stoßen die Fenster entzwei. Drei bunte  
 Schweine mit ihren  
 Ferkeln schreien im Haus und stürzen hinaus aus der Türe,  
 grad als ging es ans Schlachten, — mir standen die Haare zu Berge!<sup>13</sup>  
 [LC 95]

This quotation startles the reader with its coarse, reproachful tone, although, on closer examination, it allows the Lithuanian scholar Storost-Vydūnas to illustrate the difficulty which must be overcome if one is to integrate this kind of didactic passage from *Metai* into the Donelaitis libretto. And besides, it bears directly on Donelaitis, who appears as a stern and angry observer of the social scene, condemning not only, as he frequently does, the influence of foreign colonists<sup>14</sup>, but the very sloth of some peasants who actually live with their pigs.

In the *third* quotation from Donelaitis we have another excerpt from *Winter Cares* (*Žiemos Rūpesčiai*), where Donelaitis uses unusually harsh language to highlight and denounce the exploitation of the peasants by the ruling class who push the underprivileged from one place to another “als sei'n es verlaufene Hunde”<sup>15</sup>:

Ach daß Gott sich erbarm, es kämnen die gnädigen Herren immer  
 noch weiter des Bauern Feil nach dem letzten der Groschen.

...

Oh du selbstsücht'ger Tyrann, du Schmerbauch,  
 dem wüst sich das Haar sträubt,  
 der wie ein zungelnder Blitz umherschlägt und Schrecken verbreitet,  
 hast du denn anders begonnen als einer der Armen auf der Erden,  
 hat eine Mutter dir nicht wie jedem den Hintern gewaschen!  
 [LC 106-107]

Finally, the *fourth* quotation appears in Bobrowski's presentation of the Lithuanian wedding and comes from *Summer Toils* (*Vasaros darbai*). In this section of the novel Bobrowski's choice of quotations no longer reflects the theme of the peasants' economic struggle but allows Donelaitis to recite his own lyrical verse, for the first time entirely devoid of social involvement:

Freunde, schaut, die erstrahlende Glut vermöchte den Kienspan zu  
 zünden. Mählich aber auch welken die Kränze der Erde, die Blumen  
 senken hinab ihre schönen Häupter zum trocknenden Grase... [LC  
 120]



When analysing the *Metai* quotations in the context of *Litauische Claviere*, there is a direct connection with the plot and a direct link to Voigt's statement about Donelaitis' consciousness of “Herrschaftsverhältnisse”. Especially the third quotation, with its biting remark about the “gnädige Herren” who mercilessly exploit the poor “Bauersleute”, serves to emphasize the Bobrowskian awareness of class domination of the underprivileged by the ruling classes. Bobrowski uses this quotation to illustrate Donelaitis' social involvement, and even though it may seem far-fetched to interpret it as a manifestation of Donelaitis' view of the “class struggle”, it is most certainly part of Bobrowski's own dialectic principle which subtly but unmistakably pervades the plot.

In *Litauische Claviere* the dialectic principle can be understood from two points of view. It is both the conflict between two social classes, i.e. the Germans (thesis) and Lithuanians (antithesis), including their conflict in the Memel region, and also the creative effort of individuals, who try to liberate themselves from national limitations and look for a

solution for those conflicts in the creative process, the most perfect embodiment of which is the poet Donelaitis, the maker of Lithuanian pianos (synthesis). Within this threefold dialectical structure of the novel three groups of people emerge: the Germans, the Lithuanians and a mixed group, whom one could call "neutrals". On the German side we find a presentation of different socio-economic groups. First of all, there are the "Reichsdeutsche", who travel to the "Memelland" on cheap shopping sprees, participating in political discussions while enjoying a glass or two and reacting aggressively to any criticism of Germany or themselves. Then, there are the members of the NSDAP, the German Nazi Party in the Memel region, represented by Neumann and his henchmen. Not for a single moment does Bobrowski allow the reader to be in any doubt about his opinion regarding this group; whenever it is presented the atmosphere is charged with violence:

Rechtsanwalt Neumann schickt immer mal wieder einen schrägen Blick zu seinen Spießgesellen hinüber, so zwischendurch: zu diesem Kumpan oder jenem Komplizen. [LC 32]

The German village inhabitants are presented in the framework of a folk festival within the social structure of the village, from the lord of the manor through the representatives of the middle class, including the innkeeper Wythe, the baker Eywille and the teacher Kankelat, who sees everything but prefers to have seen nothing. Finally, there are the peasants like Gendrolis, whose daughter has become romantically and regrettably involved with Potschka, a Lithuanian of all people, something which the society of an "almost purely German village", as Neumann puts it, is going to stop at all costs, even if it has to resort to brute force.

The symbol of nationalism is the local branch of the women's association, "Luisenbund", whose sentimental stage show celebrates the historical meeting of the Prussian Queen Louise with the Emperor Napoleon. Also nationalistic in attitude is Gottschalk's German cultural society. The performance of the Luisenbund (LC 85-86), which Bobrowski sees as a belated manifestation of "Hurrah-Patriotismus", is made to appear humorous, if not ludicrous.

Forbidding and demonic, on the other hand, are the actions of the representatives of the "Kulturverein", who cold-bloodedly liquidate Josupeit at the confluence of the Jura and the Memel (Nemunas) rivers, where once a stronghold belonging to the "Deutschritterorden" (the Teutonic Knights) was supposed to have stood, "ein Ort, wo die deutschen Taten ihre Spur verlieren". [LC 60]

This merciless depiction of the Germans is followed by a curiously benevolent description of the Lithuanians. Even though Bobrowski was wary of presenting an over-idealized picture of Lithuania, the Lithuanians are here presented as peaceful, happy, gentle-natured and melancholy. Although the "patriotic" Lithuanians are referred to as "Tautyninkai", the description is made to sound neutral when compared to his depiction of the National Socialists<sup>16</sup>. Nor is there any attempt to divide the Lithuanians into classes. One is almost inclined to speak of a classless society. On Mt. Rombinus they also celebrate their great national hero, Vytautas, in a romantically nostalgic play. However, the impression left on the reader is in direct contrast to that left by the arrogant ladies of the Luisenbund:

Oben auf dem Berg, die Litauer, haben ihr Feuer schon hoch. Sie singen eine Weile. Das Feuer schon hoch. Sie singen eine Weile. Das Feuer brennt über dem Stein, ruhig, nur manchmal greift der Wind von oben her in das offene Rund hinab und dreht die Flammen auseinander. [LC 91]

Distinct from the presentation of the Germans and the Lithuanians is a third "neutral" group represented by Gawehn, Voigt, Potschka as well as the historical characters Storost-Vydūnas and Donelaitis. The members of this group share a number of common convictions; they are endowed with strong individualistic traits and illustrate Bobrowski's aim of maintaining a balance between different sociological and ideological groups:

If we postulate that the Germans and the Lithuanians respectively represent thesis and antithesis in diametrical opposition, it will follow, in dialectic terms, that the synthesis occurs in chapter eight through the dramatic apparition of Donelaitis in the midst of a Lithuanian wedding scene.

However, the dialectic principle of *Litauische Claviere* is not followed through in a coherent way. An analysis of the structure reveals a subtle but clearly discernible division into epic and lyric sections. Whereas the first section of the novel (chapters 1-6) had dealt with complex socio-political issues and is epic in nature, the second section (chapters 7-9) with its Potschka-visions of Donelaitis renounces all claims to concrete characterization and is more lyrical in character. The fact that the narrative thread seems to break off at the end of chapter six would appear to justify such a separation into two main sections, for there the ties with the immediate present are broken off as we discover the failure of the opera plans. The first two quotations

have been incorporated into the first part (chapter 6), the third and fourth into the second (chapters 7 and 8). It is interesting that the first two quotations appear before the murder of Josupeit which is the climax of the conflict.

In the second section, after most of the important characters have vanished, only one basic protagonist, Potschka, remains. He is made to merge with Donelaitis. The third quotation can thus be interpreted as the author's protest against the rule of the oppressors in East Prussia, using Donelaitis as a mouthpiece. It has been integrated into a context where the chain of real events is broken and in the sequel, beginning with Potschka's ascent to the trigonometrical tower and his possible death by falling from it, the reader is confronted with an impenetrable complexity of fantasy elements, subjectively viewed and difficult to disentangle, a complexity which according to some interpreters may indeed have been due to the fact that Bobrowski tried to complete the novel during the weeks of failing health before his death<sup>17</sup>. It is indeed tempting to agree with the interpretation that Potschka's fall is a symbolic warning of dangers of ignoring present



reality and that his Donelaitis-visions present a danger "in as far as they substitute for a clear view of the present"<sup>18</sup>. However, this visionary, non-narrative, even musical quality of the last three chapters could well have been a conscious effort to avoid a clear answer. By deliberately combining the characters of Potschka and Donelaitis Bobrowski goes beyond the boundary of a simple narrative and achieves a multiplicity of themes. Despite recent tendencies in Bobrowski-research to consider Potschka the central character in *Litauische Claviere*, it seems unlikely that this basically ambiguous and structurally insignificant character can be seen as incorporating Bobrowski's stated themes of social-moral involvement and artistic aspirations. From the very beginning Potschka has certainly been familiar to the reader as a somewhat eccentric Lithuanian teacher, interested in cultivating Lithuanian folk-songs (*daina*), but he is also seen from the beginning in his relation to Donelaitis. As early as the third chapter he identifies himself with Donelaitis, talking in the first person to his own beloved Tuta, whom he identifies with Donelaitis' wife, Anna Regina (LC 50).

Bearing in mind various phases of the characterization of Potschka, especially his tendency to day-dream, it becomes clear that Bobrowski has deliberately made use of a device which enables him to consistently break the laws relating to the dimension of time and place and finally to break loose and free himself from them altogether. Originally presented as the historical subject-matter of the opera, Donelaitis becomes increasingly more important towards the end of the novel. Relying on his special narrative technique, Bobrowski pushes this theme more and more into the foreground, until through Potschka's vision in chapter eight Donelaitis stands as one of the living "real" characters in front of us. While so doing Bobrowski uses another artistic device. Donelaitis confronts us in the Lithuanian peasant wedding scene from his own work *Metai*. In this way the last link is provided for juxtaposing Bobrowski's and Donelaitis' works, so that Donelaitis presents a perfect fusion of political involvement and artistic skill. There is, indeed, a further general consensus of opinion in both East and West that Bobrowski wanted to express the importance of the theme of art, so that aesthetics and its problems, especially in conjunction with the Donelaitis theme, constitute one of the fundamental aspects of *Litauische Claviere*. The inclusion of the above four quotations seems to exemplify this aesthetic aspect in a particularly appropriate way.



From the very beginning of the novel artistic creation is discussed in the context of music and poetry. In chapter four Voigt, the driving force behind the opera, explains to the editor Saluga his plans, which, as he says himself, are based on hope only<sup>19</sup>. According to Bobrowski, the planned opera about the Lithuanian poet Donelaitis and Lithuanian culture which had attracted the interest of "Kulturvereine" as well as individual scholars would lead to a better understanding between Germans and Lithuanians as well as to their reconciliation. This would provide the synthesis to the basic thesis and antithesis of the novel, the political and social polarization of Germans and Lithuanians. The opera would perhaps "save" the Lithuanian country, its culture and language, which Voigt describes as follows:

Ein unwiderrüflich untergehendes Volkstum, um das es schade ist, die Zurückdrängung geschieht von Süden nach Norden, eine aussterbende Sprache von größter Schönheit, eine Volkspoesie von höchstem Reichtum . . . [LC 12]<sup>20</sup>

On the other hand Bobrowski makes known through Voigt that the greatest enemy of the successful staging of the opera is the exaggerated nationalism of both countries. In another section Voigt's question, "War das alles doch eher Romantik, und ist sie vorbei?"<sup>21</sup>, rhetorical though it may be, seems to confirm Bobrowski's own conviction that creative effort, such as the planning of an opera about a "dying" people, is of value, even if doomed to failure. And such a venture is, despite the tone of the speaker, not to be seen as sheer illusion, based on deluded romantic fantasy, as Voigt's question would seem to imply.

And yet the illusion is consciously retained in chapter eight, which begins with a description of the wedding ceremonies of Lithuanian peasants and continues with the presentation of Donelaitis. For this purpose Bobrowski selects the wedding scene from *Metai*<sup>22</sup>, though the connecting link between both descriptions is fragile and defies consistent comparison. It seems that, in adapting this episode from Donelaitis, Bobrowski uses even greater poetic licence than with the quotations, achieving a concentrated and impressionistic effect, the most characteristic features reduced to a thumbnail formula. And yet, despite providing a sparkling variety of wedding customs, raucous singing and the introduction of bizarre characters from *Metai*, Bobrowski's central concern is to present a mature and somewhat weary Donelaitis, who is heard to speak softly, reciting his own lines from *Summer Toils*<sup>23</sup>. The Donelaitis character remains the uniting link, joining the functions of trigonometrical structure (loss of time dimension) and the basic theme of dissonance seeking resolution within the novel. Everything else, the colourfulness of the wedding

scene, the sound of Lithuanian folksongs, the extravagant *Metai* characters Slunkius, Pelėda and all the others, are simply a means of enlivening the chapter. At the end of the wedding and after the mysterious "Kletterer" has vanished, only Donelaitis' quiet voice remains:

Hier sind wir. Wo is das?  
Nichts mehr gehört: Daß Donelaitis leise  
zu reden begonnen hatte. [LC 120]

The eighth chapter finishes with the description of the Lithuanian wedding as well as with the appearance of somebody in the tower, an imperfect chord being played on a dilapidated old piano.

In the very last, the ninth chapter, a catastrophe appears to take place as Potschka experiences his own "death". He speaks as though he were not himself but the dying Donelaitis, addressing his wife, Anna Regina. The third piano has just been completed and he, Potschka-Donelaitis, has fulfilled his task. By means of this third piano, which has a slightly stronger sound than the ones played by his "Amtsbrüder" Kempfer and Jordan, we have a nostalgically poetical, indeed romantic, motif, a variation in musical terms of that which had been epically expressed, i.e. the dismal failure of the opera envisaged by Gawehn and Voigt. The failure of the Lithuanian opera extends to a failure of singers to harmonize with three pianos, Donelaitis does not see the point of tuning his piano higher. After all: "Sie sollten mir ja nicht springen, die Rahmen." [LC 124]

The failure is sounded somewhat pessimistically at the end of the chapter and the novel would seem to end with a negative answer to the question regarding the power of the arts and the significance of music bridging discord and dissension. It would seem that all these things are powerless in the face of political and social strife. However, in the very last lines one perhaps detects a slightly more optimistic note, in a major key, as Potschka awakes from his vision and hears the encouraging sounds of the girl, showing him a new life and beckoning in her direction:

Hingehen, das geht nicht mehr. Hingehen nicht . . . Herrufen, hierher.  
Wo wir sind. [LC 126]

In conclusion, the main hypothesis of this article about the pervasive influence of Donelaitis on the theme and structure of *Litauische Claviere* can perhaps be substantiated despite Potschka's predominant role in the last few chapters. It is Donelaitis, not Potschka, whose symbolical function extends to both epic and lyric spheres of the novel,

exemplified in the four *Metai* quotations which have helped to link a variety of themes. In the framework of what must initially be considered a fragile, bidimensional structure, the third quotation has a crucial significance for Bobrowski's concept of dialectics which we have defined as the thesis-antithesis of German-Lithuanian antagonism. The synthesis manifests itself finally in the cultural achievement of Donelaitis. Donelaitis, more so than Potschka, would appear to be Bobrowski's alter ego. Both Donelaitis and Bobrowski unequivocally condemn the tension between the oppressors and oppressed. Both censure and oppose the German cultural penetration into Lithuanian territory. Both understand it not so much as a question of countries or nations fighting one another as the chauvinistic claims of a dominating class pitted against a vulnerable weaker one. Bobrowski makes a plea for tolerance of the culturally underprivileged. In the Donelaitis figure he seems to make the Lithuanian, and in a broader sense, the East European cultural heritage a responsibility of the present but in the Potschka figure appears to draw the conclusion that time present has a responsibility to time past. Only in this way when the present is made aware of the past, is it possible to understand one's own, and in this case German, traditions.

★ ★ ★

This paper was first published in GERMANISCH-ROMANISCHE MONATSSCHRIFT, Vol. 38, 1983, No. 1/2. Reprinted with permission of the author and the publishers.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Johannes Bobrowski: *Litauische Claviere*. München 1970. This edition is cited parenthetically in the text by abbreviated title [LC] and page number. LC has been translated into Danish, Dutch, Swedish, Polish and Hungarian. It has also been translated into Lithuanian (Johanesas Bobrovskis, *Lietuviški fortepijonai*. Transl. by Eduardas Astramskas, Vilnius 1968), but not into English. For a more extensive bibliography cf. Curt Grützmaier, *Das Werk von Johannes Bobrowski. Eine Bibliographie*. München, 1974, pp. 33, 62, 101-105 and Bernhard Gajek und Eberhard Haufe, *Johannes Bobrowski. Chronik — Einführung — Bibliographie*, Frankfurt a. M. 1977.
- <sup>2</sup> For a discussion of the dialectic principle cf. my Lithuanian article: Kristina Brazaitienė-Cesnaitė: *Dialektinis principas Lietuviškuose Forte-pijonuose*. *Metmenys* 43 (1982), pp. 92-117.
- <sup>3</sup> Bobrowski has explicitly formulated this as *Mein Thema*; "Zu schreiben habe ich begonnen am Ilmensee 1941, über russische Landschaft, aber als Fremder, als Deutscher. Daraus ist ein Thema geworden, ungefähr: die Deutschen und der europäische Osten. Weil ich um die Memel herum aufgewachsen bin, wo Polen, Litauer,



Russen, Deutsche miteinander lebten, unter ihnen allen die Judenheit. Eine lange Geschichte aus Unglück und Verschuldung, seit den Tagen des deutschen Ordens, die meinem Volk zu Buche steht. Wohl nicht zu tilgen und zu sühnen, aber eine Hoffnung wert und einen reichlichen Versuch in deutschen Gedichten". *Johannes Bobrowski. Selbstzeugnisse und neue Beiträge über sein Werk*. Ed. G. Rostin Stuttgart 1976, p. 13. Abbreviation (SZ) refers to this publication.

- <sup>4</sup> For a critical edition of Kristijonas Donelaitis' works, which also includes a detailed introduction to the life of the poet, see *Kristijonas Donelaitis: Raštai*. Vilnius 1977. Abbreviation (KD) refers to this edition. — The first publication of *Seasons* (1818) appeared in the German language with an introduction by Liudvikas Réza (Ludwig Rhesa), a Lithuanian professor at the University of Königsberg (cf. the introduction to the English translation by Nadas Rastenis: *The Seasons by Kristijonas Donelaitis*. Rendered from the Lithuanian into English verse by N. Rastenis. Introd. and ed. Elena Tumas, California 1976).

For the best German translation see *Kristijonas Donelaitis, Die Jahreszeiten*. Nachdichtung von Hermann Buddensieg, München 1966. Abbreviation (Bud.) refers to this edition.

- <sup>5</sup> Bobrowski formulates this quite explicitly: "Ich benenne also Verschuldung — der Deutschen —, und ich versuche, Neigung zu erwecken zu den Litauern, Russen, Polen, usw." SZ 19.
- <sup>6</sup> LC 9; cf. the comment by the "Jenaische Allgemeine Literaturzeitung" immediately after the publication of *Metai*: "Donelaitis fand eine Sprache, reich an Spondeen, and Diphthongen, an Vokalen; eine Sprache, in welcher die Quantität nicht von Akzent und Ton abhing . . . Ihm ist der Hexameter keine Fessel; er ist ein Blumengürtel, den er um seine Muttersprache schlingt, die sich frei und ungehindert in ihm bewegt." (*Kindlers Literatur-Lexikon*. Ed. G. Woerner and G. Vollenberg, vol 4 (Zürich, 1965), pp. 2528f.)

<sup>7</sup> Cf. this article, pp. 4-6.

<sup>8</sup> It is beyond the scope of this article to give a detailed study of Donelaitis' works. However, even a cursory analysis of *Metai* shows quite clearly that it is extremely difficult to argue that Donelaitis condemned the social system of the time. Despite his frequent attacks on the bad master he clearly and consistently upheld the ideal of "the good lord and master" (cf. *KD*, 166-186), an idea somewhat in conflict with Marxist ideology (cf. contradictory Marxist and "bourgeois" lines of interpretation of Donelaitis as represented by K. Korsakas in: Kristijonas Donelaitis, *Pranešimai, Straipsniai, Archyvinė Medžiaga*. Literatūra ir Kalba VII. Ed. K. Korsakas (= Lietuvos TSR Mokslų Akademija, Lietuvių Kalbos ir Literatūros Institutas). Vilnius 1965 and by Jonas Grinius in: *Veidai ir Problemos Lietuvių Literatūroje*. Ed. A. Liuima. Roma 1973.

<sup>9</sup> Louis Passarge, *Christian Donelaitis' Litauische Dichtungen*. Übersetzt und erläutert, Halle a. S., 1894. According to the author's widow, Johanna Bobrowski, née Budrus, it is known that Bobrowski's reaction to Passarge's translation had been one of exhilarated enthusiasm (in her words, "er war wie betrunken"). However, he had apparently never been fully satisfied by either Passarge's or his own rendition of *Metai*. — According to Mykolas Sluckis (*Bobrowskis ir mes*, Pergale 10. Vilnius, 1972, pp. 27-42) Bobrowski became increasingly more interested in Donelaitis, and after discussing the poet with the Lithuanian born historian, Ewald Jurkschat, bought a copy of Passarge's translation of *Metai* in an antiquarian book-shop in Berlin in 1963.

<sup>10</sup> In his *Nachbemerkung* at the end of *LC*, the author notes: "Die Zitate aus den Idyllen des Christian Donelaitis sind auf Grund der Nachdichtung durch Louis Passarge (Halle, 1894) frei gestaltete Neufassungen" (*LC*, last page, my underlining, K. B.); cf. Bernd Leistner: *Johannes Bobrowski: Studien und Interpretationen*. Berlin 1981, p. 174. — Abbreviations (B. Leistner) refer to this work.

<sup>11</sup> E. Amstramskas, in translating *LP* into Lithuanian, used the edition of Donelaitis' works (*KD*) mentioned above, with minimal changes in the following order: p. 253 (1st quotation), p. 205 (2nd), pp. 243-249 (3rd), p. 131 (4th). This creates a considerable difference from Bobrowski's free rendition (cf. above note 10). Cf. Donelaitis (p. 253) and the relevant translations into German by Passarge: II, "Die Sorgen des Winters", 554-559.

<sup>12</sup> B. Leistner, p. 148.

<sup>13</sup> A comparison of Bobrowski's and Passarge's somewhat lengthier passage reveals their essential similarity. An excerpt will serve to illustrate this:

Schwein, so sprach ich, was thust du? Hast alle Scham verloren?  
Aber zur gleichen Zeit — merk' auf, was ich dir sage —  
Schrie'n drei bunte Schweine, mit ihren gesprenkelten Ferkeln,  
Schrie'n in der Stube gottsjämmerlich auf, als ging' es ans  
Schlachten . . .

(Passarge I, "Die Gaben des Herbstes", 622-635.)

<sup>14</sup> cf. *KD Žiemos Rūpesčiai* 530-36 and the relevant German translation in full:

Deutsche halten den Litauer oftmals für einen Lummel,  
Und das Franzosengesindel lächelt, grinst höhnisch, wenn sie uns  
sehen,  
Grinsen, scheints, aber sie loben das treffliche Brot, das wir  
backen,  
Essen mit wahren Behagen auch unsre geräucherten Würste,  
Aber sieh, nachdem sie vom Litauer Speck schon ganz voll sind  
Und mit Gewalt unser ganzes Bier bereits völlig getrunken,  
Schämt sich doch keiner, den biedereren Litauer frech zu  
beschimpfen.  
(Bud. *Wintersorgen*, p. 109.)

<sup>15</sup> *LC* 107.

<sup>16</sup> B. Leistner's interpretation of the *Vytautasfest* appears to be exaggerated: "Tatsächlich handelt es sich bei dieser litauischen Aufführung um eine durchaus nationalistisch geprägte Demonstration . . . ein Volkstum-Verständnis, das . . . militante Züge in sich birgt" (p. 148).

<sup>17</sup> Cf. in particular John Phillip Wiczorek's *Figures and themes in the works of Johannes Bobrowski*, D. Phil. (Oxford), 1978, p. 20ff., p. 159ff., both in relation to Bobrowski's works in general and *Litauische Claviere* in particular. In his article (*Die großen Taten in verschiedenen Zungen. Johannes Bobrowski's "Litauische Claviere"*, GLL 35 (1981-82), pp. 355-67) Wiczorek has emphasised even more strongly that *Litauische Claviere* should be seen in the light of Bobrowski's own particular situation in the GDR.

<sup>18</sup> J. P. Wiczorek, *Die großen Taten . . .*, p. 365.

<sup>19</sup> This reminds us of a frequently quoted passage from Bobrowski's lecture, *Benannte Schuld — gebannte Schuld?*: "Ich bin dafür, daß alles immer neu genannt wird, was man so ganz üblich als, unbewältigt' bezeichnet, aber ich denke nicht, daß es damit, bewältigt' ist. Es muß getan werden, nur auf Hoffnung." [SZ 20]

<sup>20</sup> Storost-Vydunas supplements this in his reference to the "Königsberger und Tilsiter Bemühungen", explicitly mentioning Kreuzfeld, Rhesa, Passarge, Salopiata, Stiftungen, Gesellschaften, das Litauische Seminar (*LC* 73f.).

<sup>21</sup> *LC* 74. — The "discovery" of Lithuanian language and literature by the German Romantics was seen as something ephemeral and destined to certain doom, cf. G. Bauer, *Gesellschaft und Weltbild im Baltischen Traditionsmilieu*. Heidelberg 1972.

<sup>22</sup> It is not absolutely certain whether the Bobrowski version of the wedding scene is entirely based on *The Autumn's Riches* (*KD* p. 175ff.). There is reason to believe that some details, especially the names of the wedding guests, are taken from one of the fragments of *Seasons: Pričkaus pasaka apie lietuvišką svodba* (*KD*, pp. 69-81).

<sup>23</sup> Cf. above the 4th quotation, p. 8 (*LC* 120).



Vince TAŠKŪNAS

## Lone Pine

*A stockman, they said, he would have been,  
If he had come home.*

*Riding the roan thoroughbred over the rain-steeped  
Blues, after a brumby.*

*Marrying the pretty Jones girl that he met  
At Sunday Mass in town.*

*Settling down on a farm out the back  
And beyond the sinister "scrapers".*

*Raising a couple of Catholic kids who would  
One day conquer the world.*

*Quietly living his peaceful life in full,  
In the healing stillness,*

*Having time to reflect, time to give,  
Time to love, time to live.*

*The shadow of the one tree, weeping blood,  
Is long over his mangled body.*

*As a young Turkish gunner crawls back  
To his own lines and life,*

*With a young Australian's ambitions in his  
Breast pocket, sealed away.*

*He would have been a stockman, they said,  
If he had come home.*



## USSR Nationalities Policies: Aims and Prospects

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I shall explain why the non-Russian nationalities have become a focus of Soviet and international attention in 1988 and give a chronological account of the creation of the multi-national Soviet Empire. I shall then sketch Moscow's problems in controlling a Victorian Empire with former and potential sovereign states inside it and thereby hope to establish the extent to which Soviet policy-makers are likely to be concerned with the nationalities question in the next twenty years or so.

Three generations after the proclamation of the Soviet Socialist State, the state which, before withering away, is first destined to witness the extinction of the bourgeois ideology of nationalism, we hear reports\* that Soviet tanks and infantry have moved into the city of Sumgait to interrupt a massacre of Armenians by their brothers-in-socialism, the Azeri Muslims. Official sources report 32 dead but unofficial reports give estimates of up to 500 killed with commensurate injury, destruction, arson and looting. Unofficial sources also accuse the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party of having planned the massacre and provided maps and names to the killers.

Despite Gorbachov's policy of "Openness", a total news blackout has descended. Western reporters have been kept out. Thousands of troops and millions of roubles appear to be the basic elements of Moscow's First Aid package.

In 1987, and not for the first time, there were large anti-Soviet demonstrations in all three Baltic capitals. In 1986, there were violent demonstrations in Alma Ata, Kazakhstan, with a number of deaths and injuries and widespread destruction.

There are, of course, differences in the significance of these events. Only in the Baltic States is it clear that there is widespread rejection of the system as a whole, not to mention opposition to Russian

\* "Guardian Weekly", London, February-March, 1988; "Spectator", London, March 5, 1988.


immigration and forced emigration. In Kazakhstan, the riots were a supposedly spontaneous response to the dismissal of Dinmuhamad Kunayev from the Central Committee after being accused of corruption and replaced by an ethnic Russian. In Armenia and Azerbaijan there is no evidence of the Baltic problem — the demand for autonomy or secession from the U.S.S.R. In fact, those who imagine that there is a general desire to break the Empire into national states might ponder the reported comment of an Armenian woman refugee from Baku: “I don’t know what would have happened if they had not arrived. They saved us from those mad Azeris. Thank God for the Red Army”. One is reminded of episodes in British India and of events in the same Caucasian region in 1905 and 1918-20.

Even before the events of March 1988 in Azerbaijan confirmed that the perennial nationalities question had come to the top of the Central Committee’s agenda. Michel Tatu, writing from Paris, had predicted the probable failure of both Glasnost and Perestroika, the fall of Gorbachov and his possible assassination. Tatu was well aware that his article would be given wide circulation in Moscow. Perhaps he



● Location of Spring 1988 Massacre of Armenians by Azerbaijanis.

### The Expansion of the Empire since 1553



intended to protect Gorbachov against the Old Guard rather than to terrify the liberal intelligentsia but he has certainly achieved the latter.

The dramatic emergence of the nationalities question certainly provides much new ammunition for Gorbachov’s opponents. The fear that nationalist activity could destroy Perestroika and its author is reflected in reports from Estonia and elsewhere that nationalists have circulated in Samizdat the warning that excessive displays of nationalist sentiments could prove highly counter-productive.

Of course, how one reacts to such reports depends in part on how one evaluates Gorbachov’s intentions. Nevertheless, the whole question is one which clearly is not a side-issue. For some years now we have detected such economic stagnation in Russia that the eventual survival of the Soviet Empire has come to seem unlikely if there isn’t decentralization of the economy to facilitate growth. Now there is the unfortunate corollary for Moscow that decentralization — a real Perestroika plus real Glasnost — would automatically strengthen centrifugal tendencies. Like the Tsar in 1888, faced with the necessity of another long burst of Petrine *aggiornamento*, one might say that the U.S.S.R. may be damned if it goes for a new N.E.P. and is almost certainly damned if it doesn’t.

Let us examine how the East, North, South and West were won for Moscow. Nationalities policy, after all, did not start with Lenin, though

it is remarkable testimony to Soviet propaganda that whereas almost all educated Europeans in 1888 would have known that the Russians were not the only inhabitants of Russia, that proportion today is undoubtedly far smaller. I shall not hazard a guess for Australian perceptions at either date.

How did the Empire come into being? How has the gigantic colonial inheritance been controlled? Why, after 70 years, are the decadent ideas of bourgeois nationalism not only powerful but apparently still growing, even among the proletariat?

Churchill said of the Russians: "They try every door in the house. They enter all the rooms that are unlocked. If there is a door they fail to open they withdraw and soon you get an invitation to dine with them that evening..."

Speaking of the Empire's southern neighbour, Karl Marx wrote "Strive as they may, they will no more preserve that ramshackle edifice than one can arrest the rate of putrefaction in a dead horse". Marx on other occasions expressed similar opinions of Tsarist Russia.

Nationalism and defeat have swept away all the other European Empires. Russia's alone remains. Of course, refrigeration had not been invented when Karl Marx was writing about the Ottomans in 1855. Neither had the Cheka. Yet in the last few years, despite the Cheka, the whiff of imperial putrefaction has been detected time and time again. Not only is there persistent anti-Communist and anti-Russian feeling, but there are inter-colonial problems and the recent rise of the "Pamyat" group and other centres of Russian nationalist opposition to Communism. As for opening locked doors, we now observe the Russians deciding, for the present at least, that they have taken on more than they can deal with in the room labelled "Afghanistan".

The Russian Empire took over 300 years to build and has remained much the same size since the 1800's. Between 1588 and 1888 the average territorial expansion was 50 square miles a day, mainly over sparsely-inhabited regions of Asia. Yesterday's foreign policies, for Tsarist Russia, usually evolved into today's nationality problems.

The last Imperial Census in 1913 listed 165 non-Russian nations or peoples, comprising 40% of the total population. Today the percentage of non-Russians is at least 50% and the percentage of Ukrainians has fallen so far that the Slavic percentage is down from about 80 to about 70%. Not only has the U.S.S.R. failed to sustain the rate of Tsarist territorial growth but the Eastern Slav elements within

## Ethnicity and Population Density



● LOCAL CONCENTRATION OF RUSSIANS OR "OUT-OF-REPUBLIC NATIONALS" - MAINLY CONCENTRATED IN CITIES, TOWNS, MINES, MILITARY CAMPS, PLACES OF EXILE OR GULAGS: IN SPARSELY POPULATED REGIONS THESE DENSELY POPULATED CENTRES MAY HAVE MORE PEOPLE THAN ENTIRE RURAL REGIONS' LOCAL TOTALS.

▨ MAINLY GREAT RUSSIAN POP'NS.

▨ DENSER POPULATIONS: 50 km<sup>2</sup> AND OVER

▨ LOW POPULATION DENSITY  
[ R = RUSSIANS.  
N = NON-RUSSIANS ]




the Empire have diminished — largely as a result of differential slaughter and uneven demographic transition. Down to the 1800's, Tsarism experienced very few obstacles to enlarging the Empire because it victimized for the most part small and technically backward populations occupying large territories remote from rival centres of power. The last great surge of such annexations was the conquest of Turkestan between 1860 and 1880. Military failure in the Crimea, even before this Asian episode, in fact introduced a century of relative Russian weakness lasting from the 1850's until the Cold War. Since 1880, the Empire's principal conflicts, all with technically superior societies, involving devastating losses and requiring powerful allies, have been struggles for survival rather than expansion.

In the 18th and early 19th centuries Russia first acquired the fringes of Protestant and Catholic North-Central Europe which still cause it so much trouble today. These populations had, and have, indelible convictions of their cultural superiority to the Russians and today have an equally profound commitment to the concept of national sovereignty, though it is true that before 1918, only the Poles and the Finns caused the Tsars much actual expenditure in repressing or conciliating their national sentiments. In fact hatred of the Jews, of whom many were perfectly happy to assimilate, preoccupied the Tsar's ministers a great deal more than, for example, Baltic nationalism or the views of the large Muslim populations.

The Muslims, perhaps 15% of the total population in 1913, were scattered geographically, divided ethnically and linguistically, and had very different levels of economic development. Whereas the Kazakhs were nomads with a pre-urban economy as late as the 1920's, Haxthausen had found in the 1840's that the Volga-Tatars were a civilized population whose literacy, domestic architecture and commercial skills were regarded with respect and even envy by the Russian middle-classes, let alone the majority of serfs.

When nationalism began to influence the Muslims — after about 1880 — it actually undermined the already ineffectual bond of Islam. Most of the younger Muslim intelligentsia, like the Afghan radicals of the 1970's and 80's, found themselves opposed by their local mullahs. Linguistic nationalism, in any case, was bound to split the Muslims into many small nations if it triumphed. There was also the distraction of the Ottomans as an external focus of allegiance, especially after 1908. Lastly, the majority of Muslims who became active in politics actually linked up with their opposite numbers in the existing political parties in



● A few traditional Lithuanian crosses and wayside shrines. Developed over many centuries, the folk art sets a nation apart and gives it a characteristic identity.

the Duma. The idea that the Bolsheviks were the only party to which the "disloyal nationalities" turned in the hope of overthrowing Tsarism has to be abandoned when it is realized that in pre-1914 conferences of the Mensheviks and even of the Kadets, Great Russian delegates were often outnumbered by Tatar, Caucasian, Finnish, Baltic, Polish and Central Asian party members.

It was fortunate for Tsarism that non-Russian nationalism was in general so little developed that its control took a low priority. Tsarist economic, diplomatic and internal security problems ranked far higher. Now that Soviet economic problems have again become serious, the 70 year long repression of nationalism is proving to have failed. Moreover, in that time powerful evidence of the theoretical desirability of total secession has been provided a thousand times over.



Before acquiring Poland and Finland, control of the colonies and of the Russians themselves was never complicated by nationalist ideology, whether of the government or of the ruled. Tsarist conquest was followed by a few massacres, a certain amount of land-grabbing, a modest influx of Great Russian or Tatar civilians intent on trade, and the inevitable burden of taxation. Sometimes, especially in Siberia and the Ukraine, the area had been unintentionally prepared for conquest by prior Russian trade or by the tendency of serfs to flee over the frontier: "U -Kraina" means "at the frontier". State policies of exile and imprisonment, as in Australia, often supplied the majority of new colonists and were often supplemented by private enterprise transportation of surplus Russian or Ukrainian serfs to landlord-estates carved out further east. The actual government of most frontier areas — a huge proportion of the Empire, was by military governors right down to 1917.

There was a moderate amount of slaughter and occasional deportation of the conquered but general slaughter on the Australian or American scale was unknown. Rather like the French, the Russians have fairly persistently attempted policies of linguistic, cultural and ideological penetration and assimilation rather than of mass-extermination. In all probability this can be related to contemporary demographic realities rather than solely — or at all — to humanitarian sentiment. The relevance of demographic considerations in this matter may be borne out by the preparedness to massacre the Kazakhs in the 1930's when Stalin made the enormous mistake of assuming that the Slavic populations would continue to expand indefinitely, not only to replace inconvenient national groups but to replace any Slavs whom the Cheka declared to be surplus to imperial requirements.

Deportation as a policy may actually have been first suggested to the bureaucracy by the more or less voluntary departure of 140,000 Tatars after the Crimean War. When they left for Turkey, the regime, sensitive about this maritime frontier area, arranged for the gaps to be filled with Russians, Ukrainians, Armenians and Jews, all of them more reliable. Since that time, concern about frontier areas in which Great Russians are few has led to policies of immigration, in some cases facilitated by partial or total deportation of any inconvenient ethnographic material which happened to be lying around — notably in North-East Prussia, Meskhetia and a number of Central Asian and Pacific coastal regions. The removal of the remaining Crimean Tatars in 1944 completed the voluntary clearance commenced in 1855.

China since 1950 has adopted very similar policies, which accounts for the fact that Great Russians and Han Chinese now live side-by-side in Eastern Turkestan, guarding frontiers which originally were drawn through purely Turkic or Mongol communities. Some of these Russians were sent there by Stolypin, rather than Stalin, of course.


The mass-killings and deportations from the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, Ruthenia, Bessarabia and the Bukovina in 1940 and later, plus the mass deportation from inside the pre-1940 frontier which occurred after 1943 from the Caucasus and the Volga — including the Germans, the Chechen-Ingush, the Kabardines, Balkhars and the Crim-Tatars, are the most horrific instances of Stalinist policies towards the national problem in frontier regions. In general, the destination of the survivors was Siberia or Central Asia, where one of the effects was to further dispossess and fragment pre-existing Muslim communities and produce a "New Macedonia" in which everyone would be obliged to learn Russian in order to communicate. The map published as Supplement to *National Geographic* in February 1976 (Peoples of the Soviet Union) may be said to illustrate the nationality problem in the U.S.S.R. but it is important to realize that it also illustrates an important aspect of Moscow's solution to the same problem. Central Asia is dotted with camps and with communities of peoples deported en masse in the 40's. Koreans are not going to learn German and Uzbeks are not going to learn Estonian in such a Macedonia but if schools, shops, factories and the media all use Russian, another solution is obviously expected in the very long run.

Before 1917, nationalist ideas did spread widely, though in some areas only to a thin stratum of intellectuals. Great Russian nationalism, which is still alive and well and living in Moscow, also dates to the same period and was harnessed by both the regime and by the Narodniki or populists for their different purposes. Zionism also arose in the last decades of the Empire, helping to split the Jewish intelligentsia in much the same way as occurred in Central Europe.

Social Democracy also spread in the Empire after 1880. Its importance for my theme lies in the fact that prior to 1914, non-Russian Social-Democratic theoreticians provided most of the ideas which later were used as policy or camouflage by Stalin, but not until Lenin and Stalin had first taken those ideas, originating with Bauer and Renner in Austria, and emptied them of all democratic content and intention.



## Religions 1900 (1945 Boundaries)



In late Tsarist times, therefore, there was a ferment of ideas in Russia but often the spread of these ideas was severely limited by low rates of literacy, by the small size of the potential middle-class intelligentsia available and by sheer competition between the different ideologies themselves.

The general attitude of the regime, especially after the assassination of Alexander II, was one of unrelenting repression. Pobedonostsev's principles of "Autocracy, Orthodoxy and the National Idea" came to the fore and continued to be applied by Russifiers and vicious anti-Semites such as Plehwe, though with little success in changing anyone's mind, until the collapse of 1917.

That this had not always been the case may be seen in instances where Catherine forbade her officials and bishops to continue with the forcible conversion of Volga-Tatars to Orthodox Christianity. The old policy was never seriously revived, though after 1880 pressure to use the Russian language was increased again with thoroughly counter-productive effects, especially in Poland and Finland. Catherine, a century earlier, had not only reversed the old assimilationist policies but provided money for the construction and re-building of mosques. Many Russian Muslims were still exempt from military service, even in 1914-1917.

The Russianization policies of the last three or four Tsarist decades were expressions of the Slavophile and Pan-Slavic movements and were adjuncts to the push towards Constantinople and the Balkans. In practice these policies alienated the non-Slavs and stimulated nationalism among the Russians and the nationalities alike. The main sufferers were the Jews, as usual, though repression was also directed against anyone else who actually asked for it. For example, after the Polish-Lithuanian revolt of 1863, the Latin alphabet was forbidden for 40 years.

Despite all this ferment and despite governmental brutality and incompetence, it would be misleading to conclude that there was a general desire for secession from the Empire. Russia was not nearly as much affected by nationalism as were Turkey or Austria-Hungary, where parliamentary parties were by 1900 already fully developed along nationalist lines, with the Austro-Marxists under such pressure that they had not only to permit national sections within the Party but also to write fresh theoretical material on "Marxism and the National Question" for reasons of electoral survival.

In contrast to Austria, the situation in pre-1914 Russia was that not only the Bolsheviks but the Mensheviks, the SR's, the Kadets and even most of the nationalities were committed not to national independence but to a better Empire, to a constitution either without a Tsar or with a Tsar who had abandoned autocracy. Many also wished this to be a federal arrangement, as was proposed for Austria by its socialists. It is worth noting that between the abdication of the Tsar and the Bolshevik seizure of power, the Provisional Government, as far as I can discover, was presented with formal notification of the intention to secede from the Empire by only two of the 165 nationalities - the Poles and the Finns.

Sergei Zenkovsky has highlighted the nature of this federally-oriented autonomist cultural nationalism by giving us the image of Yusuf Akchurin, leader of the Volga-Tatar Kadets, addressing the all-Russian Kadet Congress in Petrograd in 1906 in fluent French and to rapturous applause. Richard Pipes presents a similar scene: In 1912 the Mensheviks held their conference in Vienna. The Russian delegates were outnumbered by the non-Russians, including the Lithuanians, Armenians, Azeris, Georgians, Poles, Latvians and the Jewish Bundists. At this meeting, national cultural autonomy was adopted as the platform for a future parliamentary and capitalist Russia, with or without a constitutional monarch. The formula was the Austromarxist model of Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, that of community autonomy or "extraterritorial autonomy"\*.

In case it might be thought that fear of the Tsarist police was the reason for publicly going along with such a renovated Empire, it should be realized that the Tsar was as much opposed to all these ideas as to the actual physical dismemberment of the state. Many of the Poles, in any case, had always agitated for total secession, despite the police and the censorship. As in the case of Austria, there were many who reasoned that the destruction of the Empire would not only require conflict and prepare the seeds of future conflicts but would lead to poverty all round. The possibility of making the structure more democratic was therefore seen by nearly all parties — the Tsar and the Bolsheviks being notable exceptions — as worth working for.

\* Thus, Hungarians resident in a democratic Danubian federation could expect to have Hungarian schools and cultural centres in Tirol, Moravia, Galicia, etc, while German, Czech and Ruthenian schools would be run for those demanding such facilities in Hungary.

Thus, by 1913, every Russian political party was engaged in competition for the support of the various nationalities, while commitment to the Empire and to extraterritorial nationality was the policy of the Jewish Bund, the Armenian Dashnaks, the Byelorussian Hromada and the Georgian Sakartvelo. Even the Kadet or Conservative Party promised autonomy to Poland and Finland and a limited version of extraterritorial nationality to all national groups inside Russia.

Bolshevik policies were first sketched by Stalin on Lenin's orders in 1912 — largely as a response to Lenin's realization that Marx's ideas were simply inadequate for justifying socialist rule of an Empire, and particularly ill-adapted to the tricky process of transition to socialist rule.

The orthodox Marxist view was that nationalism was a superstructural phenomenon specific to capitalism which would eventually disappear under socialism, as might also any odd national groups (e.g. the Poles) who foolishly obstructed the march of progress. Plekhanov repeated Marx's and Engels' view in 1905 while commenting on some retrograde but supposedly only temporary behaviour among West European proletarians as follows: "If, occasionally, workers fall under the influence of nationalist emotions this is obviously because class-differentiation in their countries is thus far insufficiently developed".

In their public pronouncements, the heirs of Lenin and Stalin have never deviated from this remarkable attitude. For the C.P.S.U., 'Marxist common-sense' indicates that history will eventually bring forth a unified socialist world inhabited by one self-governing proletariat and speaking one language. The question of which language this is to be was, incidentally, originally determined by Professor Marr, who decided that since language was also a phenomenon of the superstructure, the future Socialist Planet Earth would naturally evolve a new language to reflect its new socio-economic base. Stalin, a Georgian but thoroughly Russified, indicated to the world in the last years of his reign that since Marr was wrong and since human language was *sui generis* and thus a phenomenon of neither the base nor the superstructure, history had in fact decided in 1917 that Russian was to be the language of the future. Q.E.D.!

Oddly enough, the principal countries to adopt the Renner-Bauer formula of "extraterritorial nationality" within a unitary state were the bourgeois republics of Czechoslovakia and Estonia between the wars.



Both came to grief, partly because of this policy which permitted the Germans in both countries to avoid all commitment to the state and to educate their children in the spirit of Greater Germany. Lenin and Stalin were not prepared to run such stupid risks. Multiculturalism for them was to be a transitional policy — somewhat akin to what is jokingly called a Leninist Land-Reform: “Give the rest of the land to the peasants until the crisis is past and take it all away from them later on.”

Lenin reacted to the Austro-Marxist Renner-Bauer formulae belatedly. He had always realized that the nationalities represented potential forces for a temporary alliance in overthrowing the Tsar but was clearly embarrassed when the other Russian political parties upstaged the Bolsheviks by offering various inducements. Lenin had to join in the game of bribing the nationalities to counter the plain facts of Marxist prejudice towards nationalism, a prejudice which Plekhanov and Rosa Luxemburg were not prepared to disguise for political advantage.

What was Lenin's super-bid? He condemned the Austro-Marxists but also attacked the orthodox Bolsheviks, including, by implication, Karl Marx! He publicly offered a policy of the right to total self-determination and independence for all nationalities, everywhere, though with one or two small reservations in very fine print.

● The Marxists believed that nationalism was a phenomenon specific to capitalism which would eventually disappear under socialism. By 1917,



however, Lenin (pictured) realised that the nationalities represented potential forces for a temporary alliance in overthrowing the Tsar. Lenin publicly offered a policy of the right to total self-determination and independence for all nationalities, albeit with reservations in very fine print. Leading Bolsheviks condemned Lenin's policy, obviously overlooking the importance of the small print.

The crucial piece of small print stipulated that, in all situations in which the rights of the proletariat are involved, the rights of the nationalities must be subordinated.

But who was and wasn't a member of the proletariat? The question seemed easy to answer in 1917, but not in later years.

The proof of how effective this apparently liberal proclamation was to be can be seen in the howls of execration which arose from the orthodox. Lenin was attacked in print by all the leading Bolsheviks. Bukharin, Radek, Dzerzhinsky, Luxemburg, Lunacharsky, Kollontai, Pokrovsky and Piatakov all condemned his policy. Since even these Bolsheviks did not realize the importance of the small print sections, it is easy to understand the positive reactions among many of the nationalities to Lenin's "Proclamation to the World" of 1917. From April of that year Lenin, incidentally, was not just appealing to the "Russian nationalities" but to the Indians, the Chinese, the Vietnamese, the Egyptians and all who lacked sovereignty. Woodrow Wilson's 14 points were actually triggered off by the scope of Lenin's appeal, later in 1917, to colonial peoples everywhere.

But what of the small print? Lenin explained as follows: "The right to self-determination is a general democratic right. It is like the right to divorce. Admission of the right to divorce is not the same policy as to actually advocate divorce! We offer the freedom of self-determination but separation is altogether not our aim. We Bolsheviks do not predict separation at all". In all situations in which — and this is the crucial piece of small print — in which the rights of the proletariat are involved, then the rights of the nationalities must be subordinated. Precisely who was and wasn't a member of the proletariat seemed an easy question to answer to Communists in 1917 but in the Stalin period quite new answers were to be created.

The eventual challenge to the Tsarist regime during the war finally broke out not in the Colonies but in Petrograd itself, which suggests that the Tsar's police were correct in considering Russian radicalism more dangerous than local nationalism. (The earlier riots in Central Asia in 1916 were not nationalist exploitation of Tsarist defeats so much as a delayed reaction to the brutality of Stolypin's policy of mass-immigration and eviction of the Muslims in earlier years.)

Lenin's promises of secession and independence for all Asia were publicly proclaimed between April and July and, from hiding, until October 1917. Since the Provisional Government was unpopular because of the war and because of the chaos in many areas of Russia, not to mention the German occupation of Poland, the Baltic States and the Ukraine, the Bolsheviks in 1917 were prepared to promise everything to everyone in order to gain potential support long before October. Local Bolshevik groups actually supported Ukrainian nationalists against the Provisional Government and also gained the



support of many national groups which were hoping for independence but at the same time kept an eye on the chances of getting the most sympathetic possible government in Petrograd.

Thus, when, after the October Revolution, Civil War broke out in 1918, Lenin's ingenious policies had already earned much tolerance, if not sympathy. The military potential of the nationalities was considerable and was probably of crucial importance to the eventual outcome. When Kolchak was urged to consider tactical concessions to the nationalities, he dismissed the whole idea as treason. On the other hand, Georgian, Latvian, Tatar, Bashkir and Caucasian Muslim regiments frequently composed the best troops the Red Army was able to muster. In sticking publicly to Tsarist ideas of Holy Russia, one and indivisible, Kolchak may have been honest but was also stupid. In general, of course, Tsarist atrocities against certain of the nationalities, rebellious peasants and army deserters helped to guarantee the eventual defeat of the "whites".

The determination of the politically skilful Bolsheviks to exploit any situations to their advantage is seen in the remarkable series of changes in tactics reflected in Bolshevik propaganda. In 1918, the Bolsheviks actually lost control of most of Russia. The Empire literally fell to pieces with up to 30 regional authorities including the German army, the Turks, the Allies, the Czech legion, the Whites, the Reds, and many nationalities under arms. Lenin's response was to promise what the Bolsheviks had never previously conceded — a Russian Federation. Furthermore, at the 8th Congress of March 1918, just as the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was being signed, Lenin came up with a new formula for the national question: "In areas where the Bolsheviks rule, the interests of the nationalities are to take second place to those of the proletariat; in areas not yet Bolshevized, the Party must campaign vigorously in favour of total national independence". Although it took 3 years and a bewildering series of campaigns, this policy of the "Progressive Double Cross" was eventually to succeed so that by 1921 the whole Empire was regained except for the western borderlands of Bessarabia, Eastern Poland, Finland and the Baltic.

In 1912 Stalin had written a rather plodding pamphlet on "Marxism and the National Question". Although Lenin was extremely annoyed at Stalin's literary and political ineptitude, it nevertheless marked the debut of Stalin as future Commissar for Nationalities, "Little Father of all the Soviet Peoples" and so on and so forth. Whereas the rootless cosmopolitans after 1917 were attracted to theoretical questions and

to becoming Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs and could hardly wait for the German Revolution and a posting to London or Paris, Stalin was planning for the reality of an embattled Empire in which nationalism, if unchecked, was likely to become far stronger than under the Tsars. The actual secessions of 1917-20 in the west and the Caucasus were, of course, overshadowed by the fear of nationalism in the Ukraine, without which there could be no Russian economy at all.

The story of Stalin's rise to power usually concentrates on his role as General-Secretary and on his gradual extermination of practically all the Bolsheviks of 1917. His role in creating Soviet nationalities policies is generally underestimated though they remain in place in a scarcely modified form today and probably were — and are — vital to the survival of the U.S.S.R.

After the lull of N.E.P. and the struggle for power, there was a sharp turn in nationalities policy when Stalin took complete power in 1929. The Great Russians, after initial hesitation, had flooded into the party. Their percentage of members by 1922 was 72% (Compare Jews 5%, Latvians 2%, Ukrainians 6%). Stalin concluded that to consolidate the sort of power he aimed at, the Russians and in particular their language were the best instrument. Thus there was a period of relatively mild treatment of the various nationalities throughout the 1920's which came to an abrupt and brutal end in 1930.

The realities of power in 1918 — 28 were very well analyzed by Sultan-Galiev, the Muslim Bolshevik who later became the first leading Communist to be thrown into the Gulag. He soon concluded that stress on the proletariat meant stress on the prerogatives of Europeans over Asians. As Stalin's chief lieutenant in the Commissariat for Nationalities, Sultan-Galiev as early as 1919 expressed doubts that the expected world-wide class struggle would produce any benefits for the people of Asia. Already by this time it was becoming clear in Central Asia that being a Russian was the new definition of being a proletarian — since the Russians were so few there that they had closed ranks against the Muslims, especially when the latter declared independence under red flags in joyous response to Lenin's proclamations.

Sultan-Galiev cautiously confined his remarks of 1919 to Britain and France and their Asian colonies but his theme was inspired by the new Russian realities. "The proletariat of Europe", he wrote, "is less concerned with liberating the exploited of Asia than with taking over the bourgeois colonial system in order to run it for their own benefit.

For the Asian colonies the triumph of the proletariat will mean only that one set of European masters will be exchanged for another.”

For Galiev, the reversion to N.E.P. was the last straw. He saw it as the open return of old Tsarist officials and of Muslim capitalists and oppressors. He was arrested in 1923 and disappeared in 1929.

For whatever reason, Lenin actually expressed concern about the trend towards the end of his life; it was becoming obvious by then that the All-Union C.P. was developing into an instrument of Russian rule and that the “full flowing of Kirghiz culture” might eventually mean “composing hymns to proletarian (i.e. Great Russian) rule in Kirghiz”.

However, despite Lenin’s death, the 20’s were a period, in practice, of relative leniency towards the nationalities. The dominant school was still that of Pokrovsky, who regarded the annexation of any non-Russian territory as an absolute evil, all resistance thereto being a hallowed revolutionary act, to be celebrated. Pokrovsky’s view actually encouraged the writing of anti-Tsarist history texts for use in Muslim schools in the 1920’s. This literature before long came perilously close to being anti-Russian, particularly since everyone in Kazakhstan knew that the vicious Tsarist colonizers of 1909 were often actually the same individuals as the brotherly proletarian Russian Marxists of 1929 — or at least had been their fathers.

Olaf Caroe has elegantly explained the Stalinist destruction of Pokrovskyism — which officially came in 1937, by referring to the Doctrine of the Proletariat and the Dogma of the Lesser Evil. The Doctrine of the Proletariat explains quite simply that as the Russians are the only proletarian nation in the U.S.S.R. this gives them primacy over all others. The Doctrine of the Lesser Evil is more ingenious since it provides a refutation of Pokrovskyism both before the Revolution and after. In, for instance, Central Asia, Pokrovsky had been wrong because Tsarism there constituted a more progressive social and economic order than the feudalism of the Khans. Tsarism, however, had never been justified in colonizing the Poles or Finns or Baltic peoples prior to 1917 since before that date they had been capitalist and thus more advanced than Russia. However, in 1917, Russia made a dramatic leap forward to Socialism, thus becoming the most progressive country on earth. It then became not only even more fortunate for Central Asians to have Russians to guide them forwards but also appropriate, for the first time in history, for Poles, Balts and Finns to realize that the light was now shining from Moscow. The implications for the whole planet are equally clear. It is quite

● Stalin: the “Little Father of the Nationalities” — or a ruthless cannibal? In Ukraine alone, there is a shortfall of some 14 million people, even allowing for the high death rates sustained during the war.

— From a cartoon by Latvian artist S. Civinskis (1895-1940).



unmistakable in Stalin’s writings between 1930 and 1953 that his adulation as Little Father of the Nationalities is a claim to paternity not only in respect of the non-Russians inside the Empire but of all non-Russians everywhere.

After 1930 the real Russian Revolution — collectivization and forced industrialization, accompanied by famine, slavery, mass-murder, and the mushrooming Gulags fell heavily on all national groups including the Russians but the worst effects were on the Kazakhs and the Ukrainians. During the 1930’s, Kazakh numbers fell by some 25%. When one compares Ukrainian numbers in 1926 and 1979, there is a shortfall, relative to the contemporaneous growth of the Russian population, of some 14 million or 25% even allowing for the high death rates sustained by both nationalities in the collectivization, the Yezhovshchina and the war.

It is interesting to observe that in all the years of Soviet power there have been dismissals, imprisonments, trials and executions, mass-deportations and also massacres for the crime of bourgeois-nationalist deviationism. Sultan- Galiev accurately foresaw, however, that none of the accused would be Great Russians. It is a disease to which Russians seemed to be miraculously immune, at least until the mid-70’s, since when Russian Fascist samizdat literature reminiscent of the Tsarist Black Hundreds has resulted in a few instances of exemplary jail-sentences. (My stress on the value of the Russian language to the Soviet Government is not intended to imply that Great Russians were immune from accusations on other equally grave charges. Probably, the total of Russians who expired as a consequence of the “application of extra-economic force” between 1917 and 1953 equalled that of all other nationalities combined.)



Of course, the promised Federation of 1922, 3 of whose members today sit in the U.N. and its agencies, was destined to be a fraud. Since there was to be only a single, All-Union, C.P.S.U., there was to be no scope for initiative — even for Communists — in the Union Republics. 1921 is notable in Soviet history for the slaughter of the last Soviet, that of Kronstadt, but it was in 1921, too, that the Georgian Party was crushed for questioning centralism. The fact that Sergo Ordzhonikidze was sent by Moscow to do the crushing can scarcely have been much consolation to the men in Tiflis!

Incidentally, the danger that the local C.P. might side with the natives (like the Anglo-Normans in Ireland) has arisen time and time again since Stalin. Latvia, Estonia, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Ukraine have all provided examples. Under Brezhnev there was a widespread “nativization” even of the Central Committee. However, since galloping corruption flourished under Brezhnev, particularly in Central Asia and the Caucasus, the present C.C. of the C.P.S.U. has only one non-Russian left on it — the ex-policeman and anti-corruption investigator, Eduard Shevardnadze. Accusations of persistent corruption in the same regions have helped to provoke the recent Armenian and Kazakh crises — with the threatened local party appealing, in several instances successfully, for public support.

From the late 20's onwards, the slogan was to be firm and clear: “National in form, Socialist in content” and the definition of “socialist” was going to require pretty careful scrutiny of Pravda every morning. Although unwritten, the worst crime after 1917 and especially after 1930 was to do anything spontaneously.

Special policies were eventually produced for certain nationalities. The 19th Century experiments of the Tsarist educator, Ilminsky, were dug up and modified to provide ways of isolating certain Turkic peoples from the propaganda of Constantinople. In some cases the children of 1920 were provided with books printed only in the Latin alphabet, whereupon in the 30's a switch was made to using Cyrillic, since under Ataturk Turkey itself had introduced the Latin alphabet.

Since Bessarabia was annexed in 1940 the local language, Romanian, has never been allowed to be written in Latin script but is written in Cyrillic and re-christened “Moldavian”. In Chisinau in 1982 I was congratulated on my spoken Moldavian despite being practically illiterate in it!

The Stolypin programme of 1906-1916, which involved thinning out overpopulated Slavic rural areas to shunt surplus peasants off to

Western Siberia and Northern Kazakhstan, was a typical pre-Bolshevik example of a multi-purpose undertaking in which economic development, security and Russification were combined. Under Stalin, similar multi-purpose projects of continental scope, accompanied by slavery, torture and mass-murder, became the norm. The only comparable projects in human history have been Hitler's plans for Germans to replace the Russians as rulers over a somewhat larger area.

As to whether there is a single centralized plan of denationalization by mixing up ethnic groups generally so as to produce a Macedonian salad automatically subject to Russification, I doubt it. However, under Bolshevik rule there have been a series of longer or shorter-term policies, some planned, some induced by crisis, which collectively have had results similar, at least in some republics, to the consequences of such a centralized plan.

Obviously the consequences of industrial-urbanization are to draw together large numbers of peasants who require a lingua franca. There is no doubt that this would have occurred under any imperial system. In Central Asia and the Ukraine pre-war and in the Baltic States since their re-conquest there has clearly been a building up of urban centres in order to provide jobs for Russians drafted in as trusties. In Turkestan for some years it appeared that there would eventually be a Russian majority but when Slavic birth rates collapsed after 1950, the prospect of Russian domination actually receded and is now seen as hopeless. Latvia and Estonia, on the other hand, have even lower natural increases than the Russians and it has been easy for Russians to be injected into purpose-built urban areas, a process which has been far less intensive in Lithuania. In the case of the Ukraine, there were the famines, the purges, strong pressures to assimilate via education and job-discrimination and also a tendency to spread graduates and school-leavers throughout the Union where they would become Russian speakers.

The Caucasian Republics, on the other hand, have been more or less left alone. Only 2.7% of the people in Armenia are Russians (1970). At the other extreme, the Karelo-Finnish S.S.R. was actually disbanded after its Russian population far exceeded the Finns, of whom a huge proportion were deported to Siberia in 1939-45. Part of the reasoning behind this decision, which occurred before Stalin died, may have been that preserving Karelia was merely a vehicle for keeping Otto Wilhelm Kuusinen in training until it was decided that the conquest of Finland would have to be postponed.



I have referred already to the savagery of the re-conquest of the Balts, Poles and Bessarabians in 1940. In this region, in a time, according to Tolstoy, of panic over a Franco-British, (not a German) attack, up to 10% of the populations in question were rapidly murdered or deported by killers hardened by a decade of mass-murder further east. In 1943-44 there also occurred the wholesale deportation of entire nationalities as disloyal (Crim-Tatars) or potentially so (Volga-Germans, Kabardines, Chechens, Meskhetians). Some, but only the smaller, of these groups have been rehabilitated. Initial death rates were up to 50%!

The purges, collectivization and famines killed perhaps 25 million — more in the Ukraine and Russia proper than elsewhere. The war itself probably killed another 20 million, perhaps fewer than half of them killed by the invaders\*, the greatest losses being in the Western zones. The 1970 overall demographic shortfall since 1926 has been estimated at about 80,000,000. There was mass slaughter of slave-camp inmates and a mass movement of civilians and slaves eastwards within the U.S.S.R. as a result of the German advance. Industrialization in the Urals, North Kazakhstan, Western Siberia and the Central Asian cities all involved accelerated urbanization and eastward movements of Russians. The occupation by Germany of the Baltic and most of the Ukraine produced its own demographic

\* Tolstoy claims (1981) that during the period of the German invasion alone the N.K.V.D. may have killed more Soviet citizens, plus prisoners of other nationalities, than the Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe and S.S. combined.



● Lithuanian deportee Zigmas Toliušis, transporting water in Siberia (1952).

-Photo: Lithuanians in Siberia.

disasters and prepared the way for flight westwards and mass-murder and deportation eastwards between 1945 and 1952. In this period, in other words, policy was overtaken by catastrophe in shaping the ethnic patterns of the Empire but the net result was similar to that aimed at by pre-war policies.

Vast new problems of imperial management were added in 1945-48 by the imposition of Communism on seven and a half East European nations, five and a half of them under direct Red Army and N.K.V.D. control. In the 40 intervening years these satrapies have proved to be difficult or impossible to control and certainly have absorbed more of the Kremlin's time and energy than the far larger populations in the internal Empire.\*

The theme of Eastern Europe is too vast to consider here in detail but its relevance to the internal colonies is self-evident. If a speech in Moscow, however secret, can help to spark a national uprising in Hungary, then there must be potential, in an era of Glasnost, for developments in Eastern Europe to influence the U.S.S.R. and vice versa. The turbulence in Poland has certainly not gone unnoticed in Lithuania. Hungarian reforms have had an influence on the U.S.S.R. itself. The Iranian Revolution has produced echoes in Azerbaijan among the Shia Muslims while it is possible that one reason for the 1988 withdrawal from Afghanistan was the fear that Sovietization of Afghanistan — at least at this time — would cause more problems for the internal stability of the Empire than retreat.

A very minor influence on the general pattern of the nationalities was exerted by anti-partisan warfare. While America — and the World — agonized over Joe McCarthy and the damage he was doing to Hollywood, the armed N.K.V.D. or Soviet Waffen-S.S. lost 100,000 troops in the Baltic States and the Ukraine between 1944 and 1952 — with no press coverage whatever — and killed a quarter of million people, mainly civilians, in doing so.

\* Europe & Asia : Populations under Communist Rule, 1988.

Soviet Empire		Eastern Europe		Eastern Asia	
Russians	141,500,000	Warsaw Pact	113,000,000	China	1,075,000,000
Ukrainians	43,000,000	Slavs (4 nations)	80,000,000	Vietnam	64,000,000
All Slavs	195,000,000	Non-Slavs (3½ nations)	60,000,000	Others (3½ nations)	34,000,000
Others	90,000,000				
Empire	285,000,000	Communist E. Europe	140,000,000	E. Asia	1,173,000,000

SOURCE: Population Reference Bureau, Inc. Washington D.C.; Mellor; Besemeres (opera cit.).



The last idea that would ever have occurred to Joseph Stalin was that if you killed them fast enough for long enough, even Russia would run out of people. Demographic transition lasted from about 1860 to 1960 and has since affected all communities except the Muslims, who it is estimated will be providing 45% of the total U.S.S.R. population increment for this year (1988). The Russian tide in Central Asia receded visibly even between the 1959 and 1970 censuses. Even the cities of Central Asia are bound to cease to be Russian in 20 or 30 years. Tashkent is already about 60% Muslim and soon all the Asian Republics will have local majorities including even Kazakhstan.

John Besemeres, from whose work I derive much of the recent demographic data, has even suggested that to avoid growing youth unemployment in Central Asia, millions of Asians may have to move to Siberia and even to the European areas of the U.S.S.R.

"Wolverhampton at home and Salisbury in the East" is how he puts it! The Jews, of course, might actually benefit from Russian racism being redirected towards visibly different Asian immigrant groups.

With the spread of urbanism and education the new demography may be expected eventually to spread to the Muslim communities. Caucasian Muslims already have lower birth rates and rates of natural increase than those in Central Asia. However, there is certainly going to be an increase in the Muslims to at least 25% of the Union total by the year 2010 (even if we allow for a fall in natural increase to 1% per annum from the current level). Recruits to the Red Army this year are estimated to be 22% Muslim. They could be as many as 50% by 2025 A.D.

The sensitivity of the Russians in recent years to the demographic threat within has been boosted by the enormous fear of China which has grown since the split of the 1960's. In 1960, there were about 3 Chinese for every Soviet citizen but in 2000 there will be 4.\* The old Russian self-assurance of *Nas Mnogo*\*\* — never that helpful when it was true — is obviously no longer true, not only in international affairs but even at home.

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\* This means that in 1960 there were six Chinese for every Russian on earth and that by 2000 A.D. there will be eight. The German-Russian and German-Soviet ratios were never so disadvantageous as these "demographic odds".


\*\* "We are many".

When the French after the First World War lost their projected Rhine Republic and then even Anglo-Saxon support, there was for a while a frantic attempt to find reassurance in the demographic statistics of the French Empire. "There may be 70,000,000 Germans but with our Empire we are greater still." Within the U.S.S.R. a similar self-deception is involved in the long-cherished project for a merging of the nationalities into a Soviet People — a "concept higher than the nation". Much touted under Krushchev, the process of the emergence of *Homo Sovieticus* was expected to involve "the fusion of nations, languages and cultures". Stalin foreshadowed this as early as the 16th Party Congress. Much actual meddling with existing languages has been planned and implemented. As Lewis put it in 1972 "The increased influence or interference of Russian with national languages is deliberately contrived — lexically, morphologically and phonetically — to say nothing of the way in which their languages are written".

The two anticipated stages of rapprochement between the so-called Soviet nations are still officially stated to involve (a) "the coming together of the nations" — or *sblizheniye*, followed by (b) their ultimate total merging, *sliyaniye*. Under Krushchev, the Party Programme already spoke of the "actual growing together of the nations of the Soviet Union and the achievement of their complete unity" — *Sovietskii Narod*. Of course, it should also be noted that under Krushchev there was going to be free bread, the surpassing of America and the final achievement of Communism by 1980. Soviet jurists are quoted for the 1970's by Lewis as "seeing the mutual relations of the nationalities in the light of the prospect of final coalescence...Whereas formerly the juridical maintenance of national and state borders meant a guarantee of national freedom, now in essence they retain no such meaning. Already, in this respect, one can say with confidence that national statehood and the Soviet federal system have fulfilled their historical function." To quote *Komunistas (Vilnius)* in this context "Archaic national characteristics and traditions are inconsistent with 20th Century technique and cultural progress." As the 1st Secretary of the Uzbek Party, Rashidov, so succinctly put it in 1972 "the Russian people is the elder brother and true friend of all Soviet peoples. The people of Uzbekistan are inseparable from and in one sacred tie with the Russian people".

Meanwhile, what do the Russian masses think of *Sblizheniye*? Rather too frequently they refer to the natives of various other republics — despite 70 years of earnest exhortation — with a range of





● Nationalist loyalties do not die easily: After 48 years of foreign oppression, thousands of Lithuanians gathered in the city of Kaunas on October 9, 1988 and hoisted the Lithuanian national flag in defiance of their Soviet masters.

pejorative epithets which rivals the inventiveness of the English in such matters: the Jew is a 'Zhid', the Uzbek an 'Ishak', the Ukrainian a 'Khokhol', Koreans are 'slant-eyes' or 'Kosoglazyi' and distinguished visiting African heads of state are yet more "Chomozhopii" — or Black-arses — no doubt begging for more aid. As for the Baltic States, the popular perception of their violent annexation is reflected in the common phrase *Sovietskaya Zagrantsa* — "Soviet foreign countries".

Notwithstanding all this slander, the official view of the situation in the U.S.S.R. is still that so inspiringly summarized by Tsamerian and Ronin in a booklet published under the auspices of Unesco: "Soviet legislation vigilantly protects the democratic rights and liberties of all Soviet citizens including effective equality of all in all fields without distinction of race or nationality. It permits no privilege based on nationality and treats any infringement of the rights of citizens and any discrimination based on racial or ethnic differences as crimes".

What problems might Russia's nationalities have had to face if forces other than Leninist-Stalinist ones had guided Russian imperial policy this century? On the right, the potential options were the policies associated with, or to be expected from, Stolypin, Kornilov or Kolchak; on the left the alternatives were Trotskyism and Bukharinism or even a Russia ruled by a Lenin who lived until (say) 83, dying in the same year as his lifelong subordinate, Stalin! There are also the hypothetical Russias of Kerensky and of post-German victory in 1918 or 1941 and the Russia which might have been left over after a successful Ukrainian declaration of independence in , say, 1918.

It is obvious that of all these scenarios the one actually experienced since 1917, although horrifying, has not been the worst from the point of view of all the nationalities. It is a very ill wind that blows no nationality any good. In contrast with the sufferings of the Balts, the Poles, the Ukrainians, Bessarabians and Kazakhs, most of the Finnish and Siberian tribes and even the Turks in general have done better than they might have under Hitler or under Russian capitalism. As for the Georgians, the Uzbeks and the Azerbaijanis, there is a general view in the U.S.S.R. that they have been so privileged under Communism as to get away with wholesale banditry for decades.

Certain of the processes operating under communism to erode the integrity of national cultures may well have proceeded equally or more rapidly under a capitalist regime. Industrial-urbanization alone may have proved as powerful a force as most of the forces operating under Stalinism, though I refer here to the degradation of national cultures



rather than to mass-murder and wholesale brutality and torture of individuals. Emigration abroad and a higher tempo of internal migration may also have been expected to continue under an imperial or a Kerenskyite regime. Moreover, if Tsarism had been both a survivor and a victor, represented at Versailles, then Baltic, Polish and Finnish independence would have been precluded.

Russification, in other words, would probably have proceeded in some fashion under any *de facto* imperial regime. The British, after all, managed to destroy the Scots and Irish languages more or less completely without invoking Marxism-Leninism to help them. It is arguable, too, that Lenin's decision to concede a formally Federal structure as a sop to nationalist sentiment has unintentionally served in some republics as a basis for national cultural survival. In the 3 Caucasian Republics today, the percentage of Russians in the populations is still quite low; ranging from as little as 3% to a maximum of 10% in Azerbaijan.

In fact, considering the scale and violence of the forces applied, from time to time, Soviet nationalities policy is quite remarkable for the extent of its failures. All the brutality has probably been less effective, except in reducing the potential sizes of populations, than alternative policies of a purely economic character might have been. Moscow's recognition of this 70-year long failure probably helps to explain the perennial fantasy of *Homo Sovieticus*, the future Communist Man. Through the processes of *sblizheniye* and *sliyaniye*, accompanied, (of course), by the "ever-increasing tempo of socialist construction and the vertiginous development of the economy", Soviet ideologues predict, without the ghost of a smile, the eventual emergence, in a heightened orbit of the dialectic, of a genuine *Sovietskii Narod* — an Ubervolk composed of Ubermenschen, all of them earnestly thinking Lenin's thoughts — even in their sleep — and exclusively in Russian! The image is mediaeval, theological, eschatological and, to the Western mind, curiously reminiscent of Islam.

The yawning gap between everyday reality and such ideological flights of fancy testifies to the practical insolubility of the Soviet nationality problem. This need not imply, however, that the U.S.S.R. is going to disintegrate or wither away, and even, if it were to do so, that the national problem would be the principal cause of such a collapse. Nationalist opposition played only a small role in 1905 and 1917, after all, and none at all in the great scare of 1941. Many empires have survived for generations or centuries despite having to grapple with the odd insoluble problem!

I want to make some final comments from a Marxist viewpoint — revisionist, of course. Whereas Plekhanov rightly observed that some proletarians succumb to the lure of bourgeois-nationalist propaganda, he was somewhat premature, to say the least, in predicting a united world proletariat rising to smash, (among other things), its nationalist chains. A corollary of the failure of the European working class to recognize its allotted historical role in 1914 has been the Russian nationalities' refusal to accept their common Soviet destiny since 1917. What is more, since their old ruling classes (Polish landlords, Baltic barons, Azeri mullahs, etc.) have been exterminated and replaced by an imperial Russian proletariat, is it surprising that the predicted sharpening of intra-national class-differentiation should have failed to develop? Or surprising that it should have been replaced by the rapid spread among many nationalities of today's neo-bourgeois false-consciousness? How can groups permeated by such sentiments be expected to make the collective leap into being both proletarian and Russian? All that the Soviet Communist Party needs, now that 20 to 30 million murders have failed, is just one miracle. Clearly, '*sblizheniye*' and '*sliyaniye*' are the collective prayers of a failed ideology for just such a miracle — a Soviet Gleichschaltung which would deliver the monocultural phalanx which gave Germany (and gives China) the power to make Moscow tremble.

As for the nature of Plekhanov's (and Karl Marx's) error, I would suggest that Joseph Stalin actually put his own revisionist finger on the problem in 1950 when he declared that human language is neither an element of the base nor of the superstructure but is a "constant element which possesses a vitality of its own" — *eine Sache an sich und für sich*. Ostensibly, he merely demolished the theories of Professor Marr but he incidentally acknowledged that Moscow's nationality problem, which is much the same thing as the language problem, is not likely to be solved by mere evolution. The promulgation of *sblizheniye* and *sliyaniye* is a clear continuation of the Stalin line but the 35 years since Stalin have seen increasing reluctance to revive Stalinist methods, since those methods inevitably involve drastic purging and slaughter within the Party itself.

As an antidote to the years of Brezhnevite sterility, two types of Perestroika are possible, involving either a resumption of Stalinistic savagery or an expansion of Gorbachovism and Glasnost. *Sblizheniye* and *sliyaniye* however, are achievable neither in theory nor in practice, particularly under a liberal or pseudo-liberal regime.



Circumstances in the U.S.S.R. since the 1950's, moreover, have progressively eroded the Slavic demographic majority which Stalin felt would be permanently at his disposal. It is going to be of considerable interest for all concerned to study the adaptations forced upon the C.P.S.U. by the constant relative rise in Muslim numbers, particularly in view of this month's (April, 1988) admission of failure in Afghanistan.

What would Pobedonostsev have suggested? What practical alternative can Gorbachov or any other leader come up with to replace all those centuries of Autocracy, Orthodoxy and the National idea?

## DISCUSSION

Topics raised included (i) the potential of nationalism, in both the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, to act as a solvent of party hegemonism and (ii) the potential impact of Islam on the U.S.S.R.

### 1. Nationalism

Multinational Empires are not difficult to dominate in the short and middle term if the imperial power is prepared to pursue *Divide et Impera* with ruthlessness and skill. The Russians today have more skills and greater regional military dominance than Tsarism ever commanded. Recent incidents in the Caucasus had their parallels in 1917-20 while earlier religious riots were deliberately fomented by the Tsars - specifically in Baku - as a means of crushing radical protest among the immigrant (non-Muslim) oil workers.

In Eastern Europe, the Albanian and Bulgarian cards have been played against Yugoslavia, the Romanians and Hungarians against one another and the German bogey invoked to shore up the Polish-Soviet relationship.

However, the long-term menace of the national problem, just as under Tsarism, is its capacity to limit the speed and scope of the leadership's manoeuvres and, thereby, to debilitate the body politic. Like malnutrition or malaria, its impact is likely to be most serious in conjunction with other problems such as economic crisis or failure in war.

Whereas the Han are more than 90% of China's population, the Russians currently comprise about 48% of the U.S.S.R. and 33% of the Soviet Bloc's population. It is noteworthy that China, like Germany since 1900, has often changed the state ideology or introduced heresies without real risk to the fabric of the state. In contrast, the Russian problem of imperial dominance, at an overall ratio of 1:2 in favour of the colonized, imposes severe limits on policy options. Moscow could not have survived - or even contemplated - the sharp twists, turns, experiments and retreats of Beijing since 1950, since there are 280 million internal and external colonials to consider rather than a handful of Tibetans, Mongols and Lao. Moscow's postures of ideological virtue and disdain for Maoism were at least partly the outcome of imperial necessity. The Tsarist, Habsburg, Ottoman and the West European Empires exhibited similar inflexibility for the same reasons. Although other historical and international political constraints were operating, the long "Brezhnev-Drift" reflected this same dilemma of dominance, as do Gorbachov's current problems.


The fundamental problems of the U.S.S.R., (but not of China), in the coming quarter-century arise from the need to achieve three conflicting goals simultaneously:-

- (1) Strengthen the imperial economy by wholesale adoption of capitalist methods, particularly in agriculture.
- (2) Adjust ideology, practice and personnel accordingly, but with a minimum of violence, preferably none.
- (3) Prevent the internal and external Empires from striking back during or after these delicate manoeuvres.

Gorbachov's Perestroika, whatever else it may involve, must imply a purge of 1930's proportions but, equally, must minimize violence if any economic or systemic improvements are to be secured, yet violence clearly threatens in four ways:-

- (i) As a reaction to price-rises and other consequences of capitalistic reforms.
- (ii) As protective reaction from the Stalinist-Brezhnevite Old Guard (led by Ligachov?).
- (iii) As an ultimate sanction in imposing the reforms or in preserving Gorbachov's dominance or survival.
- (iv) Among or from the nationalities as a consequence of any of the above.





## 2. Islam

Muslims, 15% of the Empire in 1914, may exceed 25% early in the coming century.\* Retreat from Afghanistan, the Khomeini factor and Russian nationalism and racism may be expected to create further trouble. However, the Muslims are fragmented linguistically and geographically, just as they were under Tsarism. The Uzbeks may be the 3rd largest ethnic group but 6% is a feeble total compared to the 48% of Russians. Besides, Central Asia is not a vulnerable region, the Iranian Revolution is more likely to collapse than spread at present, and the living standards of Soviet Muslims are the highest in their history and higher than those of their Muslim neighbours. As for Afghanistan, it is not impossible that Soviet troops will return, particularly if Gorbachov does fail and fall, though whether this would add to or detract from Soviet strength in the long run is debatable.

Though there is no prospect of a revival of future demographic expansion from the overworked, under-paid, poorly housed and urbanized European female population, it is likely that Muslim natural increase will decline with further urbanization, limiting the ultimate Muslim proportion to perhaps 35-40% of the Soviet population after another century. The potential consequences of this are as interesting but as unclear as the expected parallel Hispanization of the U.S.A. (McGlynn, Pakulski, Rose).


\* In 1988, there were 50,000,000 Soviet Muslims in a total population of 285,000,000, or 17.6%. The speed with which 25% is likely to be attained is a function of the recent development of a wide differential in natural increase as European C.B.R. has plummeted while Muslim rates remain high.

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- \* Available Tasmanian University Library. Call numbers in brackets.







● Recent excavations beneath the Catholic Cathedral of Vilnius, Lithuania's capital (*pictured*) have unearthed 5,000 years of history and pre-history. Archeologists have confirmed that pagan temples had stood on the Cathedral's present site. And at the very bottom of the many layers, archeologists have discovered a Stone Age dwelling dating back to approximately 3,000 BC. That is about the time Indo-Europeanised inhabitants of Middle Europe first reached the southeast littoral of the Baltic Sea.

Above the Neolithic layer lie successive layers of the late Bronze Age, the various subdivisions of the Iron Age and then on through the beginning of historical times to the present Cathedral.

It has been established so far that eleven different structures were built on this one site, in the course of many centuries.

Between the Stone Age dwelling in the bottom-most layer and the latest pagan temple, there is the early cultural level of a Lithuanian tribe. It is distinguished by its hatch-marked pottery and dates from the Iron Age.

Then there are the various pagan temples, one atop the other, followed by the mid-13th century Catholic cathedral of King Mindaugas. This was destroyed by fire after all signs of his eight-year stint as a baptised Christian member of the Roman church were deliberately washed away.

Upon the foundations of this ruined cathedral, a new temple for pagan god *Perkūnas* (Thunder) was erected. It differed from the previous cathedral in that the altar was placed in the very centre of the temple. On both the east and west sides of the new altar there was a staircase of twelve steps, ascending to the altar in a southerly direction.

This temple was destroyed after Lithuania's second baptism, when King Jogaila directed that it be torn down, the statue *Perkūnas* destroyed, the sacred fire extinguished and that a Catholic cathedral be erected in its place.

— Based on: AZUKAS, Albinas, "The Hidden History under the Cathedral of Vilnius", BRIDGES, Vol 12, No 3 (March 1988) p6.

## Balts in Sweden

Lillemor and Nils LEWAN  
University of Lund, Sweden

When we received the invitation to meet the Lithuanian Society in Hobart, we knew very little about Lithuania and about Lithuanian and Baltic research in Sweden. But we recalled some thoughts and memories.

The beautifully decorated eggs on the last page of your pamphlet remind us about the way we decorate eggs at Easter in our family. We use flowers from the garden and wrap them firmly around the eggs with a thin cloth and thread and boil them in coloured water. When we unwrap them they have got beautiful, white off-prints of the flowers against a coloured background. We don't know how this tradition came into the family some generations ago. But it is quite uncommon in Sweden, so maybe the tradition originates in some other European country along the Baltic.

Both of us have faint memories of our fathers visiting the Baltic states in the 1930s. One of us has travelled through the Baltic states en route to an excursion in Leningrad. And we remember neighbours, friends, and colleagues who are Baltic, but mainly from Estonia. A very special event occurred when we visited Mariehamn, Åland, one of the ports of the Tall Ships' Race in the Baltic this summer, and saw the Estonian flag legally set on one of the ships. Things are happening these days, and the situation may finally improve in the Baltic republics.

But all this has very little to do with research. What research related to the Baltic states is done in Sweden today? Requests at our university soon led us to the Baltic Institute of Scandinavia, Stockholm, and the Centre for Baltic Studies, University of Stockholm. We learned that there is both teaching and research on Baltic languages, literature, and folklore at Swedish universities. Lithuanian studies, however, are concentrated in the Stockholm area, where most of the Lithuanian minority lives today, around 100 persons, many of whom are doctors, architects, artists, engineers. There is a Lithuanian Society in Stockholm (c/o Gumauskas, Larsbodälvagen 36, S-123 41 Farsta).

Velta Rūke-Dravina, born 1917 in Latvia, was a teacher and researcher at the University of Lund before she was appointed to



professor of Baltic languages at the University of Stockholm. She is now retired and succeeded by Helge Rinholm, born 1942 in Norway. Juozas Lingis, has been a lecturer of the Lithuanian language and literature at the universities of Stockholm and Uppsala until 1985. He was born in Lithuania 1910, studied at the University of Kaunas in Lithuania and came to the University of Stockholm on a grant 1937-1942 to study Ethnology<sup>1</sup>.

Since its establishment in 1970, the aim of the Baltic Institute has been to encourage interest in the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian peoples, their history, culture and languages, in particular by promoting scientific research in these fields. The Baltic Institute is now in receipt of an annual income from the government, which continues to acknowledge the efforts of the institute in strengthening contacts between Sweden and the Baltic republics in the fields of culture and science, thus contributing to Swedish endeavours to promote international cooperation.

Previous conferences in Stockholm arranged by the Institute and the Centre have been devoted to studies on Baltic folklore, the Baltic



● Fig 1. Balts coming to the south of Sweden met a landscape that probably reminded them of their home country, in some places quite flat in others low hills with arable land or deciduous forests. Here the city of Lund meets arable land along the valley of a small river, Hölje å. What interest could people living in the nearby houses take in the management of this land? Discussions, walks along the river and research dissemination encouraged them to make a plan for the valley and arrange a meeting at which it was presented for neighbours and local politicians.

minorities and earlier periods in Baltic history. The conference 1987 focused on The Baltic Countries 1900-1914. The conference was visited by distinguished scholars from more than 20 countries, as well as delegations from the three Baltic republics representing academics, universities and other scientific and cultural institutions<sup>2</sup>.

Sweden and the Baltic republics together with other riparian states along the Baltic have many serious problems in common — the pollution of the sea and the air, the fishing territories, and the safety of nuclear power stations.

Among the Baltic researchers in Sweden, Professor Edgar Kant (1902-1978) from Tartu, Estonia, has meant most to us and our university. Recently we heard a lecture in Sydney on his thoughts and ideas by our colleague and friend, Professor Anne Buttmer<sup>3</sup>.

When he came to Lund as a refugee Edgar Kant already seemed an elderly man, somewhat shy with young students. Thus it was a kind of revelation to learn what our colleague said in her lecture.

In independent Estonia Kant very fast became important, a young man pursuing science and also serving his country; finally also vice-chancellor of his university. Exiled in Sweden since 1944, he was at first in emergency employment at the Department of Geography at the University of Lund. Soon, however, he made himself known as an authority in his subject, and finally in 1964 he became once again a professor, now in economic geography.

What then has been to me so interesting about Edgar Kant? Let us mention just a few things. He obviously had made it a main point to learn from others. He made extensive travels over most of Europe before WW2, and he possessed an enormous knowledge of languages, things enabling him to bring together facts, views and understanding from many sources.

He stressed the importance of knowledge of home areas (*Heimatkunde* in German, *hembygdskunskap* in Swedish), perhaps understandable in a young independent nation, but still interesting today. Thus he also stressed the value of regional identity and a sensitivity to history. He stressed the importance of natural resources and, quite a new approach, ecological conditions. He was one of the earliest promoters of the idea of seeing cities as centres for hinterlands of various sizes. For academic learning both interesting and sad, these are all things which have come to the fore much later in other places.





● Fig 2. In a commuters' village people were encouraged by research dissemination and other activities to take interest in semi-natural land close to their living area. They agreed to clear and fence an old oak-meadow that was about to be overgrown by bushes and trees, and to buy lambs and lease ewes for the summer to keep it open.

Also important with Kant was his urge to trace ideas back in history. Thus, he found roots to the central-place-theories by Walter Christaller from the 1930s as far back as the 18th century, in works by the Swedish economic historian Carl Brunckman. Equally, he showed that the method of population 'dot maps', ascribed to de Geer (1908), had been used in several countries already around the middle of the 19th century.

Obviously, Edgar Kant became a vitalizer of geography in Lund, putting forward ideas on migration and commuting, on the town-country relation as a whole, on diffusion of ideas over space, and of space-time geography.

It is worth adding two things we learned from the Kant lecture. Even a young man can, if dedicated and serious, do important service to both science and country, not the least in a small, young nation. Finally, soon being elderly ourselves, we very much regret that in our younger years we did not take the opportunity to learn from this timid but intellectually and humanly so important Baltic refugee in Sweden.

Refugees like Edgar Kant arriving in Scania, in the south of Sweden, met a landscape probably not very different from that of the Baltic republics. This landscape is in some parts rather flat, in some parts

there are low hills. Most of the land is intensively farmed, with some forests. The landscape has changed very rapidly since 1945. More and more land is used for cereal production on larger and larger fields, and grazing cattle and meadows have disappeared together with rows of willow trunks, other trees and wild vegetation along ditches and boundaries. Large areas of former grazing land have been planted with spruce, resulting in dark forest land; others are over-grown by bushes and trees because there are no grazing animals any longer. Cattle is today mainly raised in stables and needs a high quality feed.

Thus the problem today is to keep land open and to guarantee enough semi-natural land for people to wander in. It is important in the Scandinavian countries which are characterised by the ancient Act of Common Access. You are allowed to wander freely, except where crop is growing; you may climb fences but you are not allowed into private gardens. You may pitch a tent for a night provided you do not disturb; light a fire, if there is no danger; pick flowers, collect berries and mushrooms, if they are not protected by law<sup>4</sup>.

But how do we manage the semi-natural land? And is the general public interested in contributing to the management of semi-natural land? Can they generate ideas about how to contribute to land management other than by tax-paying. This has been turned into a research project in Sweden<sup>5</sup>.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Artes 3 (1981) 159.

<sup>2</sup>*Ninth Conference on Baltic Studies in Scandinavia*. The Baltic Institute in Scandinavia and Centre for Baltic Studies at the University of Stockholm, Stockholm 1988.

<sup>3</sup>BUTTNER, Anne, University of Lund, Sweden — *Edgar Kant: Baltic Pioneer*. Oral presentation at the XXVI International Geographical Congress, Sydney, Australia, August 20-25, 1988.

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<sup>4</sup>"Right and wrong in the countryside: About the Right of Public Access. Information from the National Environment Protection Board and the Swedish Tourist Board.

<sup>5</sup>LEWAN, Lillemor, University of Lund, Sweden — *Involving Local People in Sweden in the Management of Semi-Natural areas*. Oral presentation at International Commission on Changing Rural Systems Symposium in Auckland, New Zealand, August 15-19, 1988.





● In mid-June each year, people in major Australian centres commemorate the mass deportations from the Baltic States — a cruel event that started on June 14, 1941 and cost at least 655,000 lives. Pictured: A symbolic re-enactment of the Baltic tragedy, in the streets of Hobart.  
— Photo by courtesy of *The Mercury* (Hobart).

## Lest We Forget

### An address by Sir Guilford YOUNG

late Archbishop of Hobart

At the June 1986 commemoration of Baltic mass deportations

Many a Cenotaph erected in Australian cities or towns as memorials to our war dead bears the words: LEST WE FORGET. For over 700,000 Balts who were deported East in 1941 and through the decade that followed, we in Hobart have no memorial in marble or in stone. For the oppressed victims of the Soviet occupation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, no monument has been erected.

We have instead this evening's gathering of men and women who directly or indirectly suffered from the deportations, and somehow lived to make their way to the free society awaiting them here at the end of the world, along with friends and relatives who join with them annually in this commemorative service of the HELLP Association. With them here tonight are people without personal or family links with those sad events nearly 50 years ago, but who come drawn by the enormity of what happened as well as out of reverence and in sorrow for the dead.

Yes, if you like, there IS a monument to the deportees, a living one: you are that monument, built of the living stones who remember.

You remember because of your compassion. You remember because of your humanity. You remember because you are courageous enough to face unpalatable facts, and not run away from them. You remember because of your pity for their suffering and your indignation at their unjust treatment. Finally, you remember out of gratitude for the liberty you enjoy and out of fear that our complacency may take that freedom too much for granted, and so let it slip from our hands.

For the deportees, you are the living monument reminding Australians of the appalling, the genocidal inhumanity of the invaders of 1940, and the sufferings of their hapless victims.



How vital it is that the Baltic deportations never fade from our minds, because every generation will need to be reminded of what once happened, and must then ensure that nothing of the kind will ever happen again.

Unhappily the passing decades have taken their toll of the survivors, and even of their children, so that here in another land, those horrendous crimes against the Baltic people will become so distant in time and space as to fade from the memory.

That must not be allowed to happen.

It may be that some material monument, tangible and visible, that will stand at all hours in all weathers, is desirable. No doubt what you cherish in your minds and hearts in faith is the most important; but I believe we should look seriously at the idea of a monument in some enduring material which may be a reminder, LEST WE FORGET.

In my mind's eye I see it bearing an inscription in four languages, your own beloved Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian, and then the language of your adopted and adopting land, English. It could invite the reader to turn back the years and pause in pity and love to think of that recent Way of the Cross, because in my mind I see the monument depicting scene by scene that sad story from start to finish, so that generations to come could join us as we gaze upon each stage of the deportations and ponder the mystery of such great suffering by such innocent people, and see its place in the Divine plan for mankind's redemption.

It would be like the Stations of the Cross, but would not begin, as the Way of the Cross does, with the Condemnation to Death — for there was no legal process in 1941 to decide who should be deported. The first scene could show rather a family disturbed at the table as the militia enters with its dread list.

The second could show the family being forced at gun-point to climb into a truck — American Lend-Lease, of course . . . one of the many ironies of war.

And so on: the family is put into cattle trucks, the family is separated, the family is starved, frozen, sent to Arctic regions to build the workers' paradise on permafrost.

With slave labour come illness, denial of medicine, beatings and death. They are lucky if they are buried.

I see all those scenes depicted in a series that calls for a powerful artistic conception of what occurred then . . . and is still occurring.



Above all, the significance of those events needs to be suggested. The publicity for tonight's service is an admirable example of what can be done, showing as it does Christ carrying the cross which is the hammer, a symbol of oppression, over-arched by the sickle, now a symbol of death.

What a sermon without words that drawing is!

I would like to see the deportations depicted before me in a similar way so that I might pause, ponder the mystery and pray.

And, if there were to be a monument of this nature in Hobart it would not be inappropriate if it were to be erected in a place like St Joseph's Church in Hobart which was built in part by the labour of convicts whose criminality in at least some cases was doubtful. Criminal or not, they were sent to the end of the world by a harsh and oppressive system. Those who sailed up the Derwent chained below decks in appalling squalor would have understood very well what it was like in 1941 to be locked in a cattle truck for three months, or to be sent down the Yenisey River to build the Arctic city of Norilsk.

We know that nothing material is eternal, and that too much faith can be placed in stone or metal to say and convey what we believe or feel so strongly that we want it never to fade from memory. But if such a monument were to be erected in Hobart, it would serve as a focus for our commemorations, and as a spur to our efforts to build a society in which justice and freedom are honoured by all its institutions, and courageously protected by all its members.

It is our spiritual perceptions, and our convictions that we must ensure live on. Perhaps a monument might give expression to the spiritual, and reinforce our convictions if ever our ardour were to grow cool.



## BOOK REVIEW by V. A. VITKŪNAS

### Lithuanians Down Under

BIRŠKYS, B. & A., A. Putniņš, I. SALASOO, The Baltic Peoples in Australia. Australian Ethnic Heritage Series. General editor: Michael Cigler. Melbourne: A. E. P. Press, 1986.

This important, aesthetically well presented book created somewhat of a stir among Lithuanian readers after its publication and distribution in 1986-87. While one cannot but appreciate the extensive work done by the authors of the part entitled LITHUANIANS IN AUSTRALIA, some facts, interpretations and emphases need correction, or at least re-interpretation.

Before discussing the text, it must be pointed out that the map of Lithuania opposite the title page is incorrect. The capital city is not shown at all, nor are the borders accurate. To merely mention "Old Borders" and "Present borders" without giving the relevant dates leads to confusion.

These notes have been made in consecutive order, following the pagination of the book, with some quotations from the original text. Wherever possible, preliminaries and elaborations are avoided.

Let us turn to page 5, in the section "Lithuania's Epoch of Heroism":

"With Vytautas' death, the smaller dukes fell to squabbling among themselves for spoils and power. They adopted Polish customs and language, and by the end of the sixteenth century Lithuania was completely subservient to Poland. 'Grand Duke of Lithuania' was merely another title of the Polish kings. The Lithuanian people were reduced to the status of serfs."

While there is much truth in this paragraph, nevertheless it is a sweeping statement. After all, the first Lithuanian books were printed in the 16th century. As regards Lithuania's relations with Poland, the infamous Union of Lublin (with Poland, in 1569) was signed by the Lithuanian delegation under duress. I refer the authors to Dr A. Gerutis, *Lithuania 700 years*, New York: Manyland Books, 1969, p.81 in particular:

"The dramatic climax of negotiations occurred on June 28, when the chairman of the Lithuanian delegation, Jonas Katkevičius, kneeling and crying with his whole delegation, begged the King "not to wrong his fatherland." This moving scene presents clear evidence of the hopelessness of the situation which the Poles exploited by imposing the union."

Only a sentence or two is needed to present this particular period in its proper context, and not perpetuate the myth that the Lithuanian people, including nobility, were completely enslaved by the Poles.

On p6, in the section INDEPENDENCE, the authors do not relate, however briefly, that the Wars of Independence were fought not only against the Poles, but, perhaps more importantly, against the Germans and the Bolsheviks as well. Lithuania was not simply "granted" (by whom?) its statehood. After 2 years of the Wars of Independence and a sustained effort by various Lithuanian diplomats and delegations, Western European nations and the USA finally recognised independent Lithuania. Independence was dearly paid for, and unwillingly accepted by the country's neighbours. By the way, "People's Army of Freedom fighters" is a totally incorrect name: the army of the Wars of Independence was always known as "The Volunteers," or "The Army of Volunteers." "People's Army of . . ." etc, has wrong connotations in a Lithuanian mind.

The section WORLD WAR II, on page 7, contains a passage to which all Lithuanians with any conscience will object:

"In 1940, after accusing the three tiny Baltic states of 'plotting aggression against it', the Soviet Union invaded them. Lithuania was occupied on 15 June, 1940. Some Lithuanians regarded this invasion as a dual liberation: from the threat of German Nazism, and from their own government which, though national and benign, had been a virtual dictatorship. Any joy was short lived."

Firstly, the Baltic States were earmarked to be annexed to the USSR by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (and its amendments) of 1939. Secondly, 'plotting aggression' against the Soviet Union was only one of several deliberately fabricated excuses to invade the Baltic States. How the invasion and annexation came about is a much more complex issue. But the main objection lies in the statements that 'Some Lithuanians regarded this invasion as a dual liberation etc.', and 'Any joy was short lived.'

Perhaps a handful of communists might have regarded the invasion as 'dual liberation', but there were few communists in Lithuania. Some Jewish people, faced with the threat of Nazism, understandably might have rejoiced, but only some — for they well knew that under the Soviet regime their accumulated wealth, their freedom of religion and way of life were to be irretrievably lost. It was a choice between two evils. But dual liberation? On p. 8 the authors correctly state that the 'Lithuanian Jewry . . . in free Lithuania had full equality with other citizens'.





● A handful of communists welcomed the 1940 Soviet invasion, but there were few communists in Lithuania. The remaining people were petrified with fear, and mourned the end of their freedom.

Lithuanian citizens as a whole were simply petrified with fear for their future and mourned their young country's downfall. The 'virtual dictatorship . . . though national and benign' was the lightest of burdens to bear, if burden it was.

At this point, the authors certainly create the wrong impression for those who are not familiar with our mode of government, or the circumstances which decided it. It is unlikely that a different form of government would have been possible in a country barely 20 years old, striving to survive independently, and surrounded by unfriendly neighbours. Democracy in Lithuania, as in most European countries at that time, was barely budding.

'Any joy was short lived' is simply unacceptable, for there was no joy, only fear, a feeling of oncoming catastrophe, which it certainly proved to be. 'The communist Soviet government soon revealed itself as little different from the Tsarist'. No, different; that is, much worse . . .

Lithuanians are concerned that their children, many of them students, will read such statements and come to wrong conclusions. So would our Australian friends, some of them historians, sociologists, and politicians. One presumes that the book, *The Baltic Peoples in Australia* will be held by every University, and other major libraries, as will other books in the series. It is important that every fact in it is correct, and that its mode of presentation reflects the convictions and feelings of Lithuanians in Australia.

On the same page (7) one reads the following: 'The retreating Soviets deported at least 40,000 Lithuanians . . .' Incorrect. The deportations began eight days before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war on June 22, 1941, according to a meticulous plan prepared earlier. I refer the authors to the book "Soviet Genocide in Lithuania", by J. Pajaujis-Javis, PhD. (N.Y., Manyland Books, 1980). If the retreating Soviets were engaged in deportations, one could call this outrage an act of war, performed in panic by irresponsible military forces. It was not so. Besides, the very fast retreating Soviets had no time or resources to implement deportations.

So much for deviations from established historical facts. The following chapters, eg., "The Old Lithuanians", contain some very valuable material, including statistics, taken from Australian sources. There is no reason to query these. Also, the events, the general atmosphere and some more statistics in the chapter "The Displaced Lithuanians" are well presented and interesting to read.

Chapter 4, on p. 29, entitled "The Settlement: a Generation Passes" and divided into 7 sections, however, needs restructuring, balancing, and some additions and corrections.

In the introduction, organised community life deserves more than one page description. Youth, folkloric, sports, professional and religious organisations were particularly active and numerous in the sixties and later. They might have had some impact on the Australian community. Compare the chapter "Organised Community Life", five pages in all, in *LATVIANS IN AUSTRALIA!*

As for Lithuanian Community Houses — in Adelaide two such centres are maintained and well attended. In fact, the Lithuanian House at Norwood was established somewhat earlier than the Catholic Centre. The Melbourne Lithuanian House is quite large and has perhaps the best Lithuanian library in Australia.

The section "Assimilation in the 1950s and 1960s" (p. 32) might well have been included in "Achievements", which, in turn, could have been expanded to incorporate the sections "Músu Pastoge" and "Conservationist". In any case, "Achievements" is begging for some additions. For instance, thankfully, our artists are given quite a lot of space (a photograph or two would have helped) but a few people from other spheres of cultural life are not mentioned. For instance, H. Bakaitis and A. Butavičius made their names in the Australian theatre; J. Janušaitis, some years ago, in ballet; and Ms. L. Pocius publishes poetry in Lithuanian and in English.



In the index of the book, under Lithuanians in Australia, the first entry is 'academics — (p)34.' On page 34, however, all one finds is: "From these two sources, the first generation and the new, many unmistakably Lithuanian names began to appear on University Pass and Honours lists, and in academic rolls." Here are some statistics, perhaps difficult to come by, that can be used to illustrate the point. In the period of 1954 to 1986 inclusive, in Adelaide alone 151 Lithuanians graduated from the 2 Universities in South Australia. Of this number, 6 received doctorates. Quite a reasonable effort, considering that in 1961 there were only 1431 Lithuanian-born Australians in S.A. (The population figure is from the Bureau of Statistics).

Australia-wide, Professors Z. L. Budrikis, V. Doniela and A. Kabaila deserve a mention. Quite a few Lithuanians or Australian-born Lithuanians teach in various tertiary institutions. Inevitably, they do contribute something to Australian education, or even Australian lifestyle.

By the way, we have two well-respected Lithuanian recipients of the O.B.E. — Mons. P. Butkus in Sydney, and Mrs. O. Baužė, now residing in Adelaide. Why not include their names somewhere in the "Achievements" section?

Chapter 4 would have been much better balanced if the section "Conservationist" (and for that matter "Mūsų Pastogė") were shorter and simply included in the section "Achievements". After all, there is an excellent book in English about Mr. Olegas Truchanas. The space could have been used for less obvious but nonetheless important material. For instance, the achievements of our sportsmen: in the 1956 Olympics in Melbourne, A. Ignatavičius and S. Darginavičius played in the Australian basketball team. E. Palubinskas (also basketball) achieved excellent results for Australia at the Olympics in Munich, and in Montreal. In the late 50s the all-Lithuanian basketball team (Vytyis Sportsclub) held the S.A. basketball premiership for 4 years. Aldona Snarskyte (table tennis) has been a South Australian champion for 6 years in succession. Mr R. Arlauskas of Adelaide is the only Lithuanian in the world who earned the title Grandmaster — in chess.\* Is it not important in this book to show that Australian Lithuanians are well represented in many walks of life?

\*The information about Lith. sportsmen and women is to be found in both the "Australijos Lietuvių Metraštinis" and particularly in "Lietuviai Sportininkai Australijoje" Adel/Melb. ALFAS, 1980., (transl. "Lithuanian Sportsmen in Australia. 1949-1979).

Chapter 5, "The Trauma of 1974 — and After", depicts quite well our "struggle with Mr Whitlam" regarding his government's de jure recognition of Soviet Lithuania and other Baltic States. Well done!

As the authors are not well known to the Lithuanian public, one cannot know their political leanings or sympathies. The terminology used in parts of this chapter is decidedly alien to a Lithuanian mind. I quote from p. 43:


"Like other refugees from Eastern European countries, they were inclined to be receptive to the *Cold War hysteria* of the 1950s, and to the use made — often cynically — of that hysteria, to align the Australian Labor Party in the public mind with a *communist menace* in Australia".

And again:

"The Vietnam issue made politics volatile; it was harder to whip up the 'communist menace' as an election issue; attitudes everywhere were changing."

No Lithuanian refugee, with experiences of the communist regime, will use inverted commas when writing: **communist menace!** Nor will they use expressions such as Cold War fanatics (p. 44) or Cold War hysteria.

As for the Vietnam issue — Lithuanians lamented the outcome of the Vietnam War, and still do. The communist menace in the Pacific is showing signs of becoming reality; our people predicted this in the 1960s.



● The Lithuanian Catholic Centre and church in Adelaide. This is one of the two Lithuanian community houses established in the South Australian capital by postwar Lithuanian migrants.

If I did not know any better, I would hazard a guess that parts of LITHUANIANS IN AUSTRALIA were written by non-Lithuanians . . . However, on the whole, a heart-felt sympathy and understanding of the subject are plain to see.

At last, to the finale — “The Aftermath”. A few corrections are called for.

On p 49, the following passage needs amendment:

“Lithuanian Women’s groups back in the 1960s foresaw the future needs of this ageing population and after years of hard work, by 1985, could open the Lithuanian Retirement Village at Engadine, south of Sydney, with others nearing completion in Melbourne and Adelaide.”

With regard to the Lithuanian Retirement Village at Engadine, “Australijos Lietuvių Metraštis” (Lithuanian Yearbook) vol 2 records that the first six units were erected in 1975; in 1978 the common hall was built, and at the end of the same year, the opening of the hall was celebrated. In Adelaide, a block of flats for the elderly was purchased in 1986, and the first occupants moved in in the same year. In Melbourne, a committee was formed in 1987 to look into the possibilities of establishing Lithuanian retirement homes, but the project is only at a discussion and information-gathering stage at present. (June '87)

The chapter “Aftermath” ends with some passages on the Lithuanian language. First, the small error, possibly a misprint on p 51: Birškietė (unmarried feminine) should be *Birškytė*. A somewhat more upsetting explanation of a point of grammar is the following.

“Names are then submitted to the normal case derivatives, *making a multitude of proper names!*” (My emphasis.)

Not at all. Surnames and Christian names are subject to declension, like all other nouns. It is simply a matter of case inflections, as in Latin, and does not make a “multitude of proper names”. Eg, the genitive case of Birškys is Birškio; the dative — Birškiui, and so on. Such changing endings often perform the function of prepositions, without changing the basic meaning of the word.

A point regarding the bibliography of Part I. In the listing, there is an entry “Metraštis: Australijos Lietuvių Metraštis (Lithuanian Yearbook) . . .” A few lines down, another entry — “Straukas, Bronius, ‘Lithuanians in Australia’, in Lithuanian Chronicle, Adelaide ALB, 1984”. It is one and the same publication, only in the second instance the reference is to its vol. 2. The description is correct in the first mention of the publication.. The title “Lithuanian Chronicle” should

not be used, as it leads to confusion — no publication by that title exists.

While an enormous amount of research and hard work was put in by the authors in bringing “Lithuanians in Australia” into being, it could be much improved — if a second edition is ever contemplated. Perhaps a Lithuanian consultative committee could be established to work in conjunction with the authors.

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## Visitors

Four distinguished Lithuanians from overseas visited the Lithuanian Studies Society at the University of Tasmania in 1988-89. Each visitor gave a public lecture at the University and received a warm welcome from the Tasmanian audiences.



Vytautas Skuodis

Miss Gintė DAMUŠIS, Director of the Lithuanian Information Centre in New York, USA (pictured, right), spoke on January 13, 1988 about "Glasnost — the opportunities and traps of it".

The next visitor was Vytautas SKUODIS (pictured, top left), a former professor of geology at the University of Vilnius, Lithuania. He came to Tasmania on September 14, 1988 — about a year after his release from a Soviet prison.

Dr Algirdas STATKEVIČIUS (pictured, bottom left) told Hobart people about his experiences in Soviet prisons on February 8, 1989.



Dr Algirdas Statkevičius

The fourth visitor, Father Alfonsas Svarinskas, 63 (pictured, bottom right) addressed his audience at the University on March 13, 1989. He impressed everyone with his profound faith, mixed with a keen sense of humour. Father Svarinskas had no bitterness — an amazing trait for a man who had spent a total of 20 years in Soviet prisons for his defence of human rights.

The Lithuanian Studies Society intends to continue inviting distinguished visitors from outside Tasmania, to improve our knowledge of Lithuania.



Gintė Damušis



Fr Alfonsas Svarinskas

## Lithuanian Studies Society

This book has been published in Australia by a students' association known as the *Lithuanian Studies Society* of Tasmania University Union.

The Society's central aim is to make Australians more aware of Lithuania and its heritage. Films and lectures on Lithuanian topics are presented at the University of Tasmania regularly during term. Workshops are arranged to demonstrate traditional Lithuanian crafts. Academic papers emanating from these activities are published annually in the Society's journal, *Lithuanian Papers*. Four volumes have been compiled in book form so far; the fifth volume will appear in 1992.

The Lithuanian Studies Society encourages and helps with research on all topics connected with Lithuania. Amanda Banks has recently completed a most successful Honours thesis on Lithuania's environmental problems and has been awarded First Class Honours for this work. Mrs Genovaitė Kazokas is now writing a Ph.D. thesis on Lithuanian artists in Australia, and several projects are in progress in the Faculty of Law.

Within its limited resources, the Society is also helping educational bodies in Lithuania. In August 1991, the Society combined with the University of Tasmania Library and despatched a gift of 400 books to Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas, Lithuania.

Established in 1987, the Tasmania University Union Lithuanian Studies Society now has 35 student members and 3 associate members. All financial members receive the quarterly English-language journal *Lituanus* (published in the U.S.) as well as the Society's own publications.

### Iron Wolf

The black iron wolf is the Society's logo. Its origins go back to the foundation of Vilnius, Lithuania's capital city, in the 14th century.

According to legend, Gediminas, the Grand Duke of Lithuania, dreamt of an iron wolf howling from a hilltop. This dream was interpreted as a message from the god of Thunder, Perkūnas, that a new city, large and famous, was to be built around that hill.

Grand Duke Gediminas went ahead with the project, then moved his headquarters from Kernavė to Vilnius. Today, Vilnius has a population of half a million.

## Notes on Contributors

Dr Kristina BRAZAITIS was a Lecturer in German at the University of Melbourne when she wrote the paper in this volume.

Bruce DAWE is one of Australia's leading contemporary poets.

Rev John W. DOYLE, SJ, BA, MACE is Dean of Studies at St John Fisher College, University of Tasmania.

Robert J. L. (Bob) HAWKE is the Prime Minister of Australia.

Lillemor LEWAN is Senior Lecturer in Biology at Lund University, Sweden. Her husband Nils LEWAN lectures in Geography at the same University.

Tom R. McGLYNN, MA (London) is Head of Geography and History at Alanvale College, Launceston.

Jūratė REILLY, BA, Dip Ed lives in Victoria and writes poetry in her spare time. Her first book, *Lithuanian Lady*, was published last year.

Algimantas P. TAŠKŪNAS, OAM, BCom (W.Aust.), BA Hons (Tas.), MEdAdmin (New England) is Executive Officer and Part-time Lecturer in Management, at the University of Tasmania.

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Vince TAŠKŪNAS is a young freelance poet. He lives in Kingston, Tasmania.

Victoria A. VITKŪNAS, BA (Adel.), RegCertLAA is a former subject librarian of Barr Smith Library, University of Adelaide (1966-1983).

The Most Rev Guilford C. YOUNG, KBE, DD, was the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Hobart and a brave champion of the Baltic cause, right to the day of his sudden death on March 16, 1988.

## Acknowledgements

In addition to the credits cited in the text, we gratefully acknowledge the following sources for the illustrations used in this volume:

Page 4 (lower map): BOURDEAUX, Michael, *Land of Crosses*. Devon: Augustine Publ, 1979.

Page 8: *Lithuania — Land of Hereos*. Ed Leonard VALIUKAS. Hollywood, Calif: Lithuanian Days Publishers, 1962.

Pages 12, 23, 29, 32, 37 — Original works by contemporary Lithuanian artist Vytautas K. Jonynas. Reproduced from: RANNIT, Aleksis, V. K. Jonynas.

Baden — Baden: Editions Arts et Sciences, 1947.

Page 19: *Tarybu Lietuva*.

Page 81 — Drawing by A. Kantvilas.

Page 89 — *Pasaulio Lietuvis*.



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BOURDEAUX, Michael, <i>Land of Crosses</i> : The struggle for religious freedom in Lithuania, 1939-1978. 339pp. Chulmleigh, Devon: Augustine Publishing Co, 1979.	8.95	3.00	11.95
BOURDEAUX, Lorna and Michael, <i>Ten Growing Soviet Churches</i> . MARC Europe and Keston College. 1987. 196pp. Normally \$5.95, reduced to	2.95	2.50	5.45
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WALTERS, Philip and BELENGARTH, Jane (comp), <i>Light through the Curtain</i> : Poland, Czechoslovakia, USSR, Romania — testaments of faith and courage. Icknield Way, Tring, Herts: Lion Paperback, 1985, 159pp. Normally \$6.95, now	4.95	2.50	7.45

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